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Abstract 
 In the years following the proclamation of the fatwa against him, Salman 
Rushdie has come to view the conflict of the Rushdie Affair not only in terms of a 
struggle between “Islam” and “the West”, but in terms of a “battle for the 
Enlightenment”.   Rushdie’s construction of himself as an Enlightened war-leader in 
the battle for a divided world has proved difficult for many critics to reconcile with 
the Rushdie who advocates “mongrelization” as a form of life-giving cultural 
hybridity.  This study suggests that these two Rushdies have been in dialogue since 
long before the fatwa.  It also suggests that eighteenth-century modes of writing and 
thinking about, and with, the Islamic East are far more integral to the literary worlds 
of Rushdie’s novels than has previously been realised.  This thesis maps patterns of 
rupture and of convergence between representations of the figures of the Islamic 
despot and the Muslim woman in Shame, The Satanic Verses, and Haroun and the 
Sea of Stories, and the changing ways in which these figures were instrumentalised 
in eighteenth-century European literatures.  Arguing that many of the harmful 
binaries that mark the way Rushdie and others think about Islam and the West 
hardened in the late eighteenth century, this study folds into the fable of the fatwa an 
account of European literary engagements with the Islamic world in the earlier part 
of the eighteenth century.  By complicating Rushdie’s monolithic Enlightenment 
with accounts of plural eighteenth centuries, Wests, and Islams, this thesis writes 
against the discourses of cultural incommensurability emblematised and catalysed by 
the Rushdie Affair. 
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Introduction 
Battle Lines and the Joined-up World 
 
 “Do we have to fight the battle for the Enlightenment all over again?” 
laments the headline of a 2005 Salman Rushdie article for the Independent.
1
 
“Democracy is not a tea party,” it continues, “In the end a fundamental decision has 
to be made: do we want to live in a free society or not?”.  The piece is protesting 
against the UK government’s Racial and Religious Hatred Act, which was later 
passed in 2006 – an “‘anschluss’ of liberal values in the face of resurgent religious 
demands”.  The battle for the Enlightenment, we are told:  
was about the church’s desire to place limits on thought. The 
Enlightenment wasn’t a battle against the state but against the church. 
Diderot’s novel La Religieuse, with its portrayal of nuns and their 
behaviour, was deliberately blasphemous: it challenged religious 
authority, with its indexes and inquisitions, on what it was possible to 
say. Most of our contemporary ideas about freedom of speech and 
imagination come from the Enlightenment. We may have thought the 
battle won, but if we aren’t careful, it is about to be “un-won”.2  
The bellicose rhetoric of the article proclaims this battle to be nothing less than the 
struggle for a free society, and yet the nature of the battle itself is slippery: the 
                                                          
1 Salman Rushdie, “Do we have to fight the battle for the Enlightenment all over again?” Independent, 
January 22, 2005, accessed January 24, 2011  
http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/salman-rushdie-do-we-have-to-fight-the-
battle-for-the-enlightenment-all-over-again-6154315.html  
2 Rushdie, “Enlightenment”. 
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Enlightenment, within the space of a few sentences, moves from being the cause 
over which the battle is fought to being the battle itself.  The thought-limiting force 
which this battle is to be waged against is no longer the Church but the British 
government  – and “[p]rivately,” he tells us in an aside, the government will “tell you 
the law is designed to please ‘the Muslims’”.3  This notion of a Muslim-pacifying 
agenda partially concealed by the government, and of the fatal effect on freedom of 
expression this entails, has become something of a post-9/11 leitmotif in Rushdie’s 
non-fiction.
4
  In the same way, casually sensationalist, uninterrogated rhetorical 
parallels between Nazi Germany and Muslim machinations, like his reference to the 
annexation of Austria above, have been slowly gathering force in his essays and 
articles since the time of the fatwa: a  flirtation with the discourse of Islamofascism 
brought to prominence by his friend Christopher Hitchens.
5
   
 This article begins with a despairing account of the devout Christianity of a 
group of Republican senators that Rushdie had met just before the beginning of the 
war in Iraq.  It is written from the same anecdotal, first-hand perspective that allows 
the “privately they’ll tell you” account of British government policy above, and is 
bolted uneasily to the account of Britain that forms the main body of the text with 
the assertion that this is “another ‘anschluss’ of liberal values”.6  Rushdie positions 
himself as both political confidante and whistle-blower: emerging from the corridors 
of power with a secularist call-to-arms for freedom of expression.  In the multivalent 
rhetoric of this, and many other non-fiction pieces written since the fatwa, and 
especially since 9/11, the Enlightenment becomes both the battle and the battled-for, 
                                                          
3 Rushdie, “Enlightenment”. 
4 See my discussion of Islamophobia in Joseph Anton in Chapter Six. 
5 See Christopher Hitchens, “Defending Islamofascism: It’s a valid term. Here’s why.” Slate, October 
22, 2007, accessed January 20, 2014. 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/fighting_words/2007/10/defending_islamofascis
m.html  I discuss this point in further detail in Chapter Six. 
6 Rushdie, “Enlightenment”. 
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and Rushdie both war leader and embodiment of the cause.  His own traumatic 
struggle for survival against the Ayatollah Khomeini’s fatwa in 1989 has, for him, 
enacted a kind of apotheosis, rendering him both incarnation of and spokesman for a 
set of abstract ideas about freedom of expression, secularism, and religious tolerance.  
These ideas form the core of Rushdie’s vision of the Enlightenment: an 
Enlightenment which, as I explore in Chaper Six, centres firmly on simplified 
notions about the work of certain French philosophes, and particularly Voltaire.  As 
Rushdie increasingly comes to view the twentieth and twenty-first century battle for 
freedom of expression against religious demands in terms of a battle for the 
Enlightenment, so, I will suggest, he comes to view himself as the successor to his 
eighteenth-century incarnation of Enlightenment:  Rushdie begins to invent himself 
as the new Voltaire.  The distance between Rushdie’s idea of Voltaire, and the 
historical Voltaire is great – although, as I explore in my parallel reading of The 
Satanic Verses and Voltaire’s Mahomet in Chapter Four, their discursive uses of 
Islam overlap in places – and it is worth noting here that in view of Voltaire’s 
writings on war, he would be unlikely to approve of being mobilised in this battle 
rhetoric.
7
  
 In Joseph Anton, his memoir of the fatwa years, Rushdie writes that his “real 
subject, the one he would worry away at for the rest of his life,” is “the great matter 
of how the world joined up, not only how the East flowed into the West and the West 
into the East, but how the past shaped the present while the present changed our 
understanding of the past”.8  This, too, is my subject, although I am as interested in 
the disconnects in Rushdie’s work between past and present, and between ideas of 
                                                          
7 See, for example, his account of war in the entry on “Good. Of Good and Evil, Physical and Moral” 
in Voltaire, A Philosophical Dictionary, trans. John G. Gorton (London: John and Henry Lunt, 
1824) Vol. 3, 361.  
8 Rushdie, Joseph Anton: a Memoir (London: Jonathan Cape, 2012), 68-69 (Rushdie’s emphasis). 
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“West” and “East” as I am in the ways in which they join up.  The dissonance 
between Rushdie’s worlds – the joined-up world and the world divided by battle-
lines – is one of the central characteristics of his entire oeuvre.  His earlier writings 
are still used, in undergraduate courses on postcolonial or global literatures, as a 
means of exemplifying (problematic) ideas about cultural hybridity and 
cosmopolitanism – often through the study of Midnight’s Children and Haroun and 
the Sea of Stories.  These writings celebrating cross-cultural fertilization have, for 
many, proved difficult to reconcile with the pro-USA, anti-Islam stance that has 
marked much of his non-fiction writing since 9/11.
9
  This has led to a curious 
dualism where perceptions of Rushdie are concerned: he is simultaneously lauded as 
a champion of cultural hybridity, and recognised as one of the most prominent voices 
in a discourse of cultural incommensurability between Islam and West.  It is 
significant that even whilst charting the flow of the joined-up world, Rushdie 
habitually writes in terms of East and West.  This dichotomy remains a constant 
throughout his career, though the ideas associated with these terms undergo 
substantial changes. More than anything, the “battle” in the title of this study is a 
battle for definition, and its pages chart the jostling of plural Rushdies, 
Enlightenments, Islams, and Wests.   
 In addition to a shift in his politics over the course of his career, there seems, 
at first glance, to be a genre divide at work: as Edward Said remarked in 2003, 
“[t]here’s a greater disconnect between his non-fictional prose and his fiction, now, 
than there was in the decade of the 1980s”.10  This is, to an extent, true, and it is 
                                                          
9 For an influential early critique of Rushdie’s cosmopolitanism see Timothy Brennan, Salman 
Rushdie and the Third World: Myths of the Nation (London: Macmillan Press, 1989). 
10 Midnight’s Children Festival Events, “A Dialogue with Edward Said”, YouTube video, 1:28:39, 
posted by “columbiauniversity”, March 5, 2003, accessed June 7, 2014, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gb9Ny-41C_I . 
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important to think about this generic division both in terms of what Rushdie 
condemns and what he valorises. Over the course of the ten years of essays and 
criticism compiled in his 1991 collection Imaginary Homelands, beside his 
passionate invocations of transculturation, there are, among other things, powerful 
indictments of the racism of 1980s Britain, British imperial nostalgia, and Hindu 
fundamentalism in India, as well as his first pieces contesting the pro-Khomeini 
Islamic responses to the fatwa.  Whilst I discuss this critical strain at length in 
Chapter Six, it is worth noting here that Rushdie’s critiques of injustice in the 1980s 
and early 1990s range widely across national, cultural, racial, and religious borders.  
It is, of course, still true that Rushdie’s dissent ranges beyond an opposition to Islam: 
in the article above, for example, it takes in the British government as well as the 
Muslims it seeks to placate, the Christianity of the Republicans as well as the Sikhs 
rioting over Gurpreet Kaur Bhatti’s play, Behzti. Over time, however, the criticism of 
conservative Islam in his non-fiction moves from its being one form of despotism 
amongst many to its being a form of ur-despotism.  In the years after 9/11, even the 
qualifiers of “conservative” Islam or “Islamism” begin to give way to an unashamed 
condemnation of Islam itself.  So far, little of this account of Rushdie’s politics 
moves beyond what might be seen as a broad critical consensus.
11
  I will argue, 
however, that not only can this move towards placing Islam at the top of a global 
index of despotism be traced in his fiction, but its roots go as far back as Shame, 
published in 1983, and arguably even to Midnight’s Children, in 1980.   
 Although his thoughts had been tending in this direction for some years, a 
crucial binary between positive multiplicity and negative singularity crystallises for 
                                                          
11 See, for example, Sabina Sawhney and Simona Sawhney, “Introduction: Reading Rushdie after 
September 11, 2001”, Twentieth Century Literature 47, no. 4, “Salman Rushdie” (2001): 431-443.  
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Rushdie in the first years after the fatwa.   In the essay “In Good Faith,” written in 
defence of The Satanic Verses (1988), he states that: 
 [t]hose who oppose the novel most vociferously today are of the opinion 
that intermingling with a different culture will inevitably weaken and 
ruin their own. I am of the opposite opinion. The Satanic Verses 
celebrates hybridity, impurity, intermingling, the transformation that 
comes of new and unexpected combinations of human beings, cultures, 
ideas, politics, movies, songs. It rejoices in mongrelization and fears the 
absolutism of the Pure... The Satanic Verses is for change-by-fusion, 
change-by-conjoining. It is a love-song to our mongrel selves.
12
 
It is this binary, “mongrelisation” versus “the absolutism of the Pure”, which, I will 
argue, offers us the means of charting Rushdie’s seemingly oppositional views of a 
joined-up world and a world riven by battle lines.
13
  It also offers an important 
insight into the different ways in which the starkening geo-political visions 
expressed in his non-fictional prose may be at work in the richer, more elusive 
textual worlds of his novels. 
 As concerned with the cultural functions of Rushdie’s responses to Islam as 
with the texts themselves, this study takes as its core texts the novels which play the 
most pivotal parts in his changing relationship with the religion, and in the world’s 
changing cultural and political reactions to the author.  Part I deals with Shame, 
Rushdie’s first novel in which his notion of despotic Islam finds full utterance, and 
Part II examines The Satanic Verses: the text in which this conception of Islam 
                                                          
12  Rushdie, “In Good Faith”, Imaginary Homelands: Essays and Criticism 1981-1991 (London: 
Granta Books, 1991), 394. 
13 Rushdie, “Faith”, Homelands, 394. 
7 
 
becomes a globalised metaphor for “the absolutism of the Pure” – and the book 
which triggered Khomeini’s fatwa.  Part III then reads Haroun and the Sea of Stories 
as a post-fatwa text and a modulation of the previous two novels’ constructions of 
Islam as the anti-mongrel, before the thesis concludes with an analysis of The 
Enchantress of Florence as a partial return to positive mongrelisation after the bleak 
visions of the death of hybridity in The Moor’s Last Sigh, The Ground Beneath Her 
Feet, Fury, and Shalimar the Clown.   
 From as early as his first novel, Grimus, published in 1975, the idea of the 
conflict of “mongrel” and “pure” has been a central theme, as has the attendant 
struggle of the mongrel self to find utterance amongst the rigidity of “pure” religious 
and cultural identities. “All that is Unaxona is Unclean,” says the god/dess Axona to 
the hero Flapping Eagle when he confronts her in a vision. “Is it to commit sacrilege 
upon this holy place that you come, whiteskin, paleface, mongrel amongst the pure, 
traitor to your race, is it to commit your supreme act of defilement that you 
come?”.14  “[W]hen I defile you,” Flapping Eagle says before he rapes her, “I am 
cleansed… of the guilt and shame that possessed some hidden part of my mind”.15  
This strange and brutal act of misogynist iconoclasm (and I examine Rushdie’s 
treatment of women in Chapters One and Two) constitutes one of the first instances 
of a pattern that runs throughout his corpus:  blasphemy as the wresting of freedom 
of expression from mind-controlling religious despotism.  It is the pattern described 
in Rushdie’s summary of his idea of the Enlightenment in the article above: it “was 
about the church’s desire to place limits on thought… [it] was deliberately 
blasphemous: it challenged religious authority, with its indexes and inquisitions, on 
                                                          
14 Rushdie, Grimus, (London: Vintage Books, 1997), 99.  
15 Rushdie, Grimus, 102. 
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what it was possible to say”.16  This fight for freedom of expression against religious 
despotism is inextricably linked, for Rushdie, with the struggle of the mongrel 
against the pure, the multitudinous against the singular, the heteroglossic against the 
monoglossic.  What he later terms “the battle for the Enlightenment” is partly the 
battle for the joined-up world that he has waged throughout his literary career.  
Paradoxically, as this battle has raged, his rhetoric has essentialised the foe to the 
point where it has, itself, shut down the possibilities of mongrelization where Islam 
is concerned.  
 In Midnight’s Children, when the Sinai family move to Pakistan we are told  
Saleem’s parents said, ‘We must all become new people’; in the land of 
the pure, purity became our ideal.  But Saleem was forever tainted with 
Bombayness, his head was full of all sorts of religions apart from Allah’s 
(like India’s first Muslims, the mercantile Moplas of Malabar, I had lived 
in a country whose population of deities rivalled the numbers of its 
people, so that, in unconscious revolt against the claustrophobic throng 
of deities, my family had espoused the ethics of business, not faith).
17
 
 Just as it does in the essays collected in Imaginary Homelands, the despotism 
ranged against the hybrid community of Saleem and the other thousand children of 
midnight has many faces, not least the lingering hegemony of the British Empire and 
the communalist violence of the “fanatical anti-Muslim movement” Ravana, and 
perhaps most memorably that of Indira Gandhi, “the Widow”.18  As Rachel 
Trousdale reminds us, “[f]rom Midnight’s Children onwards, Rushdie is concerned 
                                                          
16 Rushdie, “Enlightenment”. 
17 Rushdie, Midnight’s Children (London: Vintage, 1995), 310. 
18 Rushdie, Midnight’s Children, 72. 
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with the Nehruvian secular pluralist ideal (and its international pluralist correlates) 
and its Indian political counterweight, Hindu nationalism”.19  Hindu nationalist 
despotism in India is, beside Islam, one of the forces against which Rushdie writes 
most passionately – here and in The Moor’s Last Sigh in particular – and it is my 
regret that the scope of this study does not allow more of a comparative analysis of 
his representations of the two dominant religions of the Subcontinent.  It is worth 
considering, however, that where the polytheistic nature of Hinduism allows Rushdie 
to riff on pluralism – as with passages like the one above, where gods outnumber 
people – the monotheistic nature of Islam provides almost a ready-made metaphor 
for despotic singularity, as does the fact that in Urdu and Persian “Pakistan” means 
“Land of the Pure”.20  As I discuss in Chapter Three, Rushdie’s celebratory accounts 
of Islamic communities in India, and especially in Bombay, in works from the 1980s 
tend to centre on the kind of mixture of mercantile cosmopolitanism and inter-
religious tolerance Saleem describes above.  In the mongrel air of India, it seems, 
Islam as an intermingling cultural force can function as an enriching influence but 
only when its singularity, and indeed its religiosity, is adulterated by the religious 
cultures around it.  Though it appears less regularly in his twenty-first-century 
accounts of Islam, this idea does persist: “[t]he Muslim population in India is, largely 
speaking, not radicalised,” he says in a 2006 interview, “[f]rom the beginning they 
were always very secular-minded”.21  As I explore later in this introduction, this 
cosmopolitan Islam – very much bound up with Kashmir as well as Bombay – is 
                                                          
19
 Rachel Trousdale, “‘City of Mongrel Joy’: Bombay and the Shiv Sena in Midnight’s Children and 
The Moor’s Last Sigh”, The Journal of Commonwealth Literature 39 (2004): 95-110, 96. 
20
 Believed to be first used by Choudhary Rahmat Ali in a 1933 pamphlet titled “Now or Never”, in 
Pakistan Movement Historical Documents, G. Allana, (Karachi: Department of International 
Relations, University of Karachi, nd [1969]): 103-110. Accessed October 17, 2014, 
http://www.columbia.edu/itc/mealac/pritchett/00islamlinks/txt_rahmatali_1933.html . 
21 Johann Hari, “Salman Rushdie: his life, his work, and his religion”, Independent, October 13, 2006, 
accessed May 14, 2014,  http://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/profiles/salman-rushdie-his-
life-his-work-and-his-religion-419902.html . 
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folded into Rushdie’s idea of the hybrid-as-past, and dislocated from his critique of 
Islam by virtue of its secularism. 
 The creation of Pakistan in Midnight’s Children is figured as the defeat of 
pluralism and the triumph of despotic singularity: Mian Abdullah’s Free Islam 
Convocation – “a loosely federated alternative to the dogmatism and vested 
interests” of the pro-Partition Muslim League – falls after Abdullah “the 
Hummingbird” is murdered, in an act steeped in Islamic symbolism.22 “Six new 
moons came into the room, six crescent knives held by men dressed all in black, with 
covered faces”.23  Rushdie’s play on the etymology of “Pakistan” is echoed by his 
instrumentalisation of a partial (in both senses) translation of “Islam” as 
“submission,” rather than “submission to the will of God”.  Thus it becomes 
“Pakistan, the land of submission, the home of purity” – the antithesis, the 
implication goes, to its vibrant mongrel neighbour.  Whilst I trace his complex 
mapping of ideas about Islam, despotism, and the oppression of women onto 
Pakistan in Shame in Chapters One and Two, it is important to register here the 
steady crystallisation of Islam as the ultimate form of “the absolutism of the Pure” in 
Rushdie’s oeuvre, even before the fatwa.  
 Rushdie’s conception of despotic Islam – in line with most strands of 
Islamophobic thought – hinges partly on the idea of its oppression of women.  As 
Leila Ahmed wrote in 1982, 
[j]ust as Americans ‘know’ that Arabs are backward, they know also 
with the same flawless certainty that Muslim women are terribly 
oppressed and degraded.  And they know this not because they know that 
                                                          
22 Rushdie, Midnight’s Children, 46. 
23 Rushdie, Midnight’s Children, 47. 
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women everywhere in the world are oppressed, but because they believe 
that, specifically, Islam monstrously oppresses women.
24
 
 As I argue in Chapters One and Two, this pervasive idea is, in large part, the legacy 
of eighteenth-century stadial views of history which use the relative positions of 
women in different societies as a means of creating an index of civilizational 
progress.  The notion of the Islamic world as backward – historically removed from 
the West – is something that Rushdie often plays on.  Couching his ideas about a 
conflict between Islam and the West in terms of a battle for the Enlightenment 
positions the Islamic world a good three hundred years behind the Western world – 
and this historical gulf between cultural hemispheres is widened by Rushdie’s 
participation in the formation of the cliché of Islamic cultures being not only 
opposed to modernity, but medieval.  Early on in Shame he writes 
[a]ll this happened in the fourteenth century.  I’m using the Hegerian 
calendar, naturally: don’t imagine that stories of this type always take 
place longlong [sic] ago.  Time cannot be homogenized as easily as milk, 
and in those parts, until quite recently, the thirteen-hundreds were still in 
full swing.
25
  
 This manoeuvre, which I will identify again and again in Rushdie’s novels, is an 
ironic wink at the reader: a postmodern get-out clause designed to highlight his 
awareness of the negatively charged cultural discourse in which he’s participating, 
and thus distance himself from it.  These gestures, I will argue, do not sufficiently 
combat the reinscription of the view of Islam which Ahmed describes above.  
                                                          
24 Leila Ahmed, “Western Ethnocentrism and Perceptions of the Harem”, Feminist Studies 8, no. 3 
(Autumn, 1982): 521-534, 522. 
25 Rushdie, Shame, (London: Jonathan Cape Ltd, 1983), 13. 
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Indeed, they generally mark the passages of his novels which promulgate anti-
Islamic ideas most powerfully.  
 Whilst invocations of unhistorical ideas of the Enlightenment in discourses of 
difference between Islam and the West first gather force from Rushdie and his 
supporters in the years following the fatwa, Rushdie’s conceptions of Islamic 
cultures and the modes in which he represents them had been shaped by eighteenth-
century ideas about the Islamic world long before.  The Eurocentric identification of 
ideas about freedom of speech, tolerance, and secularism as being of eighteenth-
century European provenance is open to question, and I argue that the array of 
negative ideas about Islam martialled by Rushdie and others can be far more reliably 
traced to Enlightenment Europe.  Rather than merely traversing the important 
historiographical arc drawn by Said in Orientalism, however, this study joins with 
the work of scholars like Ziad Elmarsafy, Humberto Garcia, and Srinivas 
Aravamudan to recover an eighteenth century in which increasing knowledge of 
Islamic cultures, and a burgeoning tendency to use Islam as a means of thinking 
about Europe, engendered a series of cultural metamorphoses which gave rise to 
many of the discourses which Rushdie figures as antithetical to Islam.  By looking at 
eighteenth-century cultural responses to the Islamic world, I not only chart the 
crystallisation of negative ideas about Islam, like the oppression of its women and 
the despotism of its men, but work to elide what Garcia terms “the imaginary 
opposition between Islam and Enlightenment”.26   
 
Rushdie’s Eighteenth Centuries 
                                                          
26
 Humberto Garcia, Islam and the English Enlightenment: 1670-1840 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2012), 223. 
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 In an interview with Una Chaudhuri in 1983, Rushdie remarked “I’m very 
keen on the eighteenth century in general, not just in literature.  I think the eighteenth 
century was the great century”.27  This early-career avowal of his interest in – and 
affection for – the eighteenth century has not gone unremarked by critics.  And yet, 
for the most part, attention has centred on the eighteenth century as a source of 
literary influence – for example Clement Hawes’s excellent essay on Tristram 
Shandy and Midnight’s Children.28  This is an interesting avenue of research, and 
there is a great deal more work to be done on unpicking the many vital intertexts 
between Rushdie and the eighteenth century.  His notebooks are saturated with 
references to eighteenth-century texts – including, in an early journal from 1974, 
several lists of works by eighteenth-century authors including Defoe, Pope, Swift, 
Sterne, and Blake – all with little ticks beside them, implying the conscious 
construction of a programme of reading.
29
  One of the earliest items in the archive is 
Rushdie’s prize-winning school essay of 1964, about the late-eighteenth-century 
French diplomat Talleyrand, which shows an extraordinarily detailed knowledge of 
European history of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic eras – youthful 
research that bubbles up again over twenty years later, with references to the French 
Revolution in Shame, and Talleyrand himself in The Satanic Verses.
30
   
 All of this indicates a deep, longstanding artistic and intellectual engagement 
with the eighteenth century, but beyond that, a very personal engagement with 
certain figures and discourses of this period that becomes inextricably, and vitally, 
bound up with the volatile dialectic of the Rushdie Affair – both for Rushdie himself, 
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 Una Chaudhuri, “Imaginative Maps: Excerpts from a Conversation with Salman Rushdie”, 
Turnstile Vol. 2, no. 1 (1990): 36-47. [Interview conducted 1983] 
28 Clement Hawes,“Leading History by the Nose: The Turn to the Eighteenth Century in Midnight’s 
Children”, MFS Modern Fiction Studies 39, no. 1, (Spring 1993): 147-168. 
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 Rushdie, Journals, Box 212, Folder 3, 1974-1978, Salman Rushdie Papers, Manuscript, Archives, 
and Rare Book Library, Emory University. 
30 Rushdie, Shame, 240; Rushdie, The Satanic Verses (London, Vintage: 1998), 205. 
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and for his commentators.  In an impassioned note on an undated early typescript of 
The Ground Beneath Her Feet in the Salman Rushdie Papers at the Manuscripts, 
Archives, and Rare Books library at Emory University is this eighteenth-century-
inflected anticipation of Joseph Anton: “[t]he autobiography.  Transcend the tittle-
tattle obsessions of the Rushdie affair by the honesty of the bared soul.  Conceal 
nothing, nothing.  Do not spare myself or anyone else.  The honesty of the book, its 
revelatory insanity, like Rousseau’s Confessions. 101% truth”.31 In a 2005 interview 
he says of the fatwa years: “I found myself reading Enlightenment writers—
Voltaire—and realizing that I was not the only writer who’d had a hard time. It may 
seem ridiculously romantic, but I was actually strengthened by the history of 
literature”.32  As I suggest in the final section of this study, we should pay close 
attention to the way in which a certain historiography of the eighteenth century, 
telescoped into the term “Enlightenment,” is becoming increasingly central to the 
way in which Rushdie sees the Rushdie Affair, the conflict between Secular West 
and Islamic East, and, crucially, himself.   
 It seems significant that the Enlightenment to which Rushdie appeals so 
frequently in the years after the publication of The Satanic Verses and the declaration 
of the fatwa is so firmly oriented around the philosophes – the thinkers of the 
Continental Enlightenment.  It is possible that this is the product of his study of 
history at Cambridge in the late 1960s, a time when influential works by Norman 
Hampson and Peter Gay propounded a historiography of Enlightenment centred on 
the conflict between thinkers like Diderot, Rousseau –  and of course Voltaire – and 
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 Jack Livings, “Salman Rushdie, The Art of Fiction No. 186”, The Paris Review, no. 174, (Summer 
2005), accessed 24
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the Monarchy and Church.33  Had more recent work, inclined to pluralise 
Enlightenment and think in terms of cultural dialogues between European and 
Islamic worlds, been available in the late 1960s, it is possible that a very different 
fable of Enlightenment might have been woven into the saga of the fatwa: a fable far 
more akin to Rushdie’s celebrations of mongrelization than to the essentialist West-
and-Rest discourse that has come to mark his recent writings. 
 Whilst Rushdie’s eighteenth-century intertexts are not my primary concern, I 
will conduct an extensive analysis of the role that a text – or parcel of texts – 
partially of eighteenth-century provenance plays in both Rushdie’s oeuvre and in 
wider Western perceptions and representations of the Islamic world: the Arabian 
Nights.  His career is bookended with allusions to these tales, from the 1001 children 
of midnight that first shot him to fame, to “The Trillion and One Forking Paths” of 
Luka and the Fire of Life, published in 2010.
34
  With its emphasis on the life-giving 
power of narrative, and the significance of narrative multiplicity over destructive 
despotic monoglossia, Rushdie’s work constantly engages, both directly and 
indirectly, with the figures of Scheherazade and the sultan Schahriar.  As the most 
influential fictional Muslims in Western culture – and arguably, as I shall 
demonstrate, in some Islamic cultures – and themselves emblems of (changing) 
discourses of Islamic despotism, Islamic misogyny, and Islamic female 
empowerment, they are central to my account of both Rushdie’s and the West’s 
engagements with Islam.  
 Home to migrant narratives from across South Asia, the Middle East, and 
North Africa, the collection of texts that Antoine Galland translated into French in 
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 See Peter Gay, The Enlightenment: An Interpretation (New York: Norton, 1969), and Norman 
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Penguin Books, 1968). 
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the early eighteenth century was a textual cosmopolis that had been borne across 
national, religious, and cultural boundaries for centuries before it fell into his hands, 
and it took its place at the heart of European cultural life.  Though Galland’s 
translation of the Alf Laylah wa-Laylah was published, serendipitously, in the midst 
of a craze for fairy tales in both the French and British courts, the obsession with the 
Arabian Nights in the eighteenth century was not based merely on an appetite for the 
fabulous, but on forms of curiosity about and desire for the cultures of the East – a 
desire which was, in turn, based on mercantile and diplomatic exchanges.  Though 
the text’s popularity has often been understood in terms of the axis of dominance 
Said describes in Orientalism, in recent years there has been a critical move towards 
re-evaluating the position of the Arabian Nights and the flood of oriental tales they 
inspired, with scholars such as Aravamudan and Ros Ballaster arguing that they 
occupy a much more complex cultural and formal position in eighteenth-century 
Britain than has previously been realised.    
The focus on realism that characterised so many influential twentieth-century 
studies on the rise of the novel, like that of Ian Watt, tended, explicitly or implicitly, 
to marginalise the Arabian Nights and oriental tales to the status of frivolous pieces 
of exotica, and followers in Said’s footsteps have viewed them as early steps in a 
process of hegemonic orientalism.  However, Aravamudan makes a compelling case, 
in his essay “In the Wake of the Novel,” for the “infra-literary or para-novelistic 
prose form of the oriental tale” to be considered “a counter-example to the English 
domestic realist novel”.35  Looking at oriental tales as forms of transnational 
allegory, he suggests that, freed from “realist posturing,” they are “formally anchored 
within international networks of an imagined cultural exchange across geographical 
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 Srinivas Aravamudan, “In the Wake of the Novel: The Oriental Tale as National Allegory”, 
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and historical distance.  Antiquarian and orientalist knowledge enable a premodern 
cosmopolitanism that illuminates local conditions for what they are”.36   In 
“Fiction/Translation/Transnation”, he suggests we could view them as “the 
multitudinous outside excluded by acts of enclosure around the novel”.37  Already 
this (inter-)cultural zone begins to bear a close resemblance to the kind of territory in 
which Rushdie’s oeuvre tries to position itself – a translational in-between space in 
which the commingling of cultures leads to a vital, extra-national newness.  It 
suggests a further generic similarity in terms of Rushdie’s use of magical realism (a 
genre fascinated with Scheherazade from its genesis) as a means of moving outside 
of a novelistic tradition saturated with a Eurocentric worldview.38 
Ballaster goes a step further by writing that the act of reading the Arabian 
Nights and oriental tales might itself entail a process of being borne across, “might... 
be figured as a kind of transmigration: the projection of the reader’s ‘spirit’ into the 
place/space/time of an ‘other’ or many ‘others,’ which requires a constant shifting of 
consciousness and perspective that transforms the reading self in the process”.39  
Whilst this notion of transformative reading might lay itself open to accusations of 
utopianism, there is certainly a sense of openness between cultures at work in the 
way in which the East was consumed and ventriloquised by Britain and France.  That 
there was, because of the number of oriental tales in the early-to-mid eighteenth 
century, a familiar (textual) oriental cultural zone which readers entered in order to 
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glean fragments of knowledge about oriental cultures as well as to find shards of 
European political commentary even suggests a blurring of national-cultural 
boundaries. “Enlightenment Orientalism,” Aravamudan suggests, “was very much an 
imaginative Orientalism, circulating images of the East that were nine parts invented 
and one part referential”.40  Whilst I return to the overlap of invented and referential 
representation of the East in Section II, there can be little doubt that there is a 
powerful sense at the beginning of the eighteenth century of what Said tentatively 
calls “selective identification with regions and cultures not one’s own”.41 
 This sense of an international, inter-cultural reading-space is fleshed out by 
the hybridity of the text itself: the Arabian Nights is emblematic of a premodern 
cosmopolitanism not only in terms of the inter-cultural encounter it provided the 
eighteenth-century European reader, but also in terms of its genesis as a cultural 
artefact, with its migrant narratives travelling along trade routes from India and 
North Africa, and in terms of the instances of cultural hybridity which appear within 
the stories themselves.  Many of the tales present the great cities of the medieval 
Middle East as cosmopolitan melting-pots, centring on the activities of merchants as 
they trade in goods from across the world and, with narratives like “The 
Hunchback,” creating a picture of a multiplicity of faiths living inter-connected 
amongst one another. 
 
A Return to History 
 For Rushdie, even if he was not aware of the full richness of eighteenth-
century responses to the Arabian Nights, the 1001 tales proved invaluable as “the 
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very essence of multiplicity” in Midnight’s Children and in The Satanic Verses, with 
frequent short-hand references like the “thousand and one chameleon changes of 
allegiance and principle” of the diplomat Talleyrand, or “the thousand and one 
dreams… [with] the terrifying quality of being serial, each one following on from the 
one the night before” that the migrant communities of London dream of Chamcha.42  
Beyond this, in Haroun and the Sea of Stories, as I explore in detail in Chapter Five, 
this narrative conceit of the Arabian Nights as a marker of hybrid multiplicity wells 
up and saturates the text in the form of the waters of the Great Story Sea, “made up 
of a thousand, thousand, thousand and one different currents”.43   
 Despite the centrality of the Arabian Nights to Rushdie’s oeuvre, both as a 
touchstone for cultural multiplicity and, in the form of Scheherazade’s struggle with 
Schahriar, a paradigm for the battle of mongrelization against the absolutism of the 
Pure, he rarely ventures into the rich contextual seas which critics like Aravamudan 
and Ballaster are navigating around the tales.   Whilst postcolonial theory has tended 
to conceive of hybridity – or, as Rushdie has it, mongrelization – as a contemporary 
lens through which to examine twentieth- and twenty-first century cultural 
phenomena such as migration and globalisation, much of the recent bloom in global 
eighteenth-century scholarship described above implicitly situates hybridity as a 
characteristic of early- or pre-colonial contact between peoples.44   
“[T]he inscription and articulation of culture’s hybridity”, Homi Bhabha 
asserts in The Location of Culture, is in “conceptualizing an international culture, 
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based not on the exoticism of multiculturalism or the diversity of cultures”.45  
Pioneered in the nineties by Bhabha and Robert Young, hybridity has become an 
integral part of the fabric of postcolonialism.46 Dennis Walder’s is a typical 
assessment of the discourse, defining it as “ideas of cross-fertilization, of the 
potential richness of traffic between and across boundaries,” and suggesting that it 
“can return postcolonial theorising to a more celebratory, even… liberatory mode”.47  
Though hybridity and multiculturalism have been problematised as discursive 
structures which retain and re-inscribe the conception of cultures as discrete, 
incommensurable entities, a sense of futurity and optimism has permeated much of 
the theorisation of hybridity by postcolonial scholars.48  Even in discussions of the 
fundamentally hybrid nature of culture itself, such as Bhabha’s formulation “[i]t is 
the ‘inter’ – the cutting edge of translation and negotiation, the in between space – 
that carries the burden of the meaning of culture”, hybridity remains a cultural 
strategy for the future as much as a lens through which to examine existent cultural 
phenomena49.  Hybridity, it is implied, is an idea born of our age of globalisation and 
migration: for Bhabha, it is implicitly linked to twentieth-century migrant borderline 
communities, just as for R. Radhakrishnan, for example, it is an “unprecedented 
‘becoming’” situated in the (migrant’s) space “between ‘having been 
deterritorialized’ and ‘awaiting to be reterritorialized’”.50  Celebrated as a late 
twentieth century phenomenon, there have been few attempts within the postcolonial 
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academy to source, or even ground, theorisations of hybridity in the past.  
Successful hybridity in Rushdie, however, is almost always an historical 
rather than a contemporary, phenomenon. Rushdie’s vision of hybridity – the 
“intermingling... [the] mongrelization... the change-by-fusion, change-by-
conjoining” he advocates in “In Good Faith” – whilst always embattled, became, in 
the post-fatwa years, with novels like The Moor’s Last Sigh and The Ground Beneath 
Her Feet, a thing of elegies: a dream fading into history.51  In Shalimar the Clown, 
permeated as it is with memories of the Second World War, terrorism, and religious 
conflict, the heart of the novel is Kashmir, a ruined paradise of hybridity “not so 
much lost,” as the publisher’s blurb says, “but smashed”.52  The symbolic marriage 
of Islam and Hinduism in the persons of Boonyi and Shalimar is ripped apart 
(partially through US-intervention), and the “mongrel” offspring of Max and Boonyi 
left in the dark, pointing an arrow at an avatar of hatred, forged in the fires of inter-
cultural conflict.  Hybridity, no longer a dream melancholically fading away, is an 
ideal visibly ravaged in front of the reader. 
 After such darkness, the dazzling celebration of cross-cultural fertilisation 
that is The Enchantress of Florence comes as something as a surprise.  Hailed by 
many reviewers as a piece of political escapism – joyous, disappointing, or irritating, 
according to taste – Rushdie fed this sense of an Orwellian retreat into the whale of 
fantasy in many early interviews.  “I’m feeling less political than I used to,” he told 
the Times, “I’ve spent so much of my life talking about these issues which take on 
the times we live in very directly.  I’ve had enough of that for a bit”.53  Such 
statements are perhaps rather disingenuous.  Certainly, whilst the tissue of fantasy 
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running through the text is strong enough to tilt its genre more towards the magical 
than the realist, Rushdie is emphatic in his assertions that this is the novel which has 
involved the most historical research – a point underlined by his inclusion of a 
lengthy bibliography at the end of the book.  The Enchantress of Florence, as I will 
argue in my conclusion, marks a powerful return to history: a plunge into the kind of 
culturally in-between space that the Arabian Nights occupies, not merely as a means 
of throwing the non-hybrid present into greater relief, but as a hopeful (though 
problematic) assertion that, as Rushdie’s friend William Dalrymple puts it, East and 
West “have met and mingled in the past; and they will do so again”.54   
 
Thesis Outline 
 As I have shown, with the doubleness of its inheritance from Eastern and 
Western cultures, frequent references to the Arabian Nights throughout Rushdie’s 
fiction function as an exemplar of his notion of redemptive mongrelization as 
“change-by-fusion, change-by-conjoining”.55  It is significant, then, that in Shame, 
his novel which engages most deeply with the lavish, problematic tropes of 
orientalist fiction, references to the Arabian Nights and its heroine Scheherazade 
should be more muted, more subtly encrypted, than in any of his other works.  In the 
first section, on Shame and Scheherazade, I unpack this muting and Shame’s 
problematic feminist project in dialogue with the complex shifts in the representation 
of Islamic women in Europe over the course of the long eighteenth century.  Itself 
migrating between centuries and geo-cultural hemispheres, this section charts the 
rise of Scheherazade and the Eastern-Islamic space she occupies as a key to 
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exploring new feminist territories outside the bounds of normative patriarchal social 
structures in the first part of the eighteenth century, and her subsequent fall into 
voicelessness.  The late-century axis of what Joyce Zonana has termed “feminist 
orientalism” in the work of authors such as Mary Wollstonecraft reversed the East-
to-West flow of female emancipation, using the harem as a stage on which to 
explore, amongst other things, the despotism of (European) men rather than the 
agency of women.  My reading of Shame as a continuation of this West-to-East 
feminist orientalism offers both an historical and cultural repositioning of the text, 
and a meditation on the Western-centrism of dominant feminist discourses.  It also 
examines Scheherazade’s (re)emergence in the last fifty years as a figurehead for 
discourses of Islamic female empowerment that seek to position themselves outside 
certain Western-delineated channels of secular feminism. 
 In the second section I turn to the mobile figure of Islamic despotism in The 
Satanic Verses, in the Rushdie Affair, and in the eighteenth century.  The journalistic 
tendency, in the furore of the Rushdie Affair, to reduce The Satanic Verses to a 
simple binary battle between Western freedom and Islamic despotism has been justly 
lamented by postcolonial critics.  Much of the controversy surrounding the novel 
centres on the dream sequences that take place in the city of Jahilia, Rushdie’s 
fictionalisation of pre- and early-Islamic Mecca.  As Rushdie has stated on numerous 
occasions, the three cities of The Satanic Verses, Bombay, London and Jahilia, are 
one – the outlines of the two postcolonial metropolises and the fictionalised 
medieval Middle-Eastern city shimmering in and out of one another as hybrid selves 
and communities are embattled by the various faces of despotic absolutism (Hindu 
fundamentalism, Mrs Torture, and Mahound).  Where Bombay and London are 
anchored in the “realities” of contemporary inter-cultural politics, however, Jahilia is 
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the text’s ideological battleground – the locale for a fable of despotic singularity 
versus multiplicity which spirals out to inform and determine the conflicts of the two 
modern cities. 
 Here, I read Rushdie’s use of a fictionalised early Mecca and the birth of 
Islam as a metonym for despotism, alongside Voltaire’s metonymic construction of 
early-Islamic Mecca in his 1736 play Mahomet.  Complicating “Saidian” readings of 
eighteenth-century European representations of Islam as vilified Other, I examine the 
pre-/early-colonial use of the figure of Islamic despotism as a means of addressing 
the despotism of the Catholic Church and French and British political systems.  In 
reading Rushdie’s mobilisation of Jahilia and the figure of Mahound in the light of 
the complex discursive manoeuvres of Voltaire’s representation of “Mahomet” and 
Mecca, I seek both to illuminate the subtle and problematic mechanisms of the 
deployment of Islam in The Satanic Verses, and to complicate and historicise the 
monolithic figure of Islamic despotism that has been invoked so often in the Rushdie 
Affair. 
 After this examination of Rushdie’s two pre-fatwa “Islam” novels, I move on 
to the aftermath of Khomeini’s proclamation itself.  The third and final section reads 
Haroun and the Sea of Stories in the light of the (historical) discourses of despotism 
and oppression explored in the first two sections.  Examining the doubleness of 
Rushdie’s literary sources, the way in which he instrumentalises the Arabian Nights 
and Farid ud-Din Attar’s The Conference of Birds, I suggest a turn, in this his first 
post-fatwa novel, towards the Manichean language of (Western) Enlightenment 
versus Islamic despotism that had increasingly come to mark his non-fictional prose.  
Less than a month after the proclamation of the fatwa, the New York Times published 
a message to Rushdie from Mexican author Octavio Paz: “We are seeing a 
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disappearance of the modern values that came with the Enlightenment. These people 
who condemn you are living before the Enlightenment. We are facing a historical 
contradiction in our century.”56  This invocation of the Enlightenment is one of the 
first utterances in a dialogue between the Rushdie Affair and the eighteenth century 
that continues to gather strength to this day on both sides of the Secular West/Islamic 
East battle lines, appearing with renewed force in Joseph Anton and the spate of 
press articles that surrounded its launch.  In the final section, I explore the way in 
which a powerful historiography of freedom of speech as the child of the European 
Enlightenment in general, and the child of Voltaire in particular, has been woven into 
the fable of the fatwa and the West by both Rushdie and commentators on either side 
of “the Affair”.   As I trace his self-fashioning as a “philosophe for our times,” I 
mark a sense of nostalgia for the days of the “Enlightened despot” – a nostalgia 
which, I argue in my conclusion, informs his representation of the emperor Akbar in 
The Enchantress of Florence. 
 As Scheherazade and the transformative possibilities of the Eastern female 
space come to the fore in this, Rushdie’s most recent and most passionate evocation 
of a joined-up world, I examine the emergence of a doctrine of universalism mingled 
with positive mongrelization.  Opening out from a discussion of the possibilities and 
limitations offered by this novelistic return to history, I conclude by reflecting on 
Rushdie’s idea that the past is “a light that if properly directed could illumine the 
present more brightly than any contemporary lamp”.57  In doing so, I ask questions 
about the way the past is used, not only by Rushdie, but in popular histories like 
those of William Dalrymple and Jeremy Paxman, by scholars of the eighteenth 
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century, and, ultimately, by this study itself. 
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Part I 
 
Shame and Scheherazade 
 
 
(oh, for the voices of Muslim women to be heard!)1 
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Chapter 1 
Scheherazade Embalmed  
 
 
 
 Midnight’s Children opens with an invocation of Scheherazade: “I have no 
hope of saving my life, nor can I count on having even a thousand nights and a night.  
I must work fast, faster than Scheherazade, if I am to end up meaning – yes, meaning 
– something”.  Where the narrator-heroine of the Arabian Nights tells stories to stave 
off death, Saleem Sinai must struggle to tell his stories before his “crumbling, over-
used body” gives out on him.1  Both, however, are striving towards constructing a 
performative narrative: Scheherazade’s tales must transform the murderous rage of a 
despot into forgiveness and tolerance, must win life for herself and for the young 
women of the kingdom, and, less tangibly, Saleem’s stories must give meaning to his 
life and, in so doing, “allow the soul of a nation…[to find] utterance”.2  The lives of 
the two story-tellers are yoked both to the texts that they simultaneously create and 
are created by and, through synecdochic bonds, to the communities that depend on 
the transformative power of their narratives for salvation and utterance.  As 
discussed above, the Arabian Nights is one of Rushdie’s most regular literary 
interlocutors: a collection of texts whose multivalent cultural origins and 
international narrative scope he uses repeatedly to gesture towards cultural 
multiplicity and to register the doubleness of his own East-West cultural inheritance.  
One of the questions that Part I of this study will seek to answer is why, given 
Scheherazade’s status as one of the most powerful female Islamic voices in history, 
she remains almost silent in this, the single Rushdie novel that addresses questions of 
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the oppression and liberation of Islamic women most directly. 
 In this chapter I will examine the way in which Rushdie’s uninterrogated use 
of late orientalist tropes in Shame perpetuates a vision of Islam as fundamentally 
oppressive to women.  Using the silencing of Scheherazade as a metonymic means 
of examining the silencing of the female characters in the text, I argue that as he 
protests against the voicelessness of Muslim women he actively participates in a 
long historical process of denying them voice.  In Chapter 2 I look at the genesis of 
this silencing – the emergence of a discourse of “feminist orientalism” in late 
eighteenth-century Europe.  I argue that this discourse obscures a history that has 
been forgotten by many present-day commentators, looking back in detail at an 
earlier eighteenth-century Scheherazade whose unfettered narratives fed a sense of 
possible likeness between Islamic and Western worlds, and created Eastern literary 
spaces in which some European women could step outside European patriarchal 
power structures to enact dreams of emancipation.  This metamorphic zone, though 
shut down by Rushdie in Shame, is vitally – though perhaps inadvertently – 
reactivated in one of his most recent novels, The Enchantress of Florence.  It is this, 
I will return to argue in the conclusion to this study, which offers both Rushdie and 
his readers the chance to recover the possibilities of mongrelization threatened by his 
anti-Islam(ist) polemic; the chance for Rushdie’s Scheherazade to recover her voice. 
 
Narrative Embalming  
The Scheherazadian transformative power of narrative suffuses Shame, but in 
this novel it has lost its generative abilities: rather than giving rise to life and 
expression, here it is at best a means of codifying and preserving stories, and at worst 
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a means of gaining lethal control over the auditor.  Bariamma, the matriarch of Raza 
Hyder’s family, ritually recounts “the family tales” every evening, as her brood sits 
around her.   
These were lurid affairs, featuring divorces, bankruptcies, droughts, cheating 
friends, child mortality, diseases of the breast, men cut down in their prime, 
failed hopes, lost beauty, women who grew obscenely fat, smuggling deals, 
opium-taking poets, pining virgins, curses, typhoid, bandits, homosexuality, 
sterility, frigidity, rape, the high price of food, gamblers, drunks, murders, 
suicides and God.  Bariamma’s mildly droning recital of the catalogue of 
family horrors had the effect of somehow diffusing them, making them safe, 
embalming them in the mummifying fluid of her own incontrovertible 
respectability.  The telling of the tales proved the family’s ability to survive 
them, to retain, in spite of everything, its grip on its honour and its 
unswerving moral code.3 
At first glance, this ritual of performative story-telling seems to constitute a rare 
moment of female empowerment in the text: here we have a strong woman forging 
the identity of herself and her family, in a similar synechdochic pattern to those 
observed above, with Saleem and Scheherazade.  This oral history is a female 
province, and it appears to contain the power not only to transmute horror into 
security, but to offer hope for the future.  In the possibility of survival that it holds 
out, then, it is consonant with Scheherazade’s narrative – and yet, where 
Scheherazade’s story-telling ultimately promises the end of horror, Bariamma’s 
recital merely offers its preservation.  One of the many avatars of deathly femininity 
that stalk the text, the matriarch’s “embalming… mummifying” (note the pun – we 
                                                          
3 Rushdie, Shame, 76. 
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will encounter it again later) narrativisation of violent crime, sexual transgression, 
and misogynist tragedy ensures that the family’s view of itself is a catalogue of 
horrors rigidly preserved in the amber of an “unswerving moral code” reminiscent of 
the “iron morality that was mostly Muslim” that traps the three Shakil sisters in the 
fortress of Nishapur.  These stories, we are told, “were the glue that held the clan 
together, binding the generations in webs of whispered secrets”.4  Rather than 
salvation, transformation, or utterance, Bariamma’s tales offer secrets, stasis, and 
damnation.  
 When Raza’s new wife Bilquis is “forced” to tell the story of the horrors that 
befell her during the violence of Partition, it becomes part of the matriarch’s 
recitation.  
Her story altered, at first, in the retellings, but finally it settled down, and 
after that nobody, neither teller nor listener, would tolerate any deviation from 
the hallowed, sacred text.  This was when Bilquis knew that she had become 
a member of the family; in the sanctification of her tale lay initiation, kinship, 
blood.  “The recounting of histories,” Raza told his wife, “is for us a rite of 
blood.”5 
With the heavy emphasis of the religiosity of this family narrative as a hallowed, 
sacred, sanctified, static text, Rushdie folds this “rite of blood” into a critique of a 
despotically rigid Islam that, as I shall demonstrate, courses through both this novel 
and its successor.  Muhammad, especially in Shame and in The Satanic Verses, but 
also in moments throughout Rushdie’s oeuvre, is configured as a kind of anti-
Scheherazade: his recitation working to lock down believers in a steely, despotic 
mono-narrative that precludes multiplicity or freedom.  From the queenly self-
                                                          
4 Rushdie, Shame, 13, 76. 
5 Rushdie, Shame, 76-77. 
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determinism of her youth in her father’s secular Delhi cinema – an “Empire” he lost, 
along with his life, “because of a single error, which arose out of his fatal personality 
flaw, namely [religious] tolerance” – Bilquis has been bound, in a Qur’anic master-
narrative, into an inescapable family enclosure which will, in the end, cause her 
death. 
 On the following page, seemingly discrete from the description of 
Bariamma’s narratives, is one of Shame’s few direct references to the Arabian 
Nights.  Describing the Pakistani government’s policy of announcing victory 
whatever the result of battles with India in the early years of the war over Kashmir, 
the narrator tells us “the national leaders, rising brilliantly to the challenge, perfected 
no fewer than one thousand and one ways of salvaging honour from defeat”.6  This is 
more than an invocation of the Arabian Nights as a means of gesturing towards a 
multiplicity of stories, however: behind the rhetorical flourish, this is a 
representation of the power of narrative as propaganda – as a means of control 
wielded this time by the despotic sultan rather than by Scheherazade.  Just as 
Bariamma binds her extended family together in “webs of whispered secrets,” so the 
nation’s leaders cast a net of lies over the populace to hold them in place.  Much later 
in the novel, Rani Harappa embroiders a series of eighteen shawls – an activity also 
directly linked to the Arabian Nights through the repeated motif of “miniscule 
arabesques [depicting] a thousand and one stories” – documenting her husband the 
dictator Iskander’s infamy.7  In “the hissing shawl… silver-threaded whispers 
susurrated across the cloth: Iskander and his spies, the head spider at the heart of that 
web of listeners and whisperers, she had sewn the silvery threads of the web, they 
                                                          
6 Rushdie, Shame, 78. 
7 Rushdie, Shame, 111. 
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radiated out from his face”.8  Although Rani’s embroidery constitutes an articulation 
of female resistance to despotism, it is uttered – or rather stitched – after the death of 
her husband: a record of his wrongdoing sent to their daughter Arjumand, his 
political successor.  It is another non-generative act of narrative embalming.   
 
Mapping Peccavistan 
 Beyond the deathly, mummifying effects of this axis of narrative-as-power, 
however, Shame is a text that seeks passionately to be transformative.  Written in the 
early eighties, during the time of the first strength of the Thatcher government, and 
what Timothy Brennan terms “a period of renewed U.S. imperial ascendancy,” 
Shame, he suggests, was part of Rushdie’s campaign to champion “a brand of Left-
Labour humanism bent on rehabilitating conscience in a frankly uncivil society”.9  
Zia ul-Haq had deposed Zulfikar Ali Bhutto as President of Pakistan in 1977, and the 
“Islamisation” programme that he had introduced on taking power was at its height, 
introducing new legislation such as the Hudood Ordinance, which made women 
rather than men culpable in rape cases, and the law of Qisas and Diyat, which 
reduced compensation on the death of a woman to half of that payable on the death 
of a man.
10
  Though Rushdie, at the time of its publication in 1983, denied that 
Shame was a political allegory, there seems little doubt that the character Raza Hyder 
represents Zia, and that Iskander Harappa and his daughter Arjumand are avatars of 
Bhutto and his daughter Benazir.
11
  Though critics such as Andrew Teverson have 
                                                          
8 Rushdie, Shame, 192. 
9 Timothy Brennan, “The Cultural Politics of Rushdie Criticism: All or Nothing”, in Critical Essays 
on Salman Rushdie, ed. M. Keith Booker, (New York: G.K. Hall & Co, 1999), 107-128, 108-109. 
10 For a full discussion of the Zia “anti-women laws”, see Inderpal Grewal, “Salman Rushdie: 
Marginality, Women, and Shame,” in Reading Rushdie: Perspectives on the Fiction of Salman 
Rushdie, ed. M. D. Fletcher, (Amsterdam and Atlanta: Rodopi, 1994), 123-144, 136-37. 
11
 For a summary of Shame as allegory, see Ziauddin Sardar and Merryl Wyn Davies, Distorted 
Imagination: Lessons from the Rushdie Affair, (London: Grey Seal, 1990), 130. 
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been right to attribute “much of the bitter, brooding anger of the novel” to Rushdie’s 
outrage over the misogyny and oppression of Zia’s regime, the scope of the novel 
extends far beyond an excoriation of contemporary Pakistani politics.
12
  As D.C.R.A. 
Goonetilleke points out, “the immediate subject of Shame is Pakistan, but the novel’s 
significance and relevance is not limited to that country.  Rushdie is once tempted to 
name his fictional country Peccavistan (p.88). It stands for both Pakistan and the 
Third World”.13  Goonetilleke is right to emphasise that the blurred boundaries of 
“Peccavistan” contain more than Pakistan, though rather than the tricontinental Third 
World, Peccavistan’s alternate signification is the “East” – that amorphous, super-
geographical cultural space to which Rushdie so often refers.  Specifically, it is an 
Islamic East or, as Rushdie put it in an interview shortly after Shame was published, 
“just… a kind of Muslim milieu”.14  Mapping the idea of an Islamic East onto a 
country that is also palpably Pakistan is problematic enough, but this uneasy 
metonymic configuration is further complicated by the addition of a third territory: a 
moral zone. 
   Rushdie takes “Peccavistan” from the apocryphal colonial pun on the Latin 
word “peccavi”: “I have sinned” (or “I have Sind”).  Sin and “-stan” combine to 
form, beneath a thin skin of British imperial humour, an expressly Islamic nation of 
wrongdoing.
15
  Though Rushdie/narrator tells us in an early aside that “[s]hame… is 
not the exclusive property of the East,” and the novel is inspired by the murder of a 
Pakistani girl in East London by her father after she had sex with a white boy, the act 
itself – despite its dislocation from Pakistan – is firmly characterised as 
                                                          
12 Andrew Teverson, Salman Rushdie, Contemporary World Writers (Manchester and New York: 
Manchester University Press, 2007), 136. 
13 D.C.R.A. Goonetilleke, Salman Rushdie, Modern Novelists (London: Macmillan, 1998), 49. 
14 Rani Dharker, “An Interview with Salman Rushdie”, New Quest 1983, in Salman Rushdie 
Interviews: A Sourcebook of His Ideas, ed. Pradyumna S. Chauhan, (Connecticut and London: 
Greenwood Press, 2001), 51. 
15 This was attributed to Charles James Napier, but in fact first appeared in Punch. 
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Peccavistani.
16
  The intrusion of a foreign (white) body into the body of his daughter, 
it is implied, constituted such an invasion of his familial, religious and cultural 
identity that only by ending her life himself, with the blade of a knife, could he 
shore-up the ruptured boundaries of his cultural and familial selfhood.  In other 
words, to retain cultural, religious and familial sovereignty, he had to violate the 
sanctity of his daughter’s body: to destroy the breached border in order to prevent the 
integrity of his exclusive racial/cultural domain from being compromised.  Evidently 
Peccavistan exists in London too. 
  In his visceral description of the “imagined spectre” of the girl’s corpse, 
Rushdie has her “lying in a London night across a zebra crossing, slumped across 
black and white, black and white”.17  The zebra crossing proves a complex metaphor 
for the cultural liminality of the victim’s position: her corpse is sprawled across the 
incommensurable states of black(ness) and white(ness), the fact of her positioning in 
death an oxymoronic double proof both that the boundaries of race and culture can 
be crossed (or else how would she be there?) and that they cannot (to cross is to die).  
Zoom out from the symbolism of her body lying on distinct yet mutually-defining 
blocks of colour, however, and the semantics of the zebra as crossing, the 
combination of black and white as the formation of a protective zone, become 
apparent.  The injustice and pathos of her death are literally underlined by the 
idealistic implication that cultural harmony, with black and white working side by 
side for a common purpose without blurring into one another and losing their 
identities, is the only means of guaranteeing safety – or peace.  This frail 
phenomenological gesture towards hybridity is immediately subsumed by the brutal 
way in which Rushdie dehumanises her. When his account reaches the death scene 
                                                          
16 Rushdie, Shame, 29, 115-118. 
17 Rushdie, Shame, 116. 
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she becomes no longer a person, but a body with “its throat slit like a halal 
chicken”.18  She has been the victim of a specifically Islamic violence: she has been 
slaughtered, the stark implication goes, according to the strictures of the Qur’an.  
  As Rushdie emphasises the inability of the non-Urdu-speaking Western 
reader to understand, and indeed the English language’s inability to express, the 
“encyclopaedias of nuance” contained in the term sharam, for which “this paltry 
‘shame’ is a wholly inadequate translation,” he implies that the shame he writes of is 
something quintessentially Eastern, quintessentially Islamic.
19
  Despite the theme of 
the novel’s east-London provenance, “to write about… shame,” he tells us in one of 
his frequent authorial intrusions, “I have to go back East, to let the idea breathe its 
favourite air”.20  Though the full meaning of sharam may not be available to me as a 
Western reader, the form shame takes in the book is unquestionably the oppression 
of women.  The “male” aspect of the plot(s), the patterns of betrayal and violence 
centred around Omar, Raza and Iskander, are products of “the opposite of shame… 
what’s left when sharam is subtracted… shamelessness”.21  Thus the layers of 
metonymy at the heart of the novel’s thematic structure are further complicated: the 
individual narratives of the women in the text become synecdoches for a general 
Pakistani oppression of women, which in turn represents a general Islamic 
oppression of women. The uneasy circle of signification we are left with is this: that 
the oppression of women is shame, shame is Pakistan, and Pakistan is the Islamic 
East.   The Islamic East therefore, in Shame’s feminist discourse, is synonymous 
with the oppression of women.  Furthermore, as there are no instances of non-
                                                          
18 Rushdie, Shame, 116. 
19 Rushdie, Shame, 39. 
20 Rushdie. Shame, 116. 
21 Rushdie. Shame, 39. 
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Eastern/Islamic female oppression in the text, it is implied that the oppression of 
women is a phenomenon that is the province of the Islamic East.  
 This notion of an Islamic shame-culture recalls Raphael Patai’s notorious text 
The Arab Mind – first published in 1973, but revised in 1983, the same year that 
Shame was published.
22
  Described in an article by Seymour Hersh as “the bible of 
the neocons on Arab behaviour”, an anonymous academic claimed that the US 
Military had derived their strategies for the torture of prisoners at Abu Ghraib from 
two central themes in the book: “one, that Arabs only understand force and, two, that 
the biggest weakness of Arabs is shame and humiliation”.23  This belief, as Joan 
Copjec points out, is “nourished on the banquet of that crude… sociological division 
of the world into ‘guilt cultures’ and ‘shame cultures’”.24  First coined by E. R. 
Dodds in 1951 in The Greeks and the Irrational, this binary has become entrenched 
in stadial theories of civilisation, making guilt the characteristic of advanced cultures 
with internalised moral principles and shame the province of cultures “forced to rely, 
for want of such principles, on the approving or disapproving gaze of other people to 
monitor morality”.25  As Said refers to Patai’s text several times in Orientalism, it 
seems likely that Rushdie would have been aware of the work – although at this 
point in his career he would have been swift to disavow any similarity in between its 
thesis and Shame. 
                                                          
22 Raphael Patai, The Arab Mind (New York: Hatherleigh Press, 2002). 
23 Seymour Hersh, “The Gray Zone: How a secret Pentagon program came to Abu Ghraib”, New 
Yorker, May 24, 2004, accessed May 2, 2015, 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2004/05/24/the-gray-zone . 
24 Joan Copjec, “The Object Gaze: Shame, Hejab, Cinema”, Filozofski Vestnik, no. 2 (2006): 11-29, 
13. 
25 Copjec, “Object”, 13.  For a compelling rebuttal of the notion of a shame/guilt division, see Silvan 
Tompkins, “Shame – Humiliation and Contempt – Disgust” in eds. Eve Sedgwick, Adam Frank, 
Irving E. Alexander, Shame and Its Sisters: a Silvan Tompkins Reader (Durham, US: Duke 
University Press, 1995), 133-179. 
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 The extra-textual irony of the novel is that, in his eagerness to represent the 
cultural and religious structures that he sees as oppressing women, Rushdie shuts off 
any possible means of escape from this oppression.  As Grewal points out, the text 
“consist[s] of a history of the unchanging subordinate position of Pakistani 
women”.26  Rushdie’s narrative functions just as Barriama’s does:  it embalms the 
women of Peccavistan in a rigid narrative framework of oppression.  In Shame there 
is no Scheherazade to offer life and freedom to women tyrannized by despotic male 
power.  Whilst the text yearns for her transformative narrative abilities, its 
determination that Muslim women must be powerless bars her from its discursive 
arena. 
 
The Harem-Museum  
 “Left-Labour humanist” as Rushdie’s polemical goal may be in this text, he 
is participating in a polarized discourse which locates female oppression squarely in 
the Islamic East and thus renders female freedom an inherently Secular Western 
phenomenon.   This Manichean division of female emancipation into two 
hemispheres, the free West and the unfree East, began to coalesce towards the end of 
the eighteenth century, most notably through a process Joyce Zonana terms “feminist 
orientalism,” a discourse in which, she holds, “by figuring objectionable aspects of 
life in the West as ‘Eastern,’ …Western feminist writers rhetorically define[d] their 
project as the removal of Eastern elements from Western life”.27  As Shame 
manifests, and as we have seen Leila Ahmed assert with her account of the 
                                                          
26 Grewal, “Marginality”, 143. 
27 Joyce Zonana, “The Sultan and the Slave: Feminist Orientalism and the Structure of Jane Eyre”, 
Signs 18, no. 3 (Spring, 1993): 592-617, 594. 
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widespread Western view that “Islam monstrously oppresses women,” so successful 
was this rhetorical manoeuvre that it remained at the very heart of the way much of 
the West thought of itself and of the East into the 1980s – and, as continuing 
controversies about the veil demonstrate, into the twenty-first century.
28
   
Ahmed goes on to speak of “those powerfully evocative words – for 
Westerners – harem, the veil, polygamy, all of which are almost synonymous in this 
country [the USA] with female oppression”.29   Despite – or perhaps because of –  
his profession of being “a translated man,” engaged in “a novel of leavetaking, my 
last words on the East from which, many years ago, I began to come loose,” Rushdie 
appears to be unwary of participating in such Western-centric discourses as he looks 
back over his shoulder to bid farewell to his old hemisphere.   
Shame opens in the “high, fortress-like, gigantic residence which [faces] 
inwards to a well-like and lightless compound yard” that will later be christened 
Nishapur.30  The house is positioned precisely between “the two orbs of the town’s 
dumb-bell shape: old town and Cantt, the former inhabited by the indigenous, 
colonized population, and the latter by the alien colonizers, the Angrez, or British, 
sahibs”.31  Placed on the border of colonizer and colonized, old and new, it is no 
surprise that this is a hybrid, in-between space – and, indeed, one of the first things 
we learn about the three sisters who inhabit it is that they have been raised “with the 
help of Parsee wet-nurses, Christian ayahs, and an iron morality that was mostly 
Muslim”.32  It swiftly becomes apparent, however, that the cultural doubleness that 
Nishapur enjoys is a far cry from the vitality of the “phenomenon of cultural 
                                                          
28 Ahmed, “Ethnocentrism”, 522. 
29 Ahmed, “Ethnocentrism”, 522. 
30 Shame, 12. 
31 Shame, 12. 
32 Rushdie, Shame, 13. 
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transplantation” that Rushdie had been exhorting British Indian writers to embrace in 
the essay “Imaginary Homelands”33.  Rather, it is a nexus of oppressive overlapping 
cultural and historical modes of representing the East – of representing what Teresa 
Heffernan has described as “the metonymic heart of the Orient”: the space of the 
Eastern woman.34   
 The three sisters, known as Chunni, Munnee and Bunny, have, we are told, 
spent their entire lives “kept inside that labyrinthine mansion... virtually 
uneducated... imprisoned in the zenana wing”. 
This interminable captivity forged between the three sisters a bond of 
intimacy that would never completely be broken.  They spent their 
evenings seated at a window behind a lattice-work screen, looking 
towards the golden dome of the great hotel and swaying to the sounds of 
the enigmatic dance music... and there are rumours that they would 
indolently explore each other’s bodies during the languorous drowsiness 
of the afternoons, and, at night, would weave occult spells to hasten the 
moment of their father’s demise.  But evil tongues will say anything, 
especially about beautiful women who live far away from the denuding 
eyes of men.35 
Crammed into this short span of three sentences is a wealth of orientalism of the sort 
that Said describes: the captive Eastern beauties gazing out of the rich lattice-work of 
their golden cage, reminiscent of the harem paintings of John Frederick Lewis, 
sensuously moving to forbidden music in oriental heat-inspired indolence, engaging 
in acts of incestuous sexual transgression and parricidal witchcraft.  Rushdie is 
                                                          
33 Rushdie, Imaginary Homelands, 20. 
34 Teresa Heffernan, “Feminism against the East/West Divide: Lady Mary’s ‘Turkish Embassy 
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mobilizing a series of centuries-old European myths about the inhabitants of the 
Eastern female space – participating in a grand tradition of fictionalization, 
exoticism, and eroticism that stretches back to the first travellers’ accounts of the 
harem interior.  Ruth Bernard Yeazell, for example, places Nicolas de Nicolay’s 
account of oriental sapphism, describing Turkish women as “as ardently amorous 
towards each other as if they were men,” frequently resorting to the baths “in order 
to carry out their voluptuous pleasures,” at least as early as 1567.36  The passage 
begins with the (male) narratorial eye inside the zenana-harem, behind the lattice 
screen with the hidden women, and then withdraws into the would-be voyeuristic 
crowd outside, and with this change of vantage-point comes a tropological doubling: 
into the mix of orientalist myths is introduced the distancing-device of rumour.  By 
making the titillating allusions to transgressive harem behaviour through the mouths 
of gossiping townsfolk, Rushdie signals his postcolonial – even “post-Saidian” – 
awareness of these myths as narratives imposed upon the occupant of the harem 
from the outside.  This step back from omniscient, authoritative authorial voice to 
street-side rumour is a means of participating in the sensual, Ingres-like aesthetic of 
the orientalised harem interior whilst simultaneously raising a knowing eyebrow 
with – and at – a reader who has just been made both observer of, and involuntary 
participant in, a hegemonic Othering process.  In short, the rumour conceit is 
designed to allow both reader and writer (though perhaps particularly the latter) to 
have their cake and eat it: to enjoy the lavish aesthetic sensuality and eroticism of 
“Saidian” orientalism with the get-out clause of ironic post-modern self-reflexivity.37 
                                                          
36 Nicolas de Nicolay, Navigations, 110. Quoted by Ruth Bernard Yeazell in Harems of the Mind: 
Passages of Western Art and Literature (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2000), 
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 This self-conscious instrumentalization of orientalist Othering shapes the 
text, with the title of the fourth chapter, “Behind the Screen”, referring both to the 
cinema screen of Bilquis’s youth and to the “screen of stone lattice-work” in the Red 
Fort behind which her fiancé installs her, and acting as another signpost of Rushdie’s 
awareness of the harem-screen’s dual capacity to act as voyeuristic vantage-point 
and veil of suggestive concealment, and thus as a site for the literal and figurative 
projection of the reader/viewer’s desires.38  These gestures towards self-scrutiny in 
the production and consumption of Western-centric myths about the Eastern female 
space offer the opportunity to reappraise negatively-charged orientalist modes of 
representation; however, in this novel they remain tantalising nods towards a 
discussion that never happens.  As Aijaz Ahmad writes of a get-out clause issued in 
relation to the imperfection of Rushdie’s memories of Pakistan, just before the 
musings on being a translated man that opened this chapter, “[t]hat he begins the 
passage with a suggestion of self-mockery does not really retrieve the banal 
character of the assertion, since the whole book is replete with all sort of banal 
statements about ‘the East’”.39  His self-reflexivity is insufficient to rescue Rushdie 
from this dangerous banality and serves merely to frame his participation in what 
Said describes as “Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and 
having authority over the Orient” more starkly.40  Though this claim of Said’s is also 
about empire, and though Rushdie’s politics, at this point, are still a long way from 
the almost neo-imperialist pro-USA stance he will adopt in the years following 9/11, 
in drawing upon this “style” of orientalism he buys into the idea that the Muslim 
woman occupies a stifling space which is at an historical remove from the modern 
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world.  Nishapur, as I explore in the following chapter, is a harem-museum.  
 
Building the Harem-Museum  
Ahmed cautions Western feminists to be aware that “negatively charged 
speculations and statements about harem life form the pre-history of their 
impressions. Although the specific detail and content of what was said has long ago 
faded, the negative charge has passed into the culture and become part of the cultural 
surround”.41  It is partly in the interest of folding the “specific details and content of 
what was said” back into contemporary debates about feminism in the East/West 
interface that I submit, in the following chapter, an examination of changing 
representations and instrumentalisations of the figure of the Islamic woman over the 
course of the eighteenth century.  Though the one-dimensional perception of the 
harem in eighteenth-century literature as a prison and its occupant a passive, 
sexualised victim of despotism has been usefully complicated and supplemented by 
scholars such as Felicity Nussbaum, Yeazell, and Ballaster, this is an area of 
scholarship which requires further attention.42  Beyond the implications of this work 
for the field of eighteenth century studies, it offers theorists in the fields of 
postcolonial and women’s studies the opportunity to recontextualise a whole host of 
ideas about feminism, secularism, orientalism, and cultures of Islam that are in wide 
circulation in both the academy and the media.   
Zonana’s influential formulation, which builds on Ahmed’s intervention, has 
proved a useful foundation for many studies of interactions between Western and 
Islamic Eastern women in the nineteenth, twentieth and twenty-first centuries – 
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notably those of Reina Lewis, Charlotte Weber, and Roksana Bahramitash.43  
Zonana, whose main concern in the article is feminist orientalism at work in the 
nineteenth century, in the structure of Jane Eyre, uses a compelling reading of Mary 
Wollstonecraft’s 1792 manifesto A Vindication of the Rights of Women to set up the 
idea.  After a brief reading of Montesquieu’s Persian Letters (1721), and a swift nod 
to Samuel Johnson’s Rasselas (1759), she concludes that “[t]o the extent that 
Montesquieu demonstrates for Western readers that the oriental institution of the 
seraglio can shed light on Western practices, one can say that his text inaugurates 
feminist orientalist discourse,” but that A Vindication of the Rights of Women 
provides “the fullest explicit feminist orientalist perspective”.44  Needless to say, this 
seventy-one-year leap she makes, from a rather wobbly start in Montesquieu’s 
Letters in 1721 to A Vindication of the Rights of Women in 1792, with barely a halt at 
Rasselas in 1759, misses out a large volume of literature that engages with the East 
and its women. The failure of Zonana’s theory of feminist orientalism, like its 
Saidian progenitor, to engage with this rich and volatile history of eighteenth-century 
writing on the orient has been perpetuated by the many subsequent studies that have 
used it as a point of departure rather than a point of enquiry.  As I shall discuss in the 
following chapter and in my examination of oriental despotism and The Satanic 
Verses in Part II, the assertion that Montesquieu’s Persian Letters uses “the oriental 
institution of the seraglio… [to] shed light on Western practices” is unquestionably 
true, but telescoped and largely obscured within this phrase is a long tradition of 
using the East as a means of thinking about the West that exists outside of the tight 
                                                          
43 Charlotte Weber, “Unveiling Scheherazade: Feminist Orientalism in the International Alliance of 
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44 Zonana, “The Sultan”, 599. 
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axis of Othering at work in late-century works like Wollstonecraft’s A Vindication of 
the Rights of Women.45 
 My contention is that the “negatively charged speculations and statements 
about harem life” that, as Ahmed says, “form the pre-history” of much Western 
feminist engagement with women in the Islamic East, were not always negatively 
charged.46  In the earlier part of the eighteenth century the harem was a zone in 
which to explore ideas of openness as well as otherness, a dynamic space in which 
transformation was as much a possibility as stasis, and the Eastern woman who 
occupied it could be in some ways more free than the European woman reading 
about her – indeed, could offer the possibility of equal emancipation to her European 
sister.  In Chapter Two I not only examine the development of the trope of the 
oppression of the Muslim woman which Rushdie perpetuates in Shame but, by 
looking at those tropes of Islamic female liberation which precede it, draw attention 
to its contingency.  This history – forgotten by most postcolonial critics and 
commentators upon relations between Islam and the West – can and should be folded 
into our reading of Rushdie.  Doing so illuminates both the limitations of his 
engagements with Islam and the possibilities of the metamorphic Islamic woman 
who emerges in the discussion of The Enchantress of Florence that concludes this 
study. 
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Chapter 2  
Scheherazade Submerged  
 
 This chapter registers patterns of both convergence and rupture between 
Rushdie and eighteenth-century visions of Islamic worlds and the women who 
inhabit them.  Whilst my account of the historical shifts in representations of 
Scheherazade and the Muslim female space in Europe is staged here in terms of a 
dialogue with Shame, it informs my discussion of Islamic despotism in The Satanic 
Verses in Part II and, in turn, my examination of Haroun and the Sea of Stories and 
mobilisations of Enlightenment as responses to the fatwa in Part III.  It is worth 
remembering that this study treats of multiple Rushdies, just as it charts multiple 
Enlightenments: that not only have Rushdie’s views and representations of Islam and 
Islamic cultures undergone significant shifts over the course of his career, but that his 
novels themselves are unstable, dynamic zones in which multiple modes of 
representing the Islamic East can overlap and bleed into one another.  Hence, whilst I 
continue my argument that Shame is the twentieth-century product of the discourse 
of feminist orientalism – that Rushdie is repeating negatively charged modes of 
thought about Islamic womanhood that have flowed strongly through Western 
worldviews since the late eighteenth century – I also argue for the presence of an 
earlier eighteenth-century legacy in the novel.  In a way which mirrors the 
submergence of Scheherazade’s feminist agency towards the end of the eighteenth 
century, the transformation of the Shakil sisters in their harem-museum constitutes 
the muted, twisted echo of the female metamorphoses which took place in the 
literary orients constructed in early responses to The Arabian Nights.  Rushdie’s 
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notion of mongrelization is a form of positive metamorphosis and yet, as I explore in 
my account of The Satanic Verses, this process of “change-by-fusion, change-by-
conjoining” becomes a form of monstrous mutation under the influence of 
despotism.1  With this in mind, there is an extra-textual irony to the Shakil sisters’ 
“monsterization,” as it constitutes a negative change very similar to that which 
discourses like feminist orientalism enacted on Scheherazade and her early 
eighteenth-century sisters.  That this irony exists outside the text – that is, in this 
case, outside the consciousness of the author – is manifest in Rushdie’s collusion 
with feminist orientalism.  Crucially, however, this will change in The Enchantress of 
Florence which, I argue in my conclusion, marks a decisive, though problematic, 
reactivation of the positively metamorphic intercultural space Scheherazade creates 
in the literature of early eighteenth-century Europe.  Though the Scheherazadian 
triumph over feminist orientalism in The Enchantress of Florence is partial, she is 
playing an increasingly important role in challenging certain modes of modern 
feminism which tend, implicitly or explicitly, to exclude female Muslims. 
 
The Return of Scheherazade  
In 1988, Chandra Talpade Mohanty wrote of the Western idea of the “third-world” 
woman that she 
leads an essentially truncated life based on her feminine gender (read: 
sexually constrained) and being “third world” (read: ignorant, poor, 
uneducated, tradition-bound, religious, domesticated, family-oriented, 
victimized, etc).  This, I suggest, is in contrast to the (implicit) self-
representation of western women as educated, modern, as having control 
                                                          
1  Rushdie, “Faith”, Homelands, 394 
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over their own bodies and sexualities, and the “freedom” to make their 
own decisions.
2
 
 
She concludes her essay by asserting that “[w]ithout the overdetermined discourse 
that creates the third world, there would be no (singular and privileged) first world.  
Without the ‘third-world woman’, the particular self-presentation of western 
women… would be problematical.  I am suggesting, in effect, that the one enables 
and sustains the other”.3  In her seminal 1985 essay “Three Women’s Texts and a 
Critique of Imperialism”, Spivak had written of Charlotte Bronte’s 
instrumentalisation of Bertha, Rochester’s mentally ill, demonised Creole wife, as a 
means of figuring Jane Eyre as an ideal feminist subject: a stark reminder, as 
Deepika Bahri has it, that “speaking for women does not always entail speaking for 
the marginalised or silenced in general”.4  We have seen Ahmed argue in “Western 
Ethnocentrism and Perceptions of the Harem”, published in the same year as Shame, 
that beyond other reasons for global gender inequalities, Americans “believe that, 
specifically, Islam monstrously oppresses women”.5   This binary between free 
Western woman and unfree Islamic woman persists today in popular culture as well 
as governmental policy in the West, with the European Court of Human Rights 
upholding the French government’s so-called “burqa ban” on July 1, 2014.  The axis 
of mutual constitution that Mohanty describes remains powerful, with the figure of 
the oppressed Islamic woman often remaining the dark sororal twin with, and upon, 
whom Western feminisms enact a process of negative self-definition.   
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 Chandra Talpade Mohanty, “Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses”, 
Feminist Review, no. 30 (Autumn 1988): 61-88, 65. 
3 Mohanty, “Western Eyes”, 82. 
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In large part the legacy of feminist orientalism, this opposition between 
female emancipation and Islam is being ever more fiercely resisted by many Muslim 
thinkers.  Mahnaz Afkhami, Minister for Women’s Affairs in the government of the 
last Shah of Iran, asserts that “Muslim women are not giving up their faith, they’re 
not giving up their traditions or their culture, but they are re-imagining them in ways 
that let them build on that and get strength and nourishment from it”.6  Looking back 
to the earlier part of the eighteenth century, when, beside the “negatively charged” 
ideas about Islam and women which Ahmed describes, nascent feminist ideas were 
crystallising between and over national and cultural borders as well as within and 
against them, offers a chance of dissolving the binary of Western freedom and 
Eastern unfreedom that continues to blinker the Secular West to the possibility of 
female emancipation in the Islamic East.  Beyond the prospect of reconfiguring some 
feminisms in the West, this look back into history also carries with it the potential to 
ease anti-feminist tensions in the East – for the polarity set up by feminist 
orientalism has become more than a unidirectional, West-to-East discursive practice: 
the idea of feminism as an exclusively secular, Western phenomenon has helped to 
engender the oppression of women in many Islamist societies.  As Ahmed has it,  
the Islamic movement, which now seems everywhere to be gaining 
ground, designates feminism among all the aspects of the West and of 
Westernization that it generally abhors, as most specifically worthy of its 
hatred... the leaders of the Islamic movement blur the actuality of 
women’s lives in the West with Western feminism. Thus practices that 
feminists battle against, such as the exploitation and objectification of 
                                                          
6
  Mahnaz Afkhami, quoted in Barbara Crosette, “Muslim Women Hear the Call of a Storyteller” the 
New York Times, February 6, 1999, accessed June 20, 2013, 
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women’s bodies by fashions, and in advertisements, are labeled part of 
that alien and abhorrent invention, feminism.7 
Thus the movement towards a feminism which can operate within the Islamic faith, 
or rather within and against cultures of Islamism, can frequently be, as Sharda Patel 
points out, a battle on two fronts: against both Western secularist and Islamic 
“traditionalist” prejudices.8   
This battle is often also a class-based conflict (a question that Rushdie 
consistently fails to engage with – all of the main female characters in Shame, for 
example, are middle- or upper-class).  Robert Young reminds us of the emphasis on 
“modernisation” in feminist movements in Asia which sought to remove undesirable 
traditional institutions such as sati and polygamy from colonial and postcolonial 
societies as they fought imperialism.  This, however, was not a manoeuvre carried 
out evenly throughout the social strata of feminist resistence movements.  A 
“substantive problem arising from the association of women’s rights with 
modernization,” Young writes, “was that reforms often did not penetrate further than 
the upper classes who increasingly defined themselves by being ‘modern’, while for 
lower-class women things went on much as before”9. 
 Significantly, the figurehead that an ever-increasing number of Muslim 
women are mustering behind in the battle for a female empowerment consonant with 
cultures of Islam is none other than Scheherazade herself.  In a 1999 article in the 
New York Times entitled “Muslim Women Hear the Call of a Storyteller,” Barbara 
Crossette hails Scheherazade as “a feminist icon, a provocative role model and an 
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inspiration for Muslim women who are seeking to take a stronger role in Islamic 
society without abandoning their religion or their culture”.10  In a series of interviews 
with female academics from across the Arab world and Iran, Scheherazade – or 
Shahrazad – is invoked again and again as a symbol of an Islamic female ability to 
speak out and, in speaking, change the world around her.  Fatima Mernissi terms her 
“a fighter for the right of free expression,” and Bouthaina Shaaban finds in her a 
symbol of Arab women’s ability to use “language as a way of fighting their battles, 
whether these are social or educational or political battles”.11  Afkhami ends the 
article with the conclusion “that the salvation of our part of the world lies in our 
being able to recreate our culture and our beliefs in ways that are conducive to the 
life we must live… The prototype is Scheherazade… who made her world as she 
talked about it”.12 
 Somaya Sami Sabry argues that it is because “the ‘Sheherazadian narrative’ 
is one narrative that resists patriarchal traditions and colonialist domination, in 
varying degrees” that works such as Nawal El Saadawi’s The Fall of the Imam 
(1989), Assia Djebar’s A Sister to Scheherazade (1993) and Mernissi’s Dreams of 
Tresspass (1994) have become “representative texts in women’s studies and Middle 
East study courses”.13  For the post-9/11 Arab-American Muslim female authors and 
performers whom Sabry examines (including Diana Abu-Jaber, Mohja Kahf, Laila 
Farah, and Maysoon Zayid), the revival of Scheherazade and her narrative 
techniques enables the depiction of a process whereby “the individual is constantly 
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processing new experiences and representations in the new homeland and attempting 
to correlate and understand them in the context of an ‘Other’ homeland,” creating a 
double consciousness “configured through its subversion of the binary paradigms 
shaping the post-9/11 political climate”.14  Scheherazade, then, is not only an 
important figure in literatures of resistance but, through the narrative multiplicity she 
offers, also opens up a space in which complex inter-cultural standpoints can be 
explored.  These are cultural positions which resonate with those Scheherazade came 
to occupy in Europe in the earlier part of the eighteenth century. 
 
Scheherazade Digested 
 Scheherazade is more than the prototype of a late twentieth-century re-
imagining of the Islamic female self; she was also, as Ros Ballaster hails her, one of 
“[t]he two founding and most familiar voices of the oriental tale-teller in the 
eighteenth century”.15  Far more than that of Mahmut, Marana’s Turkish Spy – the 
second of Ballaster’s “founding voices” – Scheherazade’s voice echoes not only 
through the many editions of the Arabian Nights Entertainments and their numerous 
offspring and offshoots over the course of the long eighteenth century, but into the 
novels, poetry, plays, operas, and eventually movies, of the nineteenth, twentieth, 
and twenty-first centuries.  It was not only her narrative world that Scheherazade 
“made as she talked about it,” but in many ways also the rich cultural imagination of 
the world of the orient that characterised so much of eighteenth-century literary 
production.  Though the stories of the Arabian Nights were far from the first oriental 
                                                          
14 Sabry, Arab-American, 4. 
15  Ballaster, Fables of the East: Selected Tales, 1662-1785 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 
5. 
55 
 
tales to reach British readers, and the information about Islamic cultures encoded 
within them was far from the first point of inter-cultural contact between Europe and 
the East, the publication of the Grub Street edition of the Arabian Nights – an 
anonymous translation of Galland’s Mille et Une Nuits that appeared in 1706, swiftly 
after the publication of the French original in 1704 – offered, as Saree Makdisi and 
Felicity Nussbaum have it, “a new world of cultural and aesthetic contemplation”.16  
Thus if, in Galland’s preface, the “whole Orient is telescoped into the confined 
chronotope of the harem, indeed to the sultana’s bedchamber,” it would not be too 
much of an exaggeration to view Scheherazade and her position in the Arabian 
Nights as occupying a similarly chronotopic space at the heart of most British fiction 
written about the East in the long eighteenth century.
17
  
 Yet if Scheherazade was central to the construction of the eighteenth-century 
European literary orient, she was instrumentalised and (re)constructed by that 
literature in her turn.  From the 1790s onwards, as Robert L Mack notes, the Arabian 
Nights became a corner-stone in nascent traditions of children’s literature:  
for well over a hundred years volumes with such titles as The Oriental 
Moralist, or The Beauties of the Arabian Nights’ Entertainments (1790), 
Oriental Tales, Being Moral Selections from the Arabian Nights 
Entertainments calculated both to Amuse and to Improve the Minds of 
Youth (1829), The Arabian Nights’ Entertainments, Arranged for the 
Perusal of Youthful Readers (1863), and – somewhat startlingly – Five 
Favourite Tales from the Arabian Nights in Words of One Syllable (1871) 
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made their ways into nurseries throughout Britain and North America.18 
As the Arabian Nights are abridged, bowdlerised, and adapted for the consumption 
of children, the figure of Scheherazade and her frame narrative are systematically 
marginalised and reduced – a recession into voicelessness and passivity that mirrors 
the shrinking of the Islamic woman into the mute signifier of female oppression that 
takes place at the hands of feminist orientalism in texts like Wollstonecraft’s A 
Vindication of the Rights of Woman without necessarily taking part in the same 
discourse.   It is a retreat into passivity and childhood which in some ways, as well 
shall see, mirrors the fate of Sufiya Zenobia in Shame. 
 Ballaster suggests that the infantilisation of the Arabian Nights at the turn of 
the century may be linked to the fact that “Oriental empire increasingly came to be 
identified as a primitive model of government superceded by new forms of European 
colonialism,” a shift in cultural perception mirrored in the transformation of the 
Arabian Nights into “childhood reading, a shaping influence upon the primitive 
imagination”.19  Be that as it may, this transformation certainly operated as part of 
the shift in the political significance of literary orientalisms in the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries as “Britain’s imperial project slowly re-emerged... in a 
properly modern form and with a new set of approaches – informed and sustained by 
the emergent cultural logic of modernization – to colonized and subject peoples”.20 
 Scheherazade and her frame-narrative are at the very heart of all seventeen 
editions of the Grub Street Arabian Nights Entertainments and its later reprintings, 
generating, enfolding, and pervading every one of the tales.  When each night ends 
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the reader is returned to the chamber in the seraglio, reminded of the threat of death 
and the inextricable link between story and life in Scheherazade’s narrative strategy 
– a link that permeates the collection in a series of metatextual ripples, as character 
after character is saved from execution by the interposition of storytelling.
21
  The 
setting up of the frame-narrative in the Arabian Nights Entertainments stretches for 
over thirty pages, providing a detailed exposition of Schahriar’s discovery of his 
wife’s infidelity, his reaction to it, and the reasoning that leads to his “bloody vow” 
to marry a new woman each night and have her executed the next morning.  The 
stage set by the city’s grief over its lost daughters, Scheherazade is finally introduced 
into the text.  She had, we are told, 
Courage, Wit, and Penetration infinitely above her Sex; she had read 
abundance, and had such a prodigious Memory, that she never forgot any 
thing.  She had successfully applied her self to Philosophy, Physick, 
History, and the Liberal Arts; and for Verse exceeded the best Poets of 
her Time: Besides this, she was a perfect Beauty, and all her fine 
Qualifications were crown’d by solid Vertue.22 
After the moral bankruptcy of almost every figure in the text so far – the 
“incontinence” of the sultanas, the agonised, but unreasonable response of the two 
princes to their wives’ infidelity, the evil genie who abducts a woman from her 
wedding and keeps her locked in a glass box, the woman herself, who delights in 
sleeping with as many men as possible behind the genie’s back – Scheherazade 
seems not merely “infinitely above her sex,” but, in her wisdom and heroism, 
infinitely above her fellow characters.  “I have a Design to stop the Course of that 
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Barbarity which the Sultan exercises upon the Families of this City,” she declaims, 
“I know the Risk I run, but that do’s not frighten me. If I perish, my Death will be 
Glorious; and if I succeed, I shall do my Country an important Piece of Service”.23  
Refusing to be cowed by her father’s threatening tale of a farmer’s wife being beaten 
into acquiescence to her husband’s will, she steps out of patriarchal power-structures 
with an assertion of her independence and superior knowledge: 
I am nothing mov’d by the Story of that Woman.  I can tell you 
abundance of others to perswade you that you ought not to oppose my 
Design.  Besides, Pardon me for declaring to you, that your opposing me 
would be in vain, for if your Paternal Affection should hinder you to 
grant my Request, I would go and offer myself to the Sultan.
24
 
This ability both to participate in and to counter gender-prescribed behaviours and 
power-play is central to her textual potency: in her manipulation and negotiation 
with her father and Schahriar, she moves between subject and object positions just as 
she does in her dual narrative roles of narrator and narrated.  As in the descriptive 
sequence of her introduction in the text, her internal “qualifications” are her primary 
and most powerful attributes, and yet “besides this” her success is also determined 
by the shell of her (male-perceived) beauty.  “As soon as the Sultan was left alone 
with her, he order’d her to uncover her Face, and found it so beautiful, that he was 
perfectly charm’d with her”.25  The subtle currents of power and powerlessness 
between the agency and passivity of Scheherazade that this text sets up set the tone 
for the interplay between discourses of transformation and stagnation that 
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characterises representations of the Eastern female over so much of the course of the 
eighteenth century.   
 The female playwright Delarivier Manley took up the character of 
Scheherazade almost at the moment of her arrival in London, in 1706.  Her plot of 
her tragedy Almyna: or, The Arabian Vow is taken, we are told in the preface, “from 
the Life of that great Monarch, Caliph Valid Almanzor, who Conquer’d Spain, with 
something of a Hint from the Arabian Nights Entertainments” – yet, as Yeazell 
points out, “the play itself offers more than ‘a Hint’ of the Arabian Nights and very 
little evidence of the known facts about Almanzor”.26  Published ten years before 
Galland’s final volume of the Arabian Nights would reveal whether or not 
Scheherazade’s storytelling would succeed in the transformation of Schahriar, 
Almyna is the “very first in the long line of England’s imaginative responses to these 
influential tales” – and, significantly, this first response is almost the opposite of 
those at the end of the century.
27
  Here, rather than removing Scheherazade from the 
tales, as we will see later editors of the nights do, the tales are removed from 
Scheherazade and she takes centre stage.  Her situation is unchanged: Almanzor has 
taken the same “Bloody Vow… to marry a Lady every Day, and have her cut off next 
morning, to avenge himself for the Disloyalty of his first Sultaness” as was 
advertised on the cover of the Grub Street edition of the Arabian Nights, and 
Almyna, like Scheherazade, has determined to marry the sultan and “save the 
innocent Lives/ Of Virgin-daughters, and their Parent’s tears,/ To stop the Coarse of 
such Barbarity”.28  Although this final, “Coarse… Barbarity” line is a direct 
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quotation from the Arabian Nights, Manley’s heroine functions as an expansion, 
rather than a quotation, of her predecessor.  Almyna  is Scheherazade extended and 
writ large: where Scheherazade tells her father “[i]f I perish, my Death will be 
Glorious; and if I succeed, I shall do my Country an important Piece of Service”, 
Almyna gives heroic orations, pages long.
29
 “I to Glory have resign’d my Life,” she 
cries, “That Spiritual Pride of Noble Hearts!” 
…Glory the strongest passion of great Minds! 
Which none but Souls enlarg’d, can entertain 
Uncommon, wonderful, and Excellent! 
Heroick! Which Excites; nay, more, Commands! 
Our admiration, Homage, and Applause.
30
 
Indeed, the greatness of her mind and the largeness of her soul are this 
Scheherazade’s stock-in-trade.  Where, in the Arabian Nights, she is an autodidact, 
and “had successfully applied her self to Philosophy, Physick, History, and the 
Liberal Arts”, Almyna has spent years studying with the chief dervish at Memphis 
and “What ever Greek or Roman Eloquence/Egyptian Learning and Philosophy can 
teach;/ She has, by Application, made her own” – adding to the autodidactic virtue 
implicit in “made her own” the credentials of a formal, classical education.31 
 Almanzor, in his fury over the betrayal of his wife, centres his many lengthy 
excoriations of women on the longstanding Islamophobic myth that in Islam they are 
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“Form’d as our Prophet says, without a Soul”.32  “Though,” as Yeazell indicates, 
“Manley makes her drama turn on a vulgar misconception of Muslim belief, she also 
represents an East that is itself significantly divided on the subject… the chief 
dervish implies that it is the imperial will rather than the Koranic text that demands 
this reading”.33  It is in this heterogeneous, disputational East – an East, I will argue 
in Part II, that is not only very close to Rushdie’s nostalgic evocations of his secular-
Muslim Bombayite and Kashmiri family, but to his Enlightenment-inflected 
celebrations of argument – that Manley has Almyna win over Almanzor, the avatar of 
male despotism, through scholarly argument.  Rather than using the subtle, 
transformative power of narrative to change him over the course of a thousand and 
one nights, this Scheherazade confronts the Sultan head-on.  Beginning with the tart 
“Since then my gracious Lord, permits me speak,/ Let me, at th’original Mischiefs 
strike,” she dismantles his Qur’anic justifications for his murderous rage with lethal 
intellectual precision: “Revenge, and Jealousy, arrests the Text:/ Thus taught to 
speak, to put a gloss on Murder”.34  She follows this with a philosophical 
disquisition on the nature of conception, birth, and death as proofs for the existence 
of a female soul, and finishes by drawing on her encyclopaedic knowledge of 
classical history with “cou’d the Roman Ladies, their Virginia,/ Lucretia, Portia, 
Clelia, thousands more,/ Without a Soul, have gain’d such endless Fames?”35   
 It becomes clear that in Scheherazade Manley has found a powerful 
spokeswoman for her own proto-feminist agenda – indeed, considering the fact that 
“Almyna” is a near-anagram of the playwright’s name, it seems that in her reading of 
the Arabian Nights narrator, Manley found something of herself; and in the Sultan’s 
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seraglio, something of the world she inhabited.  Yeazell suggests that Almyna’s use 
of argument rather than storytelling may be a result of the “constraints of genre… 
since [her] ability to talk her way to victory can only be granted a limited exhibition 
on stage, the dramatist must perforce find some alternative to the Arabian Nights’ 
dilatory tale-spinning”.  She also posits the possibility that “Manley also wants a 
heroine less concerned with delaying action than with taking it”.36  Although both 
points are well taken, Manley’s celebration of Scheherazade’s intellect, scholarly 
knowledge, and thirst for glory also places a heavy emphasis on her ability to step 
outside prescribed gender bounds.  Whilst it is true that Almyna’s intellectual powers 
are coupled with great beauty, just as Scheherazade’s are, and the impact she makes 
on Almanzor is similarly double (“Is it her Eyes, or Tongue, this Change has 
caus’d?”), Manley ensures that in the end it is her heroine’s internal, rather than 
external, assets that win out.37  Moved to declare that Almyna will be the last woman 
he ever puts to death, Almanzor plans a fake execution.  The final proof he requires 
of her worthiness is her courage in facing her death, and her ability to “by Reason 
rein the Passions”.38  In short, she must live up to her words, meeting narrative with 
action, to prove that if “Glory [is] the strongest passion of great Minds,” her mind 
truly is great, and her soul correspondingly “enlarged”.39 
 Scheherazade’s agency, and this “largeness” of mind and soul which so 
inspires Manley, ebb away in later adaptations of the Arabian Nights, and she is 
moved away from the centre of her stream of narrative and into the margins.  In The 
Oriental Moralist, or The Beauties of the Arabian Nights Entertainments, adapted 
from the Arabian Nights Entertainments in around 1790 by the hack writer Richard 
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Johnson in the guise of “the Rev’d Mr Cooper,” and “accompanied with suitable 
reflections adapted to each Story,” Scheherazade’s frame-narrative is practically 
severed from the tales of the nights themselves.
40
  It appears in an almost self-
contained “introduction” – playing itself out from beginning (the first night) to end 
(Schahriar’s forgiveness) before a single tale has been told, separated from the main 
body of the text by the implicitly supplementary formal nature of a literary 
introduction and by the lack of pagination, which only begins with the first tale.  The 
enumeration of her qualities is lifted almost word-for-word from the Arabian Nights 
Entertainments, but is followed by the neoclassical addition of “to complete the 
portrait, nature had given her the figure and beauty of a Venus, the wisdom of a 
Minerva, and the chastity of a Diana”.41  If the figure of Scheherazade appeared 
super-sexually virtuous and heroic in the Grub-street text, here she is deified to the 
point where she is culturally naturalised into the Roman pantheon.  In the crucial 
confrontation with her father, however, much of the impact of her heroic defiance is 
lost: rather than the knowledge, independence, and transgression of gender roles 
evinced by their exchange in the earlier text, here she is merely presented as 
intractable.  “All the arguments the vizier could make use of were to no purpose,” 
Johnson sighs, “and, finding his daughter inflexible in her purpose, he at last yielded 
to her importunity”.42 
 The twelfth and final volume of the Arabian Nights Entertainments ends with 
this conclusion of the frame-narrative, which I will quote at length: 
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 The Sultan of the Indies could not but admire the prodigious Memory 
of the Sultaness/ his Wife, who had entertained and diverted him so 
many Nights with such new and agreeable Stories, that he believed her 
Stock was inexhaustible. 
  A thousand and one Nights had passed away in these agreeable, 
and innocent Amusements, which contributed so much towards 
removing the Sultan’s fatal Prejudice against all Women; and sweetning 
the Violence of his Temper, that he conceived a great Esteem for the 
Sultaness Scheherazade, and was convinced of her Merit and Great 
Wisdom, and remembred [sic] with what Courage she exposed 
 herself voluntarily to be his Wife, knowing the fatal Destiny of the 
many Sultanesses before her. 
  These Considerations, and the many rare Qualities he knew her 
to be Mistress of, induced him at last to forgive her.  I see lovely 
Scheherazade, said he, that you can  never be at a loss for these Sort of 
Stories to divert me; therefore I renounce, in your Favour, the cruel Law 
I had imposed on my self; and I will have you to be looked upon, as the 
Deliverer of the many Damsels I had resolved to have sacrificed to my 
unjust Resentment.43 
In The Oriental Moralist this is contracted to the span of a single sentence:  
We must not... conclude this Introduction without observing, that after 
this amiable lady had passed a thousand and one nights in telling her 
tales, the sultan became so much delighted with her, that he renounced in 
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her favour the cruel law he had imposed on himself, and ordered her to 
be considered as the deliverer of so many damsels he had resolved to 
sacrifice to his unjust resentment.
44
  
Almost all of Scheherazade's agency in her manipulation and reformation of 
Schahriar – the merit, wisdom, and courage, the rare qualities that she shows she is 
mistress of – is elided into near-passive “amiability”.  He is “delighted” by her, the 
emphasis being on charm rather than esteem.   
 In the main body of the text, beginning on the following page under the title 
The Oriental Moralist in large print, (thus emphasising that the book proper has now 
begun), Scheherazade’s influence gradually ebbs away.  It begins with Dinarzade 
asking her to tell her story, in much the same words that she uses in Entertainments, 
and the frame-narrative recurs for the next few chapters in much the same way as it 
does in the Grub Street editions, but by the ninth chapter references to Scheherazade 
have become increasingly sparse and, when they appear, are cursory gestures like 
“[t]he next morning, at the usual time, a little before day-break, the Sultana, 
beginning a new story, thus addressed the Sultan”.45  Hereafter, Scheherazade does 
not feature until the end of the sixteenth chapter where, having “finished the story of 
the Wonderful Lamp,” she moralises briefly and rather vapidly to Schahriar, calling 
the African magician “a man abandoned to the passion of possessing immense 
treasures by the most horrid and detestable means”.46  Needless to say, this is one of 
Johnson’s “added moral reflections” – Scheherazade’s narrative moral education of 
the Sultan functions far more subtly than this in Entertainments. It is, however, 
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significant that this is the last we ever hear from her in this text.  When Sinbad’s 
voyages are over, on the last page of the book, her place is taken by Johnson’s voice.  
“During the whole course of these voyages made by Sinbad, my youthful readers 
will everywhere observe the interposition of the hand of Providence”.47  It is a final, 
formalised narrative coup-d’état – her story has been taken away from her, her 
readers annexed, her voice silenced.  Not only Scheherazade, but her sister, and by 
extension “all the Eastern nations, Persians, Tartars, and Indians,” advertised in the 
preface to the Grub-Street edition have been entirely excluded from the text’s 
rigorously mono-cultural, prophylactic borders.   Telescoped into the phrase “my 
youthful readers” is not only the infantalisation of the Arabian Nights and the 
limitation of its sphere of influence, but the (faux-)reverendness of Johnson’s pen-
name: Sinbad’s God is Christian providence.  Along with Scheherazade, Islam has 
been decisively written out of the text. 
 Two years later, in 1792, another four-volume edition of the Arabian Nights 
appears which, at first glance, looks to be yet another reissue of the Grub Street text 
(which continued to be printed into the early nineteenth century).  The main title is 
the same – The Arabian Nights Entertainments – but as the eye moves down the 
title-page, it falls upon the space that M. Galland habitually occupies, which now 
contains the words “freely transcribed from the original translation”.48  While there 
are similar patterns of narrative enclosure and exclusion in this “freely transcribed” 
edited and abridged version, Islam is in fact written into the text beyond anything in 
the Grub Street editions.  In a move that could perhaps be read as testimony to an 
implicit awareness of the revolution in France as much as to the late-century impulse 
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to gloss the orient, the “editor” adds to his account of the pre-Scheherazade despair 
of the populace the explanation “[t]he implicit obedience which good Mussulmen 
owe to the Commander of the Faithful, had as yet restrained the inhabitants of 
Bagdad from rebellion”.49  Here Scheherazade is an even more markedly diminished 
figure than she was in The Oriental Moralist.  In this text she is almost entirely 
stripped of her erudition and strength: she is merely introduced as “the beautiful and 
accomplished Scheherazade, daughter of the grand Vizier”, a figure seemingly better 
equipped to attend a society ball than to temper the murderous impulses of a tyrant.
50
  
Armed, if with anything, with a hint of coquettish sexual self-consciousness (“The 
lovely Sultaness [was] pleased to see she had made an impression on his savage 
heart”), she now has the humble passivity of an Ann Radcliffe heroine. “When 
Scheherazade was introduced to the Sultan, he was struck with her beauty, and 
modest sensibility.  Perceiving her in tears, he for a moment forgot his barbarous 
resolution, and endeavoured to comfort her”.51  The externality of her beauty and 
perceived feminine fragility, which we saw working in dialogue with her internal 
qualities in the Arabian Nights Entertainments, has now entirely replaced them.  
Rather than the bold intellectual who walks boldly into the seraglio, here, like a lamb 
to the slaughter, “the charming Scheherazade suffered herself to be conducted to the 
fatal couch, and became a devoted bride to the cruel Schahriar”.52  Even her narrative 
success is subtly undermined by the introduction of a marked keenness on the 
Sultan’s part to hear her stories in the first place: “the Sultan, wondering at so 
singular a request, consented, at the desire of his bride, and even expressed a wish to 
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hear stories which must be singular indeed to be asked for at such a 
moment.  Scheherazade, encouraged by this wish, began…”53 
 Whilst the editor of this text does not go quite as far as Johnson towards the 
removal of the frame-narrative (it is incorporated into the main body of the text 
rather than in an introduction, and the forgiveness of Schahriar is delayed until the 
conclusion of the collection), Scheherazade disappears even more rapidly from these 
pages than she does from those of The Oriental Moralist.  After she becomes “a 
devoted bride” she appears less and less in the spaces between stories, and the threat 
that her life-sustaining narrative is pitted against is almost entirely removed.  On 
page twenty-seven the reader is assured that “[t]he Sultan was delighted with these 
stories. He requested Scheherazade to proceed next night to another: and going into 
the Divan, the Vizier, his Family, the Court, and the people in general, were 
overjoyed to find that he gave no orders to put the beautiful Sultaness to death”.54  
And this is the last we hear of Scheherazade for three volumes, until the final 
paragraph of volume four, where she is given the rather cursory send-off of “[t]he 
Sultan of the Indies could not but admire the memory of his Sultaness, who had now, 
for a thousand and one nights, entertained him with these agreeable stories. Her 
beauty, her patriotism, in exposing her life to his unreasonable revenge, had long 
since obtained her possession of his heart”.55  His admiration for her memory is the 
only acknowledgement of her intellectual or narrative achievement – and even then it 
is a recognition of her Bariamma-style retentive rather than creative abilities – and 
the very notion of her patriotism in “exposing her life” to him is laced with passivity.   
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 Scheherazade, by the turn of the nineteenth century, has lost her voice – her 
transformative power to “make her world as she talked about it” removed, along with 
her encyclopaedic knowledge, her extraordinary intellect, and her indomitable will.  
What is left is an oriental doll.  In the span of the hundred years from when 
Scheherazade first drew breath to tell her tales in Europe, until her voice was 
silenced and her stories taken from her, she contributed to the construction of a 
dynamic literary space in which fantasies of female liberation could be explored. 
 
Liberation in the Harem 
 Scheherazade’s frame tale is, at its heart, the story of a women’s revolution.  
In the act of storytelling in the seraglio she saves herself and the women of the nation 
from death, and replaces a despotic regime of male violence with a reign of 
tolerance.  As I explore in more detail in Part II, the East had long been a literary 
locale in which Europe could think about itself before the Arabian Nights reached 
France and England, but the colossal cultural impact of Scheherazade’s narrative 
reconfigured the harem as a zone in which to think about a gendered sense of 
liberation.  The theatricality implicit in the title the Arabian Nights Entertainments 
was immediately embraced, as we have seen, by Manley as she masqueraded in the 
narrative garments of Scheherazade to propound her proto-feminist assertions of 
intellectual equality on the London stage, and this sense of the liberation to be found 
through theatrical engagement with the East, or through oriental masquerade, 
permeates early eighteenth-century culture on either side of the channel. 
 Montesquieu’s highly influential epistolary novel Persian Letters (1721) 
follows two Persian travellers as they journey through Europe.  Through their letters 
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to one another and to Mullahs back home, they enact a comparative commentary on 
society, culture, and government in Persia and Western Europe – a commentary I 
engage with in detail in the following chapter.  In an early letter from Paris, Rica 
expresses his weariness of being the oriental Other: “I found portraits of me 
everywhere; I saw myself multiplied in all the shops, upon all the mantelpieces, so 
fearful were they of not having seen me enough!”  
I therefore resolved to set aside my Persian clothing and dress instead as 
a European, to see whether anything in my appearance would still 
astonish.  From this text I learned my true worth: stripped of my exotic 
finery, I found myself appraised at my real value, and I had good reason 
to complain of my tailor, through whom I’d lost, in an instant, the 
attention and esteem of the public; for suddenly a dreadful void 
surrounded me; sometimes I’d pass an entire hour in a group of people 
without anyone looking at me…56 
This sense of identity as a form of masquerade resurfaces periodically throughout the 
text, not just in terms of the perception and reception of Otherness, but in terms of 
simply existing in society – indeed, in a sense in terms of the perception of 
Likeness.
57
  In a later letter, Rica overhears two Frenchmen talking in the next room.  
They are hatching a plot to create a reputation for themselves as wits, and decide to 
create a performance of wittiness:  “we’ll protect one another with prearranged 
signals; today you’ll shine, tomorrow you’ll support me”.58  In six months, they 
decide, they will have seats in the Academy, at which point they will be able to 
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abandon their performances because then “you’ll be a wit whatever you do”59.  As 
Andrew Kahn points out, this exchange “displays conviction in the notion that only 
appearance is authenticity.  This Parisian is no more a native of his world than Rica, 
unless he can satisfy social expectations of his identity”.60  This notion of identity as 
something created by the wearing or removing of a turban, a pair of breeches, a set 
of mannerisms, or a badge of membership is, beneath its primary function of 
satirising French society, a further inscription of a doctrine of universalism that runs 
through Rica’s and Usbek’s exchanges – and which we will see reinscribed by 
Rushdie in The Enchantress of Florence.  Beneath the clothes, beneath the social 
masquerading, it suggests, people may be the same.   
 Interspersed with these letters, however, is a correspondence between Usbek 
and the women and eunuchs of his seraglio that seems, at first reading, to be 
participating in a completely oppositional discourse.  The harem is not solely a space 
for positive change in the early eighteenth century.  Whilst Aravamudan’s claim that 
“imperial conquest turned Orientalism malefic” is well taken, it is important to 
remember that there was a strong negative charge operating in European 
representations of the orient beside and bound up with the literary use of the East as 
zone of liberatory experimentation.
61
  The first sentence of Usbek’s first harem letter, 
addressed to his chief black eunuch, is awash with the language of despotic oriental 
misogyny: “You are the faithful custodian of the most beautiful women in Persia; to 
you I have entrusted the worldly possessions I hold most dear; you guard the keys to 
those fateful doors which open solely for me”.  Each of the three clauses lowers the 
reader progressively into a rendering of the harem as an eroticised heart of oriental 
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darkness.  We are taken from the ambivalence of “custodian,” with its doubled 
significations of care-taker and imprisoner, to the cold objectification of women as 
“worldly possessions,” to the dark, prolepsis-laden “fatal doors”.  He is addressing 
his eunuch as the guardian of stasis: “the scourge of vice, the pillar of fidelity,” 
“equally in the silence of the night as in the bustle of the day,” he is responsible for 
ensuring that the women remain in a state of suspended animation until Usbek’s 
return.
62
  Over the course of Persian Letters, Usbek travels simultaneously in both 
directions along Schahriar’s trajectory from despotism to tolerance.  As his sense of 
inter-cultural similitude grows stronger, so the tenor of his letters to the seraglio 
grows more and more thunderously despotic.   
 The women are rebelling.  As the novel progresses, unrest in the harem 
builds to the point where it begins to tear itself apart, and Usbek’s frantic attempts to 
transfer his despotic power to his eunuchs (“I grant you unlimited power over the 
entire seraglio… may fear, may terror be your companions”) can do nothing to halt 
it.  “I do not know what is happening,” writes the eunuch Solim, “but everything is 
turning out wretchedly… it is as though anything is permitted”.63  “I no longer 
observe, on the faces of your wives, that resolute, severe virtue that I used to see; a 
new joyfulness, which is everywhere evident, is to my eyes infallible proof of some 
new satisfaction; I notice, in the smallest things, a bold freedom hitherto 
unknown”.64  These letters to and from the harem become more and more frequent as 
the text wears on, until in the end they completely subsume any other 
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correspondence in the novel.  The final letter of the book is from Roxane, the one 
wife that Usbek has never doubted.
65
 
Yes, I have deceived you; I have bribed your eunuchs, I have played 
upon your jealousy, and I have managed to make of your dreadful 
seraglio an abode of delights and pleasures. 
I am about to die: soon the poison will be coursing through my veins, for 
why would I remain here, when the only man who gave me a reason for 
living is dead? 
…How could you suppose me so credulous as to believe that the sole 
purpose of my existence was to adore your caprices?  That while you 
refused yourself nothing, you had the right to frustrate every desire of 
mine?  No: I may have lived in servitude, but I have always been free: I 
have rewritten your laws to conform to those of nature, and my spirit has 
always remained independent.
66
 
In this letter she makes it clear that she has been the author of the seraglio’s 
destruction.  Scheherazade’s dark twin, through a stream of destructive narrative she 
has shattered his despotic hold over the denizens of the harem and, in a phrase that 
strikingly anticipates Mahnaz Afkhami’s statement that “salvation… lies in our 
being able to recreate our culture and our beliefs in ways that are conducive to the 
life we must live,” she has “rewritten [his] laws” that she might remain 
independent.
67
   
                                                          
65  Though Montesquieu did add supplementary letters to the mid-century edition, including a further 
ten letters after Roxane’s. 
66  Montesquieu, Letters, 213. 
67 Crossette, “Muslim Women”; Montesquieu, Letters, 213. 
74 
 
 In a chilling love letter from Usbek to Roxane earlier in the text, he lyrically 
and affectionately recalls having raped her.  “Fortunate Roxane!” he exclaims 
several times, as he speaks of her sequestration in the seraglio, “heaven gave you to 
me to ensure my happiness, yet with what difficulty did I gain possession of the 
treasure which you defended with such resolution!”68  He writes fondly of the tears 
she shed on the many occasions when he tried to rape her, as proof of her “frightened 
modesty,” and how he found himself “intoxicated” by the way in which, after he 
finally managed to “vanquish” her, she saw him as “an enemy who had violated 
[her] and not as a husband who loved [her]”.  He then goes on to contrast the brazen 
behaviour of European women to her example of chaste Eastern womanhood, 
assuring her that “if you were here you would be outraged at the ignoble disgrace 
into which your sex has fallen”.69  Except the passage that follows, describing 
Roxane’s charms – “you enhance the brilliance of your complexion with the most 
beautiful hues… you perfume your whole body… you put on your prettiest 
garments” – reads almost identically to that which catalogues the shamefulness of 
the women of Europe, with “their artfully painted complexions, the ornaments with 
which they adorn themselves, the care they lavish on their persons”.70  The position 
of the women in the seraglios of Persia and the polite drawing rooms of Paris is, it 
seems, perhaps not as different as it may initially appear.  As Alain Grosrichard puts 
it, it is “[a]s if the novelist had wanted to lead us to imagine, in the features of the 
Oriental seraglio, a future which the historian dare not forsee”.71  Montesquieu 
capitalises on the harem as an existing literary zone of rebellion, set in a reassuringly 
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distant cultural and geographical locale, to criticise inequalities in his own society – 
in particular, as I explore in the following chapter, the despotism of Louis XIV.   
 The use of oriental masquerade as a means of liberation is not merely a 
formal phenomenon, however.  In Daniel Defoe’s Roxana, published three years 
after Persian Letters in 1724, the sexually liberated heroine creates a series of 
different identities for herself – using masquerade as a means of making her way to 
the top of a patriarchal society.  As manifested by the novel’s full title, The Fortunate 
Mistress: Or, A History of the Life and Vast Variety of Fortunes of Mademoiselle de 
Beleau, Afterwards Called the Countess de Wintselsheim, in Germany, Being the 
Person known by the Name of the Lady Roxana, in the Time of King Charles II, she 
is a mistress of self-transformation of all kinds, and yet the most significant of the 
various masquerades and deceptions Roxana employs whilst sleeping her way to 
becoming Countess, is her “habit of a Turkish princess”.72  The usage of the term 
“habit” here is self-consciously doubled – for Roxana is at pains to inform the reader 
that she “learned the Turkish language; their way of dressing and dancing, and some 
Turkish or rather Moorish songs” from “a little female Turkish slave… taken at sea 
by a Maltese man of war”.73  Like her predecessor Moll Flanders before her, Roxana 
is a polyglot: able to learn the languages and cultures of both foreign nations and 
social classes at will, she navigates her way through the world by a process of 
continual self-fictionalisation that is reminiscent of Scheherazade’s power to “make 
the world as she talks about it” – as, perhaps, is the frame-tale of the mature 
Roxana’s repentance, which surrounds it.74  “It must be confessed,” she tells us, “that 
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the [Turkish] habit was infinitely advantageous to me,” and indeed she achieves 
royal favour through a combination of a French dance which, she admits, “being 
perfectly new… pleased the company exceedingly… they all thought it had been 
Turkish”, and her Oriental costume.75  This French-Turkish masquerade, a 
combination also reminiscent of the Arabian Nights’ mingled Eastern and French 
provenance, materially alters both her fortune and her identity: so potently erotic is 
the sight of a white woman in “Mohametan” garb dancing in an “oriental” fashion, 
that one of the men of the audience cries out “Roxana! Roxana!” – possibly, as 
Zonana notes, remembering Montesquieu’s Roxane.76  “Upon which foolish 
accident,” the heroine complains, “I had the name of Roxana fixed upon me all over 
the town, as effectively as if I had been christened Roxana”.77  As she 
instrumentalises the garb of the Muslim woman and capitalises on the erotic power 
of the harem in order to achieve agency and step over polite gender boundaries, it is 
significant that the name her male audience chooses for her is redolent of female 
rebellion.78  As much as she is buying into the sexual allure of the oriental woman, 
she is buying into her capacity for change – although, once changed by this act of 
branding, she finds her own orientalised history hard to shrug off. 
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 The possibility for personal and social metamorphosis in the harem had been 
experienced first-hand six years earlier by another self-fictionalising – though not, in 
herself, fictional – female polyglot: Lady Mary Wortley Montagu.  Montagu, rather 
like Scheherazade herself, was an autodidact, teaching herself Latin and Greek as a 
child and retaining a passionate interest in languages, literature and history 
throughout her life.
79
  When her husband was appointed Ambassador to Turkey in 
1716, she determined to travel with him, and the collection of letters she wrote back 
to England, to members of the aristocracy and literary friends – including Pope – 
became a runaway success when they were published in 1763, after her death.  This 
doubleness of release makes this a difficult text to place in a cultural history of the 
eighteenth century, for whilst these letters – or versions of them – were in circulation 
amongst the haute monde of London in the late 1710s, it is only in the 1760s that 
they enter mainstream British cultural consciousness.  It is also worth noting that 
whilst she had many admirers, amongst them towering figures like Johnson and 
Voltaire, her reception amongst her peers was often hostile, particularly towards the 
end of her life.  Whilst her views of the Eastern female space cannot be said to have 
directly influenced much of the early eighteenth-century vision of the harem, 
however, her experience of it as an inspiring and powerfully metamorphic zone is 
significant, not merely because of the stark contrast it makes with later feminist 
orientalist texts, but because of its long afterlife: her letters have been in wide 
circulation ever since their first publication. 
 Masquerade is a crucial point of engagement with the East for Montagu – 
both literally and figuratively.  Soon after her arrival in Constantinople, she writes to 
                                                          
79  See Isobel Grundy’s biography Lady Mary Wortley Montagu: Comet of the Enlightenment, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
78 
 
her sister “I am now in my Turkish habit… ’tis admirably becoming”.80  Her use of 
the word “habit” is, if less self-consciously so than Roxana’s, just as doubled: like 
Defoe’s heroine, she learns Turkish and plunges herself into Turkish culture to the 
point, she would have Lady Rich believe, where she begins to forget her English.
81
  
This opportunity to immerse herself in Turkish culture is the product of her own 
aristocratic credentials, and it is important to remember that, however valuable her 
insights, the culture into which she is admitted is that of the Turkish elite.  “’Tis very 
easy to see they have more liberty than we have,” she writes of Turkish women, 
no woman, of what rank so ever being permitted to go in the streets 
without two muslins, one that covers her face all but her eyes and 
another that hides the whole dress of her head… You may guess how 
effectually this disguises them, that there is no distinguishing the great 
lady from her slave.  ’Tis impossible for the most jealous husband to 
know his wife when he meets her; and no man dare either touch or 
follow a woman in the street. …This perpetual masquerade gives them 
entire liberty of following their inclinations without danger or 
discovery.
82
 
Indeed, Montagu takes advantage of this liberating masquerade on several occasions, 
taking the opportunity, like the Caliph from the Arabian Nights, of wandering the 
streets incognito – visiting “the Exchange in [her] own Turkish dress, which is 
disguise sufficient”, and, “dressed in [her] Turkish habit”, being admitted to mosques 
“without scruple”.83  This freedom through anonymity – the scandalous essence of 
the masquerade balls that remained popular for much of the eighteenth century – 
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whilst evidently exaggerated (she admits, at one point, “I believe they guessed who I 
was”), is a powerfully suggestive notion to Montagu.  Through it, as Srinivas 
Aravamudan points out, she “invents a female subjectivity existing without 
subjection, a sexual agency without concomitant object status, and generalized 
public privileges abiding with few corresponding obligations… The compulsory 
“disguise” that women wear in public, a restriction that keeps their social 
participation to an unindividuated minimum, paradoxically enhances their unfettered 
agency”.84 
   Beyond this individual liberation that Montagu experiences within the 
sartorial space of the veil is the atmosphere of homosocial freedom she finds within 
the hammam.  “It is,” she writes, “the women’s coffee-house, where all the news of 
the town is told, scandal invented, & c.”.85  Aravamudan suggests that 
Englishwomen themselves could not come up with an alternative to the 
coffeehouse’s resolutely masculine monopoly of sociopolitical space.  
The exclusively male preserve of the coffeehouses has been identified by 
historians of modernity as a vital innovation that created a public sphere 
of free political discussion, leading to the invention of liberal democracy.  
In this precise sense, the bathhouse simulates the Habermasian sphere of 
communicative freedom.
86
 
Whilst the link between coffee-house and hammam is worthy of note, Aravamudan’s 
claim that there is a precise parallel to be drawn between bathhouse and 
Habermasian public sphere is perhaps a little stretched.  Freedom of communication 
there may have been, but the implication that the Ottoman female hammam was a 
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zone in which substantial political reform could be enacted does not bear much 
weight.  Nevertheless, this notion of a complete freedom of exchange between 
women in a zone of male exclusion where “women thrive without men and find 
pleasure in living together without rancour and dissent” is highly significant, and has 
been termed a “feminotopia” by Nussbaum, who theorizes it in terms of Mary 
Astell’s proto-feminist community for unmarried women in A Serious Proposal for 
the Ladies (1694) as an “exclusively female [space]” which “[contests] masculine 
versions of experience”.87  Montagu’s experience of this space and Nussbaum’s 
theorization of it, are strikingly reminiscent of Leila Ahmed’s feminist reading of 
space in Saudi Arabia in the nineteen-eighties: 
Saudi society not only designates and demarcates men’s space, it also 
designates and demarcates women’s space, and furthermore declares it – 
women’s space but not men’s space – inviolable. In their space, women 
can be, and often are, freely together, freely exchanging information and 
ideas, including about men, without danger of being overheard by men. 
For just as this space is accessible to women across class lines, so it is 
also absolutely and unconditionally barred, when women other than kin 
are present, to men.
88
  
Montagu’s writings, then, anticipate a feminism that extends beyond cultural 
boundaries, and overlaps self-Other binaries between Eastern and Western 
womanhood: a feminism that is still, three hundred years later, struggling to gain 
momentum. 
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The Fossilisation of the Harem 
 By the time Montagu’s letters were published in 1763, the transformative 
power of the Eastern female space was weakening in the literary orient.  Samuel 
Johnson’s novel Rasselas, published in 1759, marks the beginning of the turning of 
this tide of embryonic proto-feminist cultural relativism.  A rhetoric of likeness is 
still in operation in this text, with the Ethiopian protagonists, Imlac, Rasselas, 
Rasselas’s sister Nekayah and Pekuah, her maid, all moving fluidly between 
positions of “‘oriental’ subjectivity” and Christian morality, and the cultural 
aggrandization of Europe.
89
  Though highly problematic, Johnson’s use of his East 
African characters as mouthpieces through which to propound his views on morality 
and society implies at the least a notion of potential parallelism between Europe and 
the East.  This is complicated by the intersect between East and West, Islam and 
Christianity, however: his protagonists are Coptic Christians, and as such exist in a 
liminal zone between Easternness and Christianity, offering Johnson the opportunity 
to explore distance and difference, but also sameness. Although Christianity and the 
East are by no means mutually exclusive, Christianity, however riven by schisms, 
was central to a sense of European identity – and the geopolitical idea of 
Christendom in Europe (though by this point only really a cultural memory) had 
become, by this point, more associated with the occident than the orient. The cultural 
dialogue that Johnson sets up between orient and occident is a far cry from the 
occidental acknowledgement of oriental cultural equality, even superiority, which 
Montagu, also problematically, sought to promote in her letters.  His characters’ 
(E)nlightenment is manifested through their frank acceptance of European 
supremacy: “[t]hey are more powerful, Sir, than we,” Imlac tells Rasselas, “because 
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they are wiser; knowledge will always predominate over ignorance, as man governs 
the animals”.90  Johnson’s is a proto-historicist rendering of the East: the orient is 
archaic and behind the West both culturally and socially, but the behindness it 
exhibits appears to operate in a completely discontinuous temporality to that of the 
West.  Western superiority is “the unsearchable will of the Supreme Being”; the East 
is static in its backwardness, there is no question of it being in “the waiting room of 
history”, it is an inalterably historical zone.91  The harem Pekuah inhabits when she 
is abducted by a band of Arabs, therefore, is almost diametrically opposite to the 
feminotopian zones of engaging, liberated womanhood which Montagu describes.  
Indeed, the principle of womanhood as a unifying factor between Islamic and 
Christian (Eastern and Western) females is directly addressed and refuted: 
“There were women in your Arab’s fortress,” said the princess, “why did 
you not make them your companions, enjoy their conversation, and 
partake their diversions?”… “The diversions of the women”, answered 
Pekuah, “were only childish play, by which the mind, accustomed to 
stronger operations, could not be kept busy… They had no ideas but of 
the few things that were within their view, and had hardly names for any 
thing but their cloaths and their food.”92 
This constitutes a wholesale rejection of the trope of harem sensuality on Johnson’s 
part.  As Arthur Weitzman explains, he is systematically destroying “the hedonistic 
and romantic notion of the voluptuous lives led by Moslem men, which had become 
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a staple of Oriental fiction in the eighteenth century”.93  The lack of conversation 
shuts down the Eastern female space as a zone of Habermasian communicative 
freedom.  Johnson is destroying the dynamism of the (imagined) Eastern woman, 
and the world of the seraglio; methodically stripping away the layered myths of 
oriental magnificence, eroticism and sexual transgression to reveal a newly-neutered 
harem, a barren womb in which no metamorphoses take place, but only stagnation.   
 This new mode of representation becomes increasingly popular as the century 
wears on: the theatricality of the harem, the sense of potential masquerade-affiliated 
liberation within its walls, is replaced with stasis and fossilisation.  The sterilization 
of the harem seems to have been instrumental to the development of the eighteenth-
century project which Karen O’Brien terms “the historical investigation of human 
sociability and the historicising of women”, which gathered force in the lead up to 
“the demand, first made at the end of the very end of the century, for equal civil and 
political rights for women”: the birth of feminism.94  The Eastern woman is a 
constant point of reference, for example, in William Alexander’s The History of 
Women (1779): whilst the women of Europe oscillate between wantonness and 
chastity in response to the changing historical perceptions of them by their menfolk, 
“the women of the East,” we are told, “have exhibited always the same appearance: 
their manners, customs, and fashions, like their rocks, have stood unaltered the test 
of many revolving ages”.95  There is also, at this time, a distinct desexualisation of 
the Eastern woman’s plight in operation within mainstream literary production or, 
rather, the perception of their oppression moves from the specifically sexual to the 
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general – and to the spiritual.  The myth that Muslims believed women to have no 
souls had been in operation in the West for centuries, indeed it is something that 
Montagu makes a point of tackling in a letter to the Abbé Conti in 1718.
96
  It had, 
however, remained largely subordinate to the erotic aspect of the harem scenario 
until this point when, as the feminist voice began to find utterance, it also sought its 
shadow in the East.  The interchangeable terms “Turkish,” “Eastern,” and 
“Mahometan” were used as signifiers for phenomena which would eventually come 
to be called “sexism” and “misogyny” and used as tools with which to interrogate 
Britain’s social and cultural past.  In his Life of Milton, published the same year as 
Alexander’s History of Women, Johnson muses “there appears in his books 
something like a Turkish contempt of females as subordinate and inferior beings”, 
and Wollstonecraft, writing ten years later, says of Milton’s representation of Eve: “I 
cannot comprehend his meaning, unless, in the true Mahometan strain, he meant to 
deprive us of souls, and insinuate that we were beings only designed by sweet 
attractive grace, and docile blind obedience”.97  Indeed, “it is ‘Mahometanism’ – and 
the ‘Mahometan’ institution of the seraglio or harem – that Wollstonecraft singles 
out as the grand type for all oppression of women,” as Zonana points out.98  
 Wollstonecraft is amongst the first, and certainly the most influential, of the 
proponents of feminist orientalism.  To go back to Heffernan’s formulation, the 
space of the Eastern woman that had been for so long the metonymic heart of the 
European conception of the orient had given birth to a parallel space closer to home.  
By the end of the eighteenth century, the space the European woman occupied had 
become, in a sense, the metonymic heart of the occident: she had become central to 
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Europe’s understanding of itself.  Furthermore, as the rhetoric of empire grew 
stronger in Europe, so its definition of progress grew to resemble its definition of 
itself: Alexander’s formulation that “the rank… and condition, in which we find 
women in any country, mark out to us with the greatest precision, the exact point in 
the scale of civil society, to which the people of such country have arrived” became 
central to the way in which Europe, soon to begin to thinking about itself as “the 
West”, positioned itself in the world.99  Alexander’s ideas derive from stadial 
theories of social progress expounded by thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment such 
as Adam Smith and Adam Ferguson.  European women came to define the top of an 
index of civilization, the end of a timeline of human progress, and Eastern women 
came to be seen as the living embodiments of earlier points in history.  Whilst 
clichés about Islamic culture, and especially about life in the harem, had been in 
widespread circulation for centuries, it is during this period that negatively charged 
shorthand ideas about the oppression of women in the Islamic world began to 
become fixed in the imagination of the nascent West.  The harem became a tableau 
rather than a performance, a static counter in arguments the West had about itself.  
What had briefly been configured as a feminotopian place of agency, of cultural 
interchange that could augment European life and even improve it, became a femino-
dystopia: receptacle of everything the West most wanted to distance itself from.  The 
West’s harem became a museum, and the women in it, exhibits of a shameful past. 
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Inside the Harem-Museum – or – “The woman in the veil: a horror 
story”100 
In a 1984 interview, Rushdie commented that “Midnight’s Children was a 
book that was deliberately constructed to be very open; Shame describes a very 
closed society… and so Shame is a closed system”.101  Himself a powerful generator 
of cultural shorthand, the closed system Rushdie describes goes beyond his structural 
attempt “to write a novel without a central character… [with] the characters of the 
novel standing in a circle facing inwards,” through to the physical and emotional 
spaces the characters inhabit, and to the abstract notions of religion and culture 
which are collapsed into them and which they, in turn, are trapped within.
102
 Aijaz 
Ahmad characterises this sense of enclosure as a “cage-like quality,” and roots it in 
the novel’s conception of the nation and the impermeability of its boundaries: “[t]he 
sense that Pakistan is a cage… [the] sense of being trapped,” he writes, “permeates 
the whole book right up to the final denouement where we find that even dictators 
cannot cross the ‘frontier’ and escape their cage”.103  He goes on to state that “any 
representation of women, whether in fiction or in life, has to do, surely, with gender 
relations, but also with more than gender relations; it is almost always indicative of a 
much larger structure of feelings and a much more complex social grid”.104  As I 
have demonstrated, this is particularly true of Shame – and, indeed, recalls the late 
eighteenth-century use of the position of women in society as an index of relative 
civilization – however Ahmad fails to trace the “larger structure” of the nation-cage 
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inwards, rather than outwards, down to the metonymic heart of the “social grid”: the 
woman-cage.  
 Whether incarcerated in attics, mouldering bungalows and marble palaces by 
fathers and husbands, hermetically sealed inside the bodies and minds of other 
(imprisoned) women by the narrator, trapped inside their own maimed and cauterised 
psyches, or the determined occupiers of self-made world- or men-excluding 
chrysalises, all women in the text are contained within prophylactic envelopes of one 
kind or another.  The Eastern female space, the harem-veil-prison, is the cage that 
haunts the text – the cage that is the text.  As Catherine Cundy points out, Rushdie’s 
fiction is often “a case of content dictating form,” and in Shame the theme of female 
containment is also a textual practice.
105
  The book consists of a set of overlapping, 
but not interlinking, enclosures, each with a woman inside it.  It works like a 
mismatched set of Russian dolls, all straining to fit inside the shape of one monstrous 
female imprisonment, the “Mother Country”.106 
 We have seen Ahmed remind Western feminists that “negatively charged 
speculations and statements about harem life form the pre-history of their 
impressions. Although the specific detail and content of what was said has long ago 
faded, the negative charge has passed into the culture and become part of the cultural 
surround”.107  I would suggest that whilst this may be particularly true of the 
negative charge of feminist orientalism, older tropes of the harem as a 
transformative, metamorphic space, have also become negatively charged.  The three 
sisters, Chunni, Munnee and Bunny, with whom this section started, live in a space 
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that is clearly the legacy of late eighteenth century texts like Rasselas and The 
Vindication of the Rights of Woman: not so much “the waiting room of history,” but 
history’s cabinet of curiosities.108  Nishapur is effectively a museum: it is a place of 
“positively archaeological antiquity,” with “outsize chambers stuffed brim-full with 
the material legacy of generations of rapaciously acquisitive forebears”.109  As 
Brennan points out, “[t]he Shakil household betrays a history of collaboration, in 
which many of the English imperial habits are symbolised”.110  What he does not 
articulate in his analysis, however, is that whatever its past before the sisters’ self-
imprisonment, Nishapur as we see it in the text is a place “beyond history,” an extra-
temporal zone of history-defying pastness.  Murmurs of colonial memory and 
imprints of a colonial past do exist there, but they are rendered simultaneous to “the 
impossible forms of painted Neolithic pottery in the Kotdiji style,” and “bronze 
implements of utterly fabulous age”.111  This sense of temporal polyphony and 
disjunction is emphasised by Rushdie’s use of the Hegiran calendar.  “All this 
happened in the fourteenth century”, Rushdie-narrator tells us, neatly (if 
unconsciously) summarizing Scottish Enlightenment notions of comparative 
civilizational temporality, “…[t]ime cannot be homogenized as easily as milk, and in 
those parts, until quite recently, the thirteen-hundreds were still in full swing”.112  
Amidst this extra/poly-temporal “thing-infested jungle… [this] mother-country,” the 
three sister-mothers are merely one more “oblivion-sprinkled” relic of a previous 
age: exhibits in a museum they were born into and in which, in the final passage of 
the novel, they will die.
113
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Monsters in the Harem-Museum 
And yet the barrenness of this Rasselas-style harem-museum, in which 
“nothing new seemed capable of growth,” is also a zone of monstrous 
metamorphosis.
114
  In his chapter on Montagu and the hammam, Aravamudan 
writes:  
Architecturally labyrinthine, the enclosed hammam… became a more 
generalized allegory for psychosexual interiors.  The dreamscape of the 
bathhouse may suggest a uterine memory of the mother – or the figure of 
“our General Mother,” as Montagu formally states it.115 
Nishapur, otherwise referred to as the “mother-country”, represents another intersect 
in the text’s woman-Islam-nation metonymic structure.116  Whilst Pakistan in Shame 
is never directly personified as a mother in the way that India is in Midnight’s 
Children, it is frequently referred to in the feminine – as, significantly, is history 
itself – and, as discussed above, is mapped onto the same territory as the Islamic East 
and zones of female oppression and imprisonment.  The mother-nation as a place of 
origin (birth) and a place of confinement (the womb) looms large in the text’s chain 
of metonymic female spaces, and the labyrinthine corridors of Nishapur constitute 
not so much a “uterine memory” as a uterine “presence” of a monstrous mother.  
 As the Shakil sisters begin to display the symptoms of pregnancy (one real, 
two phantom) they, “by virtue of dressing identically and through the 
incomprehensible effects of their unusual, chosen life, [begin] to resemble each other 
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so closely that even the servants made mistakes”.117  Their individual features 
masked by the carapace of mysticism hardening around them, the sister-mothers 
become a faceless trinity, “the simultaneity of their behaviour suggest[ing] the 
operation of some form of communal mind”.118  The longer they remain inside their 
manless zenana, their sultan-free harem, the further they retreat into the uniformity 
of the imagined woman: the blank canvas, the projector-screen.  Gradually the 
depiction of their weird-sisterhood, their “three-in-oneness,” becomes more 
nightmarishly physical: rather than three identical entities they become a single, 
many-limbed, many-headed, many-breasted individual or goddess.  “[Y]ou drank 
from half a dozen [nipples]”, they tell their son Omar and, later, “six hands fly to 
three heads and take up hear-no-see-no-speak-no evil positions”.119  This is 
mythologisation in the truest sense of the word: the six breasts recall both beast-
mother (Mowgli, Romulus and Remus, “suckled… on the feral multiple breasts of a 
hairy moon-howling dam”) and fertility goddess; the multiple limbs, Hindu gods; the 
multiple heads, Hindu demons, hydras, and perhaps even a “hell-bitch”, Cerberus’s 
mate-mother guarding the portal to hell.
120
  The primitive God-Demon-Beast-Mother 
figure which emerges from the mythical depths of the harem is all the more insidious 
because of the light-hearted, engaging way in which Rushdie produces it.  Made 
cuddly by the sister-mothers’ comic “trialogue”, and the narrator’s roguish “nudge-
nudge-wink-wink” pattern of allusions, the bestial demon-god-mother is only 
revealed in its true, terrifying power during the final “Judgement Day” section of the 
text.
121
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 Trapped in the monsterous uterine “mother-country” of Nishapur, the sisters’ 
son Omar begins to hate his mothers and himself becomes deformed by the pressures 
of his life in their harem space.  The Shame-cage, as we saw Ahmad indicate earlier, 
is not a space with exclusively female occupants.  Its boundaries, however, are 
always echoes of the central theme of female imprisonment, always echoes of a 
suffocating, monstrous womb.   The cell in which Raza incarcerates Iskander at the 
end of the book, is “death’s belly, an inverse womb, [the] dark mirror of a 
birthplace” and Iskander’s execution by hanging is an echo of the death of Raza’s 
son, strangled by the umbilical cord during Bilquìs’s labour.  The machinations of 
the male despotic Islamic state are revealed, in the end, to be trapped in the same 
deathly, deforming walls of the female enclosure that it created.  Death is implicitly a 
woman: Iskander is “death’s baby, travelling down the death canal,” and the threat of 
deadly violence lurks within the women of Shame.  Rushdie’s feminism in the text, 
as Grewal points out, is predicated on “a patriarchal fear of women,” and operates 
through “playing on and by showing the potential for destruction that is contained 
within women”.122  Sufiya Zinobia, the brain-damaged daughter of Raza and Bilquìs, 
is mentally deformed by her parents’ disappointment that she is not a son and 
becomes, as Ambreen Hai summarizes, “the retarded, monstrous, increasingly 
degenerate allegory of female rage, the repository of a culture’s inability to feel 
shame”.123 “[D]isorder’s avatar,” she stalks the night raping men and then ripping 
their heads off, the incarnation not only of shame and female rage but, as Ahmad 
explains, “the oldest of the misogynist myths: the virgin who is really a vampire, the 
irresistible temptress who seduces men in order to kill them, not an object of male 
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manipulation but a devourer of hapless men”.124  She is the incarnation of patriarchal 
fear: she effeminizes, emasculates, and kills men. 
 Sufiya is, in fact, a far-off echo of Montesquieu’s Roxane – the negative 
charge left over from the early female revolution in the seraglio.  Her duplicitous 
description of the wreckage of the harem in her penultimate letter to Usbek reads like 
an excerpt from anywhere in roughly the final quarter of Shame: 
Horror, darkness and terror hold sway in the seraglio, which is shrouded 
in ghastly mourning; at every moment a tiger gives vent in it to all his 
rage… He keeps us locked up separately in our rooms; although we are 
alone, he makes us wear the veil; we are no longer permitted to speak to 
one another; our sole remaining freedom is in tears.
125
 
When it becomes clear that Roxane has been the instrument of the harem’s undoing, 
her image of the tiger – superficially representing Usbek’s vengeful eunuch – begins 
to look like a self-portrait, shaking the walls of the seraglio as she roars “with all the 
violence of loathing”.126  In a final, dark modulation of Scheherazade’s narrative-as-
life formula, as the poison courses through her veins, the pen drops from her hand 
and her life ends, the book ends with her.  Two hundred and sixty-one years later, 
Sufiya’s rage has transformed her into a mythical “white panther” with “fiery eyes” 
and she is, “[f]or the first time in her life… free”.127  Her female fury builds up 
inside her until, as she stares at her husband Omar Shakil, she explodes, “the fireball 
                                                          
124 Rushdie, Shame, 219; Ahmad, “Rushdie’s Shame,” 1468. 
125 Montesquieu, Letters, 211. 
126 Montesquieu, Letters, 213. 
127 Rushdie, Shame, 254. 
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of her burning, rolling outwards to the horizon like the sea,” and with her dies the 
narrative.
128
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Part II 
 
Islamic Despotism and  
The Satanic Verses 
 
 
 
 
    Messenger, do please lend a 
    careful ear.  Your monophilia, 
    your one one one, ain’t for Jahilia. 
    Return to sender.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 Rushdie, Verses, 106. “Jahilia”: literally “ignorance” – the name traditionally given to the time 
before Islam.  
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Chapter 3 
Mahound and Mahomet 
 
  Though the narrative of Shame may die with Sufiya, the novel’s vision of 
Islamic despotism and its power monstrously to deform the people it oppresses is 
perpetuated and expanded in The Satanic Verses.  A few months after the declaration 
of the fatwa in 1989, Srinivas Aravamudan lamented that: 
[t]he multiple generic, discursive, literary, historical, and cultural 
protocols imbricated with this novel have been largely abandoned in 
favour of journalistic yet highly phantasmagorical simplifications, 
yielding the well-worn dichotomy of religious fanaticism battling secular 
free speech: (Western) democracy crusading against (Oriental) tyranny. 2 
Aravamudan’s reservations are well-founded. With the advent of the fatwa the novel 
ceased, for much of the world, to be a cultural artefact and became a cultural banner 
– a mustering point for fundamentalists from both sides of the dividing globe: “a 
symbol of the violation by one culture of something fundamental in the other 
culture”.3  And while the widespread appropriation of the text as a rhetorical pawn in 
“clash-of-civilizations” debates frequently relied (and continues to rely) on the 
scantiest acquaintance with the novel itself, we can read its global reception not only 
as an indication of the widening gap between the cultural hemispheres of East and 
West, but as a catalyst to this process of inter-cultural division.  If the dichotomy 
Aravamudan describes was well-worn when he was writing in 1989, it seems yet 
more Manichean now, and although the many such appeals for more nuanced 
readings of the text are justified, the old  East/West, Secular/Religious, 
                                                          
2  Aravamudan, “Being God’s Postman Is No Fun, Yaar: Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses”, 
Diacritics 19, no. 2 (Summer, 1989): 3-20, 3. 
3  Claes Kastholm, “The Crime of Silence”, trans. Anne Born in Freedom of Expression: The Acid 
Test, ed. Niels Frid-Nielsen (Stockholm and Copenhagen: Nordic Council, 1995), 121-125, 123. 
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Tyranny/Freedom binaries that The Satanic Verses, willingly or unwillingly, has 
invoked are too important to be read over.  Whilst we must approach the novel with 
eyes keen to see all of the nuances and ambiguities obscured by years of journalistic 
simplifications, part of our reading must also be along the very lines of the debate 
that the novel provoked.  As carefully as we examine the text, we must examine the 
cultural function of the text.  “In our beginnings we find our essences,” Rushdie tells 
us: “[t]o understand a religion, look at its earliest moments”.4  This appeal to history, 
as I will demonstrate, is made again and again throughout his corpus and, just as 
Chamcha “makes himself whole by returning to his roots”, we must both “return... to 
the actually existing book,” as Rushdie begs us to, and to the roots of the “struggle 
between Western freedoms and Eastern unfreedom” in which the book is entangled.5  
This examination of both the book’s ideas and the histories of the book’s ideas in 
some ways goes against the advice of critics such as Sara Suleri by addressing the 
very “unhelpful oppositions between fundamentalism and secularism” which, it is 
alleged, have masked among other things “his engagement with both cultural self-
definition and Islamic historiography”.6  My sense is, however, that the destructive 
simplicity of the monoliths constructed on either side of the battle lines drawn in the 
Rushdie Affair can best be complicated by addressing them directly, and that doing 
so has the potential to reveal, rather than to mask, a great deal.  
 As we have seen with the creation of Peccavistan in Shame, Rushdie is not 
shy of the notion of Eastern – specifically Islamic – zones of unfreedom.  The 
mapping of despotism in The Satanic Verses, however, is a more complex affair than 
the process which takes place in his previous novel.  If Scheherazade was the key 
                                                          
4 Rushdie, “Is Nothing Sacred?” Homelands, 415-29, 424. 
5 Rushdie, “Faith”, Homelands, 319-414, 398, 395, 396. 
6 Sara Suleri, “Contraband Histories: Salman Rushdie and the Embodiment of Blasphemy”, in Fletcher, 
Reading Rushdie, 221-236, 222. 
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figure in my critique in Part I, my analysis of The Satanic Verses in these chapters 
takes place, in a sense, in dialogue with the figure of the Sultan Schahriar.  In the 
following pages I examine Rushdie’s participation in the discourse of oriental 
despotism, not merely arguing that he is promulgating an Islamophobic discourse 
which characterises Islam as antithetical to freedom, but suggesting also that his use 
of oriental despotism as a metonym for other forms of oppression echoes its origins 
in the eighteenth century. 
 Much of Rushdie’s work concerns the dissolution of binaries – he sets them 
up, as M. Keith Booker describes, “like the snakes and ladders of Sinai’s children’s 
game, only to deconstruct those oppositions by demonstrating that the apparent polar 
opposites are in fact interchangeable and mutually interdependent”.7  And yet 
Rushdie, whilst he plays with binaries, never quite demolishes them.  “It was so, it 
was not,” “it was and it was not so... it happened and it never did”.8 With these 
leitmotifs Rushdie positions The Satanic Verses, just as all his novels are positioned, 
in the intersect between fiction and reality: as he says of Shame, “[t]here are two 
countries, real and fictional, occupying the same space, or almost the same space.  
My story, my fictional country exist, like myself, at a slight angle to reality”.9  This 
double-vision occurs throughout Rushdie’s fiction, replicating the liminal cultural 
space it seeks to inhabit, making the textual space a mass of refracted histories, 
narratives, realities; and yet the shimmering profusion of overlapping worlds is 
bounded, in the end, with the bookends of reality and fiction.  The action may take 
place within the “and” between it happened and it never did, and yet the notion of 
the so and the not so is never quite deconstructed.  “From Nietzsche’s transvaluation 
                                                          
7 M. Keith Booker, “Beauty and the Beast: Dualism as Despotism in the Fiction of Salman Rushdie”,  
in Fletcher, Reading Rushdie, 237-254, 238. 
8  Rushdie, Verses, 275, 35 (Rushdie’s emphasis). 
9  Rushdie, Shame, 29. 
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of values to the dialogics of Bakhtin to the deconstructive project of Jacques 
Derrida”, Booker summarises, 
 a number of modern thinkers have argued that the dualistic thinking so 
central to the history of Western civilization has tended inevitably toward 
the establishment of hierarchies – one term in a pair is privileged over 
the other so that what is “good” becomes defined from its difference to 
what is “bad.”  Dualistic thinking thus allows complex issues to be 
reduced to questions of black-and-white, good-and-bad.  It allows the 
identification of the opposition as the Other, as evil, and provides a 
justification for the violent oppression of that opposition.10 
Booker is right to ally Rushdie’s work with this modern critical discourse at this 
point in his career and yet, just as they did in Shame, Rushdie’s attempts to distance 
himself from – and thus implicitly problematize – Islamophobic orientalist tropes 
founder in The Satanic Verses. 
 
Dissent and Islam 
 As I have suggested, the doubleness of his vision when it comes to fiction 
and reality is matched by the doubleness of his cultural vision, not only in terms of 
the rich, conflicted interface between East and West that his characters inhabit in The 
Satanic Verses, but in terms of the cultural wellsprings he draws on.  Much valuable 
scholarship has centred, in the wake of the fatwa, on repositioning Rushdie within 
Islamic literary traditions: Suleri, for example, places The Satanic Verses within the 
Urdu ghazal form, bound up, she says, with “the rejection of Islam for some new 
object of epistemological and erotic devotion”; Feroza Jussawalla links the text to 
                                                          
10 Booker, “Beauty and the Beast”, 250. 
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the Urdu/Persian dastan tradition, specifically the dastan-e-dilruba, “a love story 
created for the beloved,” which he argues is, in this case, Islam; and Rushdie himself 
asserts that “doubts, uncertainties, even shocks... have... long been a legitimate part 
even of Islamic literature”.11  Beside such moves to categorise The Satanic Verses as 
Islamic in genre and trope, comparisons between Rushdie and individual Islamic 
writers through the ages come thick and fast – from Daniel Pipes, who compiles a 
check-list of medieval Islamic poets including  Abu Nuwas,  Al-Mutannabi and  
Abu’l-‘Ala al-Ma’arri, all of whom “penned some very daring statements,” to 
Timothy Brennan, who (more convincingly) writes that  The Satanic Verses is “under 
the shadow of Iqbal, the Milton of Urdu poetry”.12  Khomeini and the book-burners 
of Bradford are not the only face of Islam, and dissent, satire – even blasphemy – the 
message goes, have long been part of Islamic literature.  Readings of the novel can 
certainly be illuminated by the long, rich, multivocal Islamic literary heritage of 
dissent, but I would suggest that, in their eagerness to foreground the novel’s Islamic 
credentials as a means of writing against Khomeini’s proclamation, some such 
critical interventions overstate the case.  My argument is that Rushdie’s dissent is far 
more closely bound up with eighteenth-century literature opposing the despotisms of 
Church and state than has previously been realised.  It is a dissent which, as I shall 
demonstrate in Part III, he increasingly comes to identify with the Enlightenment – 
indeed, I will argue that the quality of dissent itself comes, for him, to join the raft of 
other such ideas he locates in his notion of the world of the philosophes.  What he 
does not perhaps realise, however, is how firmly certain eighteenth-century 
discourses of dissent grew out of cultural dialogues with the Islamic East. 
                                                          
11 Suleri,“Contraband Histories”, 224; Feroza Jussawalla, “Rushdie’s ‘Dastan-e-Dilruba’: The Satanic 
Verses as Rushdie’s Love Letter to Islam”, Diacritics 26, no. 1 (Spring, 1996): 50-73, 63; Rushdie, 
“Faith”, Homelands, 396. 
12  Daniel Pipes, The Rushdie Affair: The Novel, the Ayatollah, and the West (New York: Birch Lane 
Press, 1990), 151; Brennan, Salman Rushdie, 143. 
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 Rushdie frequently invokes the doubleness of his literary and cultural 
inheritances, both through intertextual references in his novel, and in his non-fiction 
and interviews.  As he says himself, “Islamic culture is the one in which I grew up – 
I know it well.  Its narratives are my narratives”, and Midnight’s Children, as 
Brennan points out, started life as the story of a Muslim holy man.13  The move from 
so many liberal critics to reincorporate Rushdie into an implicitly monolithicised 
Muslim literary fold is, however, problematic.  I would complicate the suggestion 
that his is an essentially Islamic dissent, or that The Satanic Verses is “a deeply 
Islamic book,” as Suleri asserts, or a love letter to Islam, as Jussawalla holds, or even 
that it is “a novel whose questions are essentially religious,” as Brennan claims.14 
 The confusion that lies behind many of these critical moves to Islamicise 
Rushdie and The Satanic Verses is the conflation of the Islamic faith with Islamic 
cultures – and it is, as evinced by his post-9/11 writings, a confusion Rushdie has 
come to share.  In his 1991 essay “One Thousand Days in a Balloon”, he writes: 
[a]nd I said to myself:  Admit it, Salman, the Story of Islam has a deeper 
meaning for you than any of the other grand narratives.  Of course you’re 
no mystic, mister, and when you wrote I am not a Muslim that’s what 
you meant.  No supernaturalism, no literalist orthodoxies, no formal rules 
for you.  But Islam doesn’t have to mean blind faith.  It can mean what it 
always meant in your family, a culture, a civilization, as open-minded as 
your grandfather was, as delightedly disputatious as your father was, as 
intellectual and philosophical as you like.  Don’t let the zealots make 
Muslim a terrifying word, I urged myself; remember when it meant 
                                                          
13  Gerald Marzorati, “Salman Rushdie: Fiction’s Embattled Infidel”, New York Times Magazine, 
January 29, 1989, 47, cited by Jussawalla in “Dastan-e-Dilruba”, 60; Brennan, Salman Rushdie, 
146. 
14  Suleri, “Contraband Histories”, 222; Brennan, Salman Rushdie, 151. 
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family and light.15 
Although the narrators of Rushdie’s non-fictional writing should be approached with 
the same pinch of salt that we afford the unreliable narrators of his novels (and this 
piece, ending with “Ladies and gentlemen, the balloon is sinking into the abyss,” is 
an example of his would-be performative anti-fatwa writing at its most fervent), this 
account of his relationship with Islam is, though rose-tinted, consonant with the way 
certain cultures of Islam are represented in his pre-fatwa works.  As Jussawalla 
points out, the “facts of Mughal-Islamic religion, history, culture and literature as 
they were syncretized in India” are central to The Satanic Verses – even more so, I 
would add, to Midnight’s Children – but the accounts of Muslim life in Bombay that 
they inform, the upbringings of Saleem and Saladin in Midnight’s Children and The 
Satanic Verses respectively, are accounts of the world that Rushdie grew up in: 
while both my parents were believers neither was insistent or doctrinaire.  
Two or three times a year, at the big Eid festivals, I would... go with my 
father to the great prayer-maidan outside the Friday Mosque in Bombay, 
and rise and fall with the multitude, mumbling my way through the 
uncomprehended Arabic much as Catholic children do – or used to do – 
with Latin.  The rest of the year religion took a back seat.  I had a 
Christian ayah (nanny), for whom at Christmas we would put up a tree 
and sing carols about baby Jesus without feeling in the least ill-at-ease. 
My friends were Hindus, Sikhs, Parsis, and none of this struck me as 
being particularly important.16 
The Islam that Rushdie is really embracing is the hybrid culture of secularised, 
specifically Bombayite, middle-class Indian Muslims. The Faith, as we see from the 
                                                          
15  Rushdie, “One Thousand Days in a Balloon”, Homelands, 430-439, 435. 
16  Rushdie, “In God We Trust”, Homelands, 376-377. 
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passage above, is quite marginal.  Indeed, even in the clutch of apology essays 
published in the first year after the fatwa – “In God We Trust”, “In Good Faith”, “Is 
Nothing Sacred”, “One Thousand Days in a Balloon” – Rushdie’s views on religion 
are damning: where “most political discourse... can be seen as a dream of adequacy... 
The great universal religions, by contrast, ask us to accept our inferiority”.17  
“Religion,” he says, “places human beings beneath history.  In this world we are not 
masters, but servants”.  His stark translation of Islam as submission consciously 
carries with it the other great opprobrious abstract nouns of liberalism: oppression, 
tyranny and, as we shall see, despotism.18  Though he acknowledges “the rifts, the 
lack of homogeneity and unity characteristic of present-day Islam,” he uses the 
figure of Islam as a metonym not only for religion, but for the despotism of any 
monologic creed or narrative.19 
 When the Islamic faith moves in from the margins of secular life, in the 
Pakistan passages in Midnight’s Children, in Shame, in The Satanic Verses, it is a 
long way from the delightedly disputatious civilization of Rushdie’s upbringing, it is 
an avatar of “the absolutism of the Pure”.20  Whilst his novels feature non-Muslim 
despots like Indira Gandhi and Margaret Thatcher  (as the Widow and Mrs Torture 
respectively), the mobilization of Islam in Rushdie’s discourse of anti-despotism is 
far subtler, more pervasive and wide-reaching than his use of individual despotic 
figures like these. 
 Rushdie’s dissent, when it comes down to it, is not the dissent of a Muslim 
trying to reconstruct Islam from the inside, but the protest of a secular humanist 
looking at what he sees as an oppressive regime from the outside.  Beyond this, 
                                                          
17  Rushdie, “In God”, Homelands, 378. 
18  He states this explicitly in “In God”, Homelands, 378, and, significantly, Mahound’s religion in 
Verses is known only as “Submission”. 
19  Rushdie, “In God”, Homelands, 383. 
20  Rushdie, “Faith”, Homelands, 394. 
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however, the way in which Islam shimmers in and out of being the signifier only for 
itself, the representative of the despotism of religion in general, and the sign for 
despotism at large in The Satanic Verses recalls the way in which certain eighteenth-
century texts instrumentalise Islam and the figure of the oriental despot.  It was the 
discourse of oriental despotism which, in the end, partially produced the list of well-
worn dichotomies that began this chapter, but also contained within it the seeds of 
the oppositional discourse that postcolonial criticism has mobilized against them.  
The legacies of discourses of oriental despotism are not only interwoven with “the 
actually existing book” The Satanic Verses and the polarised “struggle between 
Western freedoms and Eastern unfreedom” that has surrounded it, but with the 
rhetoric of likeness with which liberal writers have sought to undo the schism of East 
and West.21   
 
Mahound and Mahomet 
 Voltaire’s play Le Fanatisme, ou Mahomet le Prophète (written in 1736 and 
first performed in 1741) has been considered alongside The Satanic Verses in 
commentary on the Rushdie affair since a performance in Geneva in 1994 was shut 
down under the weight of Muslim protests.22  Although Voltaire would later decry 
the way in which Montesquieu deliberately misread and deformed the travellers’ 
accounts of Islam and Islamic nations that were his primary archive in order to create 
a convenient vehicle for his deist ideas, in Le Fanatism, Voltaire is guilty of much 
the same crime.  In a letter to the King of Prussia in 1742, he admits: 
It may perhaps be objected to me, that, out of my too abundant zeal, I 
have made Mahomet in this tragedy guilty of a crime which in reality he 
                                                          
21 Rushdie, “Faith”, Homelands, 398, 395, 396. 
22 See Pipes, The Rushdie Affair, 268. 
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was not capable of committing...  It was not my design merely to 
represent a real fact... it was my intention to shew the horrid schemes 
which villainy can invent, and fanaticism put in practice.23 
Voltaire was using the Islamic East as a zone in which to propound his rationalist 
views – and like both Montesquieu and Rushdie, Voltaire deliberately fictionalised 
and deformed Islam and its history in order to further his own aims.  The similarities 
between Le Fanatism and the Mahound sequences of The Satanic Verses are 
remarkable, both in terms of the political furore of their critical receptions, and in the 
way in which both texts configure Islam as despotism itself, metonym for the 
despotism of religion in general, and metaphor for despotism at large.   
In 1744, Voltaire’s controversial play was translated into English as Mahomet 
the Impostor, by James Miller.24  Banned after three performances in France, its 
excoriation of the despotism of Mahomet was considered too close to the bone by 
members of the court of Louis XV – the absolute court was often critiqued in terms 
of oriental despotism, as I discuss later – and, although dedicated to Cardinal Fleury, 
its indictment of religious fanaticism was considered an attack on the Catholic 
Church.  Though there are a few token references to rumours of Christian doctrines 
of gentleness and tolerance in the text, the play raises reason, not God, as the 
antithesis of the murderous despotism of Mahomet and the corrupting webs of 
fanaticism with which he enmeshes his hopeless victims.  The ban on Le Fanatism in 
France was lifted in 1745 when Pope Benedict XIV, at Voltaire’s personal request, 
                                                          
23 Voltaire, The Works of M. de Voltaire: Mahomet. Socrates. Alzira, trans. Thomas Francklin 
(Salisbury: Newbery, 1763), 13. 
24 I choose to work from Miller’s text here, which might be more properly termed an adaption than a 
translation (characters’ names are changed, and there are a few slight plot modifications), because 
of its popularity in eighteenth-century London, and the opportunity it provides to demonstrate the 
facility with which the Islamic East was viewed by the populace as a zone in which to explore 
European realities.  For a closer, more recent translation, see Hannah Burton’s Fanaticism, or 
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agreed that the play could be dedicated to him.  Voltaire’s letter to the Pope, written 
with more than half an eye on posterity, is an outrageous piece of satire: 
Your holiness will pardon the liberty taken by one of the lowest of the 
faithful, though a zealous admirer of virtue, of submitting to the head of 
the true religion this performance, written in opposition to the founder of 
a false and barbarous sect. To whom cou’d I with any more propriety 
inscribe a satire on the cruelty and errors of a false prophet, than to the 
vicar and representative of a God of truth and mercy? 25 
The fact that the play had been banned in France was a great selling-point in 
London: playbills appeared in many of the London papers announcing, beneath the 
title “Mr. Miller’s Mahomet the Impostor”, 
N.B. Mons. VOLTAIRE’s Tragedy of MAHOMET, on which this is 
Founded, was Suppress’d at Paris, after the Second Representation, on 
account of the Free and Noble Sentiments, with regard to Bigotry and 
Enthusiasm, which shine through it; and which the French Nation found 
full as Applicable to itself, as to the Bloody Propagators of Mahomet’s 
Religion.26 
These “free and noble sentiments” are neatly folded into British national identity by 
James Miller’s prologue, in which Voltaire is figured as “Our Gallick Bard,” on a 
“Crusade” against “th’Enthusiast’s Rage”.  “France was deaf - for all her Priests 
were sore,” but “On English Ground she makes a firmer Stand,” we are told, for “No 
Clergy here usurp the free-born Mind”.27  Indeed, it is striking how little attention is 
paid to the Islamic content of the play in the prologue: beyond a reference to 
                                                          
25  Voltaire, trans. Francklin, Works, 16. 
26 Classified ads, Daily Gazetteer (London Edition) (London, England), April 30, 1744; Issue 3170. 
27 Voltaire, Mahomet the impostor. A tragedy. As it is acted at the Theatre-Royal in Drury-Lane, by 
His Majesty's Servants. By a gentleman of Wadham-College  2nd edition, trans. James Miller, 
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imposture in the fifth line –  a reference which, but for the title of the play, would not 
have conjured a vision of Muhammad especially vividly in the mind of the auditor – 
its anti-fanaticism rhetoric is entirely composed of Catholic European referents: 
 Hooded and train’d like Hawks th’Enthusiasts fly, 
 And the Priest’s Victims in their Pounces die. 
 Like Whelps born blind, by Mother-Church they’re bred, 
 Nor wake to Sight, to know themselves misled. 28 
This withering away of Islamic content from the prologue underlines how directly 
Voltaire was targeting the Catholic Church, and how transparent a metaphor for 
clerical despotism Islam was as it appeared to the English public. 
 Like Montesquieu and Voltaire, Rushdie partially uses Islam and oriental 
despotism as a means of talking about the West.  The Satanic Verses is superficially a 
tale of three cities: London, Bombay and Jahilia – pre-Islamic Mecca – and yet, as 
Rushdie has said on many occasions, the three cities are one.  Whilst the outlines of 
all three cities blur and shift in tides of myth and magic, where Bombay and London 
are anchored in the realities of contemporary politics, Jahilia is the text’s ideological 
battleground – the locale for a fable of despotic singularity versus multiplicity which 
spirals out to inform and determine the conflicts of the two modern metropolises.  
The Submission of Jahilia at the hands of Mahound is a metonym for the 
deformation of hybrid identities at the hands of absolutist master-narratives like 
Thatcherism and Hindu fundamentalism that is taking place in London and Bombay, 
and yet it is also the literal account of the rise of the most powerful of these despotic 
narratives: Islam.  Like both Montesquieu’s and Voltaire’s, Rushdie’s critiques of 
Western and Islamic despotisms are uneven.  Both Voltaire and Rushdie locate their 
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representations of Islam at the moment of Muhammad’s triumph over Mecca.  Just as 
we will see Rushdie make much of pre-Submission Jahilia as a dynamic city of 
multiplicity in order to emphasise the desolating effect of Mahound’s despotism, 
Voltaire makes pre-Islamic Mecca a republic in order to starken his portrayal of 
Mahomet’s tyranny.  By making the birth of Islam the birth of despotism, both 
authors are deliberately making Islam inseparable from despotism: they are 
conjoined twins. 
 Mahomet opens with the Priam-like leader of the Meccan senate, Alcanor, 
raging against the imminent invasion of the city by Mahomet’s armies.  From the 
outset, the despotism of Islam is figured in terms of its elision of the rights of the 
individual: Alcanor curses his fellow senators as “those Vipers,/Who, singled out by 
a Community/To guard their Rights, Shall... sell ’em to the Foe!”29  Rather than the 
shrill, solipsistic rhetoric of the Mullah that we shall see in Montesquieu’s Persian 
Letters, however, this Islam is characterised by its horrifyingly adept command of 
language.  When Mirvan, Mahomet’s general, takes the stage in the opening scene to 
parley with Alcanor, far from appearing the murderous traitor that Alcanor has lead 
us to expect, he seems almost more reasonable than the distraught old man.  His 
rhetoric, when he speaks of Mahomet, is that of republicanism, of meritocracy –  
Mahomet’s Grandeur’s in himself; he shines not 
With borrow’d Lustre… 
Born of himself, Himself’s the only Fountain 
Of all the flowing Honours that adorn him.30   
The auditor is left momentarily disorientated, even partially seduced by the notion of 
                                                          
29 Voltaire, Mahomet, 2. 
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the self-made-man (beneath which is encrypted the fact of his false credentials as the 
hand of providence), but after this moment of seduction, Mirvan’s mask slips: 
“[e]mbrace our Faith then,” he exhorts Alcanor, “reign with Mahomet,/And, cloath’d 
in Terrors, make the Vulgar tremble”.31   
 This is the same terror of the reason-suppressing seductiveness of absolutist 
rhetorics that haunts the pages of The Satanic Verses as the people of Jahilia have 
their individuality stripped away from them by Mahound’s despotic legislative 
master-narrative of “rules, rules, rules... no aspect of human existence was to be left 
unregulated, free”,  and as the Khomeini-Imam and Ayesha-the-prophetess swallow 
their followers.32 
 This is the aspect of the depiction of Islam in The Satanic Verses that, 
alongside Rushdie’s account of the Submission of Jahilia, places Islamic despotism 
beyond the analogy of any of the other avatars of despotism in the text: whilst what 
is represented as the white-supremacist rhetoric of Thatcherism has the power to 
transform immigrants into animals, it is only the master-narrative of Islam that has 
the power to unmake people.  As the multitudes are lost inside the dark maws of 
Ayesha and the Imam, Gibreel is torn apart by the despotic monoglossia of Islam: his 
last, fragmented utterances before he kills himself, his narrative stripped away from 
him, are searing images of Islamic violence. 
 always vengeance why 
  I can’t be sure  something like this for the crime of being 
human 
                                                          
31 Voltaire, Mahomet, 10. 
32 Rushdie, Verses, 363. 
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 especially female but not exclusively people must pay.33 
Similarly, the final act of Mahomet sees the Prophet triumphing over both the 
destruction of Zaphna, the hero, and of the agency of the people of Mecca: 
Go then, and thank your Pontiff and your Prince 
For each Day’s Sun he grants you to behold. 
Hence, to your temples and appease my Rage.34 
In both texts, we see the death of the individual at the hands of the despotism of the 
master-narrative, and in both texts this is intended as a parable for the destructive 
inhumanity of organised religion – although the ultimate face of this inhumanity is, 
for Voltaire, the Catholic Church.  Ironically, both texts have deliberately deformed 
the history and teachings of Islam in order to promulgate a discourse of reason over 
the deforming effects of religious faith.  And yet, whilst both Voltaire and Rushdie 
manipulate and vilify Islam in order to further their wider aims, their very use of 
Islam to talk about Western – or global human – frailties positions them at least 
partially outside of the binary structures of East-West Othering that hardened 
towards the end of the eighteenth century.   
 
 
 
                                                          
33 Rushdie, Verses, 544 (spacing an approximation of Rushdie’s own). 
34 Voltaire, Mahomet, 68. 
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Chapter 4 
Thinking with Islam 
 
From the end of the seventeenth century and all through the eighteenth, a 
spectre was haunting Europe: the spectre of despotism... Whether they 
were nostalgic for the past or were builders of the future, all of them saw 
the Absolute One as the instrument of an always deadly uniformity.1 
 
 When Shabbir Akhtar, in his anti- Satanic Verses polemic Be Careful with 
Muhammad! wrote “[a] man who brought a book that directly inspired a major world 
civilisation is here portrayed as an insincere impostor with purely political 
ambitions”, he could have been describing any number of works on Islam from the 
seventeenth, eighteenth or nineteenth centuries.2  “Muhammad” in The Satanic 
Verses, he says, “is an unscrupulous politician – ‘a smart bastard’ in Rushdie’s phrase 
– whose enemies, particularly ideological ones, are victims of a ruthless anger 
discrepant with his official professions of mercy”.3  As he points out, much of this 
catalogue is consonant with what he terms “the unoriginal biases of traditional 
Christian polemic”, and yet the representation of Islam as despotic, hypocritical and 
misogynist has often functioned, as we have seen, as a means of interrogating flaws 
in European societies.4  Turn back to the eighteenth-century beginnings of the well-
worn dichotomy of Oriental despotism and Western liberty, and it becomes apparent 
that beside and behind the destructive, simplistic Othering-process that many have 
identified lies an axis of rhetorical likening.  The Islamic East was, for Montesquieu, 
Voltaire, and many other eighteenth-century thinkers, a place in which to explore 
anxieties about Europe, and tales of the despotism of Islam and Islamic rulers a 
                                                          
1 Grosrichard, Sultan’s Court, 3. “Thinking with Islam” adapted from Elmarsafy, The Enlightenment 
Qur’an, 6. 
2
 Shabbir Akhtar, Be Careful with Muhammad! (London: Bellew Publishing, 1989), 5. 
3 Akhtar, Muhammad, 5. 
4 Akhtar, Muhammad, 27. 
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means of critiquing the arbitrary power of Church and crown at home.  Alongside 
this runs a strong stream of British Protestant thought that celebrates Muhammad as 
a wise legislator, the phenomenon of “Islamic Republicanism” that I am unable to 
explore within the scope of this study, but is brilliantly argued for in Garcia’s recent 
study Islam and the English Enlightenment: 1670-1840.  The crucial point for Garcia 
and others is that the representation of Islam – Islams, whether representative of 
despotism or republicanism – had a dialectical function in the eighteenth century.  
The Islamic East, whether eroticised, demonised, idolised, or narrativised, was first 
and foremost a locale in and with which to think. 
 Writing, with Garcia, against “the imaginary opposition between Islam and 
Enlightenment”, here I open out from English engagements with Islam to reconsider 
those of Rushdie’s Enlightenment: the Enlightenment of the French philosophes.5  
As Montesquieu charts Europe and its frailties through “Islamic” eyes in Persian 
Letters, as we saw Voltaire map the rise of Christian fanaticism onto the cityscape of 
early Islamic Mecca, we see the landscapes (both physical and cultural) of Europe 
and the Islamic East overlap, producing a cultural in-between space in which these 
authors explore cultural Likeness whilst participating in discourses of cultural 
Otherness.  And it is this same uneasy double-vision that is central to Rushdie’s 
mobilisation of Islamic despotism in The Satanic Verses. 
 
Reading and Writing Despotism 
 The discursive figure of oriental despotism has long functioned as 
                                                          
5 Garcia, Islam, 223. 
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“something good to think with”.6  Long before Montesquieu codified despotism in 
The Spirit of Laws (1748) as one of the “three species of government: republican, 
monarchical, and despotic”, ideas of despotism – most frequently Eastern despotism 
– had been used by political theorists, theologians and propagandists to illustrate an 
extraordinarily diverse range of social, religious, cultural and political standpoints.7  
The historiography of despotism has often concentrated on the notion of an 
eighteenth-century “insight that Western Europe was not only geographically but 
also politically and culturally different from the Orient, and that the political liberty 
and restraints on the exercise of power in the West starkly contrasted with the 
restrictions on personal and political liberty in the Orient”.8  This rhetoric of 
difference is certainly a common feature of European writing on the East, from the 
pre-modern period to the present.  As Makdisi and Nussbaum write, 
For all the variety... what mattered to the development of Orientalism 
was not, for example, whether there was one orient or many, or even 
whether the otherness of the Oriental was celebrated and valourized... or 
scornfully condemned... What mattered, rather, was the sense of 
otherness itself, and the creation and maintenance of a sense of radical 
difference between West and East(s): a project that was initiated in its 
modern form in the eighteenth century and that continues to this very day 
in the resurgent Orientalism that has had such influence on United States 
foreign and military policy after the events of 11 September 2001.9 
Beside and bound-up-with this axis of Othering that Makdisi and Nussbaum identify 
                                                          
6
 Claude Lévi-Strauss, “animals are good to think [with]” from Lévi-Strauss, Totemism, trans. Rodney 
Needham (Boston: Beacon Press, 1963), 89.   
7 Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, trans. Thomas Nugent (New York: The Colonial Press, 1900), Vol. 
1, Book 2, 8. 
8 Michael Curtis, Orientalism and Islam: European Thinkers on Oriental Despotism in the Middle 
East and India (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 71. 
9 Makdisi and Nussbaum, The Arabian Nights, 6. 
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at the heart of Orientalism, however, there is a discursive mechanism that we could 
term likening, that operates in European writing on the Islamic  East during the long 
eighteenth century. 
 Beyond the recent flowering of scholarship on the global eighteenth century 
from scholars such as Aravamudan, Ballaster, Elmarsafy, Garcia, Makdisi, 
Nussbaum, and many others, much important work is being carried out that is eliding 
the old crusader/Saracen, “embattled believers facing barbarian hordes” conception 
of the binary history of East-West relations in the pre- and early-modern period.10 As 
studies such as Lisa Jardine and Jerry Brotton’s Global Interests: Renaissance Art 
between East and West show, “the boundaries between... East and West were 
thoroughly permeable in the Renaissance, and... even in situations of conflict, mutual 
recognition of icons and images could be used adversarially with creative verve”.11  
As reciprocal knowledge between the Ottoman empire and the countries of Western 
Europe grew over the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, through a 
combination of trade, conflict, captivity, diplomacy, travel and increased linguistic, 
theological, cultural and historical research, the figures of the Turk, Islam, 
Muhammad and the Qur’an became increasingly common referents, mobilised by 
both sides of schisms in the Church and the state.  Both Cavaliers and Roundheads 
likened one another to Muslims and Turks during the Civil War, and the same 
technique, as Michael Curtis notes, was in currency amongst “intense theological 
disputes on the origin and nature of Christianity.  During the Christian religious 
ferment in Europe at that time, Catholics and Lutherians accused one another’s 
religion of possessing Islamic characteristics and its adherents of being Turkish 
                                                          
10 Said, Orientalism, 120. 
11
 Lisa Jardine and Jerry Brotton, Global Interests: Renaissance Art between East and West 
 (London: Reaktion Books, 2000), 8. 
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infidels”.12 
 As the century wore on, critics of Louis XIV were increasingly arguing “that 
he was introducing an alien, arbitrary, Turkish form of government by humbling the 
nobility, reducing the authority of corporate bodies, and undermining provincial 
autonomy,, whilst “apologists for the Sun King, notably Bishop Bossuet, were at 
pains to show that absolute government should not be confounded with arbitrary 
government, or in other words that assertions of royal power in France were not 
tantamount to the establishment of oriental despotism”.13   
 As the figure of the “Turk” became more and more an established (if 
ventriloquised) interlocutor in religious and political debates in the late seventeenth 
and early eighteenth centuries, scholarship on the subjects of Islam, Muhammad and 
the Qur’an proliferated.  Whilst some of it remained vehemently hostile to Islam – 
Humphrey Prideaux’s influential True Nature of Imposture Displayed in the Life of 
Mahomet (1697), for example – an increasing number of thinkers, like Henry Stubbe 
and Pierre Bayle, came to view Islam in a more positive light.  As Elmarsafy writes 
of Adrian Reland’s De religione Mohammedica (1705): 
  Reland compares the false claims thrown at Islam with those that the 
various Christian sects use against each other, thereby demonstrating his 
lucidity as to where the real gist of the quarrel about Islam lay in the 
early eighteenth century.  Catholics and Protestants, says Reland, accuse 
each other of resembling Muslims, but whether these polemics bring 
either side to a clearer comprehension of Islam is very much in doubt.14 
                                                          
12 A poem in a 1647 Cavalier pamphlet, for example, opens with the lines “Come Mahomet, thy Turn 
is next;/ New Gospel's out of date,/ The Alcoran may prove good Text/ In our new Turkish State.” 
Mercurius Pragmaticus (London: 1647); Curtis, Orientalism and Islam, 34. 
13 David Young, “Montesquieu's View of Despotism and His Use of Travel Literature”, The Review of 
Politics 40, No. 3 (July, 1978): 392-409, 403. 
14 Ziad Elmarsafy, The Englightenment Qur'an: the Politics of Translation and the Construction of 
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The pursuit of a clearer comprehension of Islam both led to and was enabled by 
more faithful translations of the Qur’an, like that of George Sale (1734), and yet the 
old myths of the essentially violent nature of the Islamic faith and Muhammad’s 
impostordom – that his revelatory trances were in fact epileptic fits, that he had 
conned Meccans into believing that a pigeon collecting dried peas from his ear was 
in fact the angel Gabriel reciting the Qur’an – continued to be widely circulated.  
This is partly as a result of the fear and hatred of Islam which prevailed amongst 
many Western Europeans until late in the century, partly because they were 
entertaining stories, and partly because, quite simply, they were useful.  By the early 
eighteenth century, Islam was an essential part of the vocabulary that Europe used to 
talk and think about itself and, as I shall illustrate, thinkers such as Montesquieu and 
Voltaire were quite prepared to make generalisations and mobilise myths about Islam 
that they knew were untrue in order to propound their ideas. 
 
The Self through Other Eyes 
 The immediate success of Montesquieu’s hugely popular and influential 
Persian Letters springs not only from the interlocking early eighteenth-century 
desires for knowledge of the East and for oriental exotica, but from a new-found 
desire to view European metropolitan society through the eyes of an uninitiated 
Other.  As Andrew Kahn notes in his introduction to Persian Letters, the arrival of 
four Iroquois chiefs in London in 1710 prompted Addison to write an account of the 
capital and its society through their eyes in the Spectator.15  The ethnographical 
speculations of the chiefs on British society and religion, whilst titillatingly primitive 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Islam, (London: Oneworld Publications, 2009), 19. 
15 Khan, “Introduction”, Persian Letters, xxii; Addison, Spectator 50, 27 April, 1711, in The 
Spectator, ed. G. Gregory Smith (London: J.M. Dent and Sons, 1926), Vol. 1, 184-187. 
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in their referents (“Instead of those beautiful Feathers with which we adorn our 
Heads, they often buy up a monstrous Bush of Hair, which covers their Heads, and 
falls down in a large Fleece below the Middle of their Backs”), are satirically critical 
of British irreligiousness. 
And indeed, there are several Reasons which make us think, that the 
Natives of this Country had formerly among them some sort of Worship; 
for they set apart every seventh Day as sacred: But upon my going into 
one of these holy Houses on that Day, I could not observe any 
Circumstance of Devotion in their Behaviour; There was indeed a Man 
in Black who was mounted above the rest, and seemed to utter something 
with a great deal of Vehemence; but as for those underneath him, instead 
of paying their Worship to the Deity of the Place, they were most of them 
bowing and curtsying to one another, and a considerable Number of them 
fast asleep.16 
The early eighteenth-century reader’s appetite to have his/her world opened and 
described by a foreign voice, in the same way that travellers like Jean Chardin 
(Journeys in Persia, 1711) and Jean-Baptiste Tavernier (The Six Journeys of Jean-
Baptiste Tavernier... in Turkey, in Persia and in the Indies, 1719) were describing the 
East, is notable for the interest it implies in reciprocal cultural analysis between 
Europe and Other civilisations.17  Whilst the fundamentally playful nature of 
Addison’s text should not be overlooked, the notion of the foreign eye as a lens 
through which to identify the frailties of European society was a powerful one during 
this period, and I would argue it partially derives from the awareness of the Islamic – 
                                                          
16 Addison, The Spectator, 186. 
17 This interest prevails through much of the century, as exemplified by Oliver Goldsmith’s The 
Citizen of the World, or Letters from a Chinese Philosopher (London: T. Vernor et al., 1792), first 
published in the 1760s. 
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specifically the Ottoman – eye that was trained on Europe.  There was a huge 
demand for captivity narratives, the first-person accounts of Europeans captured by 
Ottoman ships, at this time.18  Joseph Pitts’s Religion and Manners of the 
Mohammetans, published in 1704, had to be re-issued in 1731 because “pirated 
editions had appeared as a result of the ‘great’ demand for his captivity account”.19  
In it, amongst the traditional short-hand vilifications of Islam, are many home truths 
about European culture reported coming from Muslim lips: “I have heard them 
oftentimes condemn the Christians for the little regard they have to their books: 
‘For,’ say they, ‘you’ll use the paper of them to burn, or light your pipes, or to put to 
the vilest uses [lavatory paper]”.20  Pitts himself compares European religious 
practice unfavourably with that of the Ottomans, lamenting “I wish to God that 
Christians were as diligent in studying the holy scriptures, the Law and the Gospel, 
wherein we have eternal life, as those infidels are in poring upon that legend of 
falsities”.21  Apart from the excitement and the frisson of horror such narratives 
provoked, the notion that superior religious piety (however skewed by “falsities”), 
and a greater love of learning could be found in a Muslim society than in Britain 
added to the sense of the decentring of Europe and Christendom as (by default) the 
global locus of virtue that the work of scholars like Stubbe and Bayle had begun, and 
further opened Europe’s way to a more complex pattern of inter-cultural analysis. 
 
 
                                                          
18 In Captives, Empire and the World (London: Jonathan Cape, 2002), Linda Colley estimates that as 
many as twenty thousand Britons had been taken captive by Ottoman corsairs by the 1730s, 
though some doubt has been cast on the accuracy of her figures: see Richard Drayton, “Putting the 
British into the Empire”, The Journal of British Studies 44, no. 1 (January, 2005): 187-193. 
19 Nabil Matar, “Introduction: England and Mediterranean Captivity, 1577-1704” in Piracy, Slavery 
and Redemption: Barbary Captive Narratives from Early Modern England, ed. Daniel J. Vitkus 
and Nabil I. Matar (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 1-54, 3. 
20 Pitts, Religion and Manners of the Mohammetans, in Vitkus and Matar, Piracy, 220-340, 244. 
21 Pitts, Religion, 244. 
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Montesquieu and the Rise of Despotism 
  “The noun despotism,” as Grosrichard points out, “entered the [French] 
language fairly late.  The first dictionary to refer to it is Trévoux’s, in 1721.  The 
dictionary of the Académie Française included it in its 1740 edition, defining it as 
‘absolute authority, absolute power’”.22  Alongside the accounts of travellers like 
Chardin and Tavernier and the literary productions of Marana and Galland, French 
theorisations of Eastern realities also crossed the Channel to take root in the British 
imagination – and none more firmly than the idea of oriental despotism.  Although it 
was Montesquieu’s The Spirit of Laws that “gave the term its theoretical 
accreditation as the name for a form of government, illustrating the concept with the 
governments of Asia”, in 1748, notions of despotic Eastern rule had been circulating 
through France and Britain for much of the previous century.23  As we have seen, 
accusations of “Islamicness” were being thrown around, not just between warring 
factions of Christianity, but at rulers and would-be rulers like Louis XIV and 
Cromwell.  The conception of despotism as a specifically Eastern form of tyranny 
truly coalesced at the turn of the century, partly via Galland in the form of Shahriyar 
from the Nights (as we saw in the previous chapter), and partly due to the accounts 
of travellers such as Chardin, Tournefort and Rycaut.24  By the time Montesquieu 
writes that “[t]he king of France... has frequently been heard to remark that of all the 
governments in the world, that of the Turks, or that of our august sultan, would suit 
him best, so high is his opinion of the oriental political system” in Persian Letters, 
                                                          
22 Grosrichard, Sultan’s Court, 4. 
23 Asli Çirakman’s study of the idea of despotism in Europe in the pre-modern period examines the 
“orientalisation” of the term during the early eighteenth century.  “From Tyranny to Despotism: 
The Enlightenment’s Unenlightened Image of the Turks”, International Journal of Middle East 
Studies 33, No. 1 (February, 2001): 49-68.  
24 It is significant that Karl A. Wittfogel, in Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957), is still using the Arabian Nights as evidence of the 
existence of oriental despotism in pre-modern Islamic societies in the mid twentieth century. See 
138. 
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there can have been no doubt in the mind of the reader that he was referring to a 
specifically oriental despotism.25   
 It is significant to note that, consonant with the previous century’s tendency 
to talk about itself in terms of the East, barely had the idea of oriental despotism 
crystallised before it was applied to Europe.  Through the eyes of the Persian 
travellers Usbek and Rica, Europe is both strange and familiar.  Just as narratives of 
Britons kept captive by the Ottomans, like that of Joseph Pitts, call mosques 
“churches” and imams “priests” (“I knew not well otherwise how to express myself 
so as to be understood”), the Persians call monks and priests “dervishes”.26  This 
exchanging of names is similar to a process Homi Bhabha describes when writing on 
the “misnaming” of Islam in The Satanic Verses, “Mohamed referred to as Mahound; 
the prostitutes named after the wives of the Prophet”: 
It is the formal complaint of the fundamentalists that the transposition of 
these names into profane spaces – brothels or magical realist novels – is 
not simply sacrilegious, but destructive of the very cement of 
community.   To violate the system of naming is to make contingent and 
indeterminate what Alisdair Macintyre, in his essay on “Tradition and 
translation”, has described as “naming for: the institutions of naming as 
the expression and embodiment of the shared standpoint of the 
community, its traditions of belief and enquiry”.27 
 
The contingency and indeterminacy of religious naming in Persian Letters 
deliberately manoeuvres “shared standpoints” of European and Persian communities 
                                                          
25 Montesquieu, Letters, 47. 
26 Pitts, Religion, 225. 
27 Homi Bhabha, The Location of Culture (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), 321-322; citing 
Alasdair. Macintyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (London: Duckworth, 1988), 378. 
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into the same space: priest and imam overlap, either jarring the reader with the sense 
of their difference or surprising her/him with their likeness.  Where Rushdie’s 
misnaming often functions to ally different forms of despotism, Montesquieu’s is a 
more sophisticated version of the opprobrious rhetorical likening that characterised 
the seventeenth-century use of Islam and despotism to vilify opponents – 
“Cromwell/Charles I is like Muhammad,” “Louis XIV is a despot,” “the 
Catholic/Protestant Church is like Islam” – and yet this time the critique works in 
both directions; questions are asked about ecclesiastics of both faiths.  At one point a 
“dervish” (monk) shows a surprised Rica a wall of “commentaries on the scriptures” 
in a library by authors who approached them as “a work that could provide authority 
for their own ideas; that is why they have corrupted every meaning and twisted every 
phrase; it’s a place which men of every sect swoop down upon and plunder”.28  
Elsewhere, Usbek tells a “dervish” “[i]f the Great Sophy had a man like you in his 
court, who behaved towards him as you do towards your God, who differentiated 
among his commands, and instructed his subjects in which circumstances they must 
obey them and in which other circumstances they may violate them, he’d have him 
impaled on the spot”.29  Thus the self-serving hypocrisy of the Church is laid bare 
through the (imagined) Islamic lens, leading Usbek to observe that “for Christians 
there exists a great distance from profession to belief, from belief to conviction, from 
conviction to practice”.30   
 Christianity and Islam are represented as having different frailties.  At one 
point Usbek writes to a mullah to ask “[w]hy is it that our Legislator forbids us the 
flesh of the pig... and commands us to wash our body constantly in order to purify 
our soul?” reasoning that 
                                                          
28 Montesquieu, Letters, 179. 
29 Montesquieu, Letters, 75-76. 
30 Montesquieu, Letters, 102. 
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Mud looks dirty to us, because it offends our sight, or another of our 
senses; but in itself it is no dirtier than are gold and diamonds... 
Therefore the senses, divine Mullah, must be the sole judges of the purity 
or impurity of things; but, since objects do not affect all men in the same 
way... it follows that the evidence of the senses cannot serve us as the 
rule; at least, unless it is said that each of us may decide this matter, and 
distinguish, as far as he personally is concerned, what is pure from what 
is impure. 
But would not that very statement, Oh holy mullah, overturn the 
distinctions established by our divine Prophet, and the basic tenets of the 
law inscribed by the hand of the angels?31 
 
Rather than with any nuanced theological response to his question, however, he is 
greeted only with thunderous and rather solipsistic assertions of his ignorance: “your 
understanding is like the shadowy darkness of the abyss”, “when you do not grasp 
why certain things are unclean, that is because there are many other things that you 
do not know”, and a faux-Qur’anic tale about the pig being born from the “vast 
quantity of excrement” that the elephant produced on the Ark.32   
 As Christianity is portrayed as riven with conflict, doubt and hypocrisy, Islam 
is characterised as inflexible, absolutist and anti-reason: the reader is left between 
two religious cultures which seem equally futile.  David Young’s assertion about The 
Spirit of Laws holds equally true for Persian Letters: “Montesquieu was a deist in his 
personal beliefs, and his attacks on the social consequences of Mohammedanism, or 
what he took to be such, often served as a convenient method for condemning the 
                                                          
31 Montesquieu, Letters, 24. 
32 Montesquieu, Letters, 25. 
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social implications of Christianity”.33  Cloaked in the frivolity of (oriental) fiction, in 
Persian Letters Montesquieu is able to attack the foundations of both Christianity 
and Islam in almost equal measure.  This is an important “almost”, however – though 
both religions are portrayed as fundamentally absurd, their frailties are of very 
different natures.  Where Christianity’s frailty is that it has become “less a subject of 
sanctification than a subject of disputation in which anybody may participate”, 
Islam, whether through (one-sided) philosophical exchanges between Usbek and the 
Mullah like the one quoted above, or through the insidious irony of repeated 
exclamations such as “[b]lessed ignorance of the children of Muhammad! Gracious 
simplicity so beloved by our holy Prophet, you remind me always of the innocence 
of ancient times”, is characterised as backward, fossilised and – crucially – anti-
disputatious.34  In other words, while Christianity  suffers from a surfeit of 
intellectual inquiry and debate, Islam suffers from the lack of it.  To put it bluntly, the 
seeds of the monoglossic Islam versus heteroglossic West that Rushdie writes in The 
Satanic Verses have been sown: the partitioning of the globe into the hemispheres of 
Gup (“gossip” or “nonsense”) and Chup (“quiet”) that we will observe in Haroun 
and the Sea of Stories, in the next chapter, is the reformulation of a three-hundred-
year-old discourse. 
  It is important to note, parallel to my discussion of harem politics in Persian 
Letters in the previous chapter, that over the course of his stay in Paris, Usbek’s 
missives to the seraglio become progressively more despotic as order breaks down in 
his absence and the women and their warders struggle for power.  In an almost 
schizophrenic break from the subtle, philosophe-like tone of his letters on the 
vagaries of cultural relativism and universalism (my terms, not Montesquieu’s), even 
                                                          
33 Young, “Montesquieu’s View”, 403. 
34 Montesquieu, Letters, 102, 103, 141. 
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his language is transformed into the cliché of the oriental tale:  “May this letter fall 
upon you like a thunderbolt that strikes amid lightning and tempestuous rain!”35  It is 
significant that, in his despotic rage, his language recalls that of the Mullah’s 
response to his philosophical questioning of the Qur’an at the beginning of the text: 
“[y]our empty philosophy is the lightning that heralds a storm and darkness; you live 
in the heart of the tempest, and drift at the will of the winds”.36  Far from his 
musings on common, super-cultural humanity (“Everybody knows, and everybody 
feels, that man, in common with every creature that strives to survive...” etc.), Usbek 
becomes the incarnation of the Other, the personification of the rhetorics of 
difference (“liberty is made for the spirit of the peoples of Europe, and servitude for 
that of the peoples of Asia”) which, though proleptic presences in this text, come to 
the fore in The Spirit of Laws37.  As he writes “[w]ith this letter I grant you unlimited 
power over the entire seraglio; command there with all the authority that I myself 
would wield; may fear, may terror be your companions; hasten from room to room 
bearing punishment and retribution”, he assumes the mantle of the enduring figure of 
oriental despot that Montesquieu will codify some twenty years later, and will come 
to haunt the pages of Western writings about the Islamic East for over two hundred 
years. 38 
 
The Spirit of Laws and the Spirit of Injustice: the Mobile Locus of 
Despotism 
 Aside from the rendering of the harem correspondence, Persian Letters is 
remarkable for its reliance on travellers’ accounts of the East, rather than on the 
                                                          
35 Montesquieu, Letters, 209. 
36 Montesquieu, Letters, 24. 
37  Montesquieu, Letters, 199, 175. 
38  Montesquieu, Letters, 205-206. 
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many generalised myths about the Islamic world that were in circulation.  The 
writings of Chardin, Rycaut and Tournefort were the most authoritative sources on 
Eastern societies available to Montesquieu, and much of the material on Eastern 
governments in The Spirit of Laws was also taken from their works.  Although there 
is much less fluidity in his representations of Eastern and European cultures in this 
later work, governments and cultural norms being anchored to some extent by 
climate, much of his discourse on despotic governments is still a ciphered response 
to fears of arbitrary rule in Europe, and much of his anti-Islamic rhetoric is a coded 
attack on the Catholic church.39  What is, perhaps, surprising in such a 
comprehensive and serious dissertation on governance is the extent to which 
Montesquieu distorts the evidence gleaned from his sources in order to further his 
theories.  As Young points out in the conclusion to his minutely detailed study of 
Montesquieu’s construction of oriental despotism and the travellers’ accounts that 
were his primary archive, “Montesquieu... misread his sources, or rather he read 
them selectively.  Though he could find evidence to support his view of despotism, 
one is inclined to suspect that he read the travelers with that view at least partially 
formed”.40 
 The Spirit of Laws, though it specifically names nations without Muslim 
majorities like China and Japan as despotic, repeatedly figures Islam as the crutch of 
despotism.  If the essence of despotism is fear, then Islam is the codification of fear: 
in despotic states “religion has more influence than anywhere else; it is fear added to 
fear.  In Mahommedan countries, it is partly from their religion that the people derive 
                                                          
39  For accounts of the effect of climate on culture see, for example, Montesquieu, Spirit, Book 5, 
Chapter 15 and Book XIV; “Montesquieu’s purpose in describing despotism was, of course, at 
least partly polemical; he meant to criticize French statesmen and their policies quite as much as to 
describe Asiatic states. He was using a traditional form of argument to condemn the absolutism of 
Richelieu, Mazarin, and Louis XIV; he was trying to show to what a dreadful state of affairs 
unlimited royal power could lead.” Young, “Montesquieu’s View”, 404-405. 
40Young, “Montesquieu’s View”, 403. 
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the surprising veneration that they have for their prince”.41  If the propensity of 
peoples of despotic governments for complete submission to arbitrary power is 
engendered by the climate, it is compounded by Islam.  With this fusion of Chardin’s 
notion that “[t]he climate of each people is always, I believe, the chief cause of 
men’s customs and inclinations”, with Ricaut’s assertion that “[t]he Turks teach the 
obedience which they owe their emperor more as a principle of religion than of 
state”, Montesquieu forged an enduring interdependence between the ideas of 
despotism, Islam and heat that would become almost a given in much later writing 
on the East.42  Alexander Dow, for example, would write in his History of Hindustan 
in 1770 that “the seeds of despotism resulting from the Indian climate and soil” had 
reached “perfect growth by the Muhammadan religion”.43  If Islam and despotism 
were a partnership of oppression, however, Montesquieu holds Islam to be the only 
thing that can moderate the despot’s arbitrary power: “it is religion that amends in 
some measures the Turkish constitution”.44  This is an acknowledgement of the 
assertions that Ricaut, Chardin and Tournefort all made on the subject, “that 
Mohammedan divines taught that God’s law was above the decrees of the ruler”, and 
yet, as Voltaire was quick to point out, it is a deliberate elision of the fact that civil 
and religious laws overlapped in Muslim countries.45  As Young illustrates, the 
travellers are “at one in affirming that the Koran, interpretations of its teachings, and 
precedents of earlier cases decided on such principles were the guides to the ‘men of 
law,’ the judges of Turkey and Persia” and, as such, “[t]o say that religion limits 
                                                          
41 Montesquieu, Spirit, 59. 
42 John Chardin, Travels in Persia 1673-1677 (London, Argonaut Press, 1927) Vol. 2, 40, 275-276; 
Paul Ricaut, Histoire de l’État present de l’Empire ottoman trans. M. Briot (Amsterdam, 1670), 
24, both cited in Young, “Montesquieu’s View”, 399-400. 
43 Alexander Dow, The History of Hindustan (New Delhi: Today & Tomorrow, 1973), Vol. 3, vii. 
44 Montesquieu, Spirit, 59. 
45 Young, “Montesquieu’s View”, 399; Voltaire, “A, B, C” in Voltaire, Philosophical Dictionary, ed. 
and trans. Peter Gay (New York: Basic Books, 1962), 503-504. 
126 
 
capricious power, but that law does not, would be meaningless in a Turkish or 
Persian context”.46 
 Although Montesquieu’s manipulation of the “facts” of Eastern governance 
as recorded by the travellers was noted in certain quarters, the agenda which he had 
whittled them to fit transpired to be convenient for a wide range of different thinkers 
and institutions, not least to the East India Company.  Writers like Dow used 
Montesquieu’s assertions as mental and governmental templates with which to 
process the East in general and Mughal India in particular.  This did not go unnoticed 
at the time – Abraham-Hyacinte Anquetil-Duperron in France, and his 
correspondent, Charles William Boughton Rous in Britain, both produced tracts that 
not only indicted Montesquieu for generalisation and falsification of information but, 
strikingly, argued that oriental despotism was a fiction devised by Europe to justify 
the conquest of Asia and that if despotism was endemic to any countries of the world 
they were Britain and France.47 
  This constitutes another change of direction for the extraordinarily mobile 
discourse of oriental despotism over the course of the century: from the complex 
manoeuvres of Montesquieu’s subtle encryption of Western despotism as Eastern, to 
the crystallisation of despotism as something intrinsically oriental, to the 
characterisation of Western proto-colonial practice as orientally despotic.  The 
conceit of oriental despotism has been inverted and applied to its creators. Whilst 
Anquetil-Duperron and Boughton Rous’s dissent is powerful, however, we can read 
in its very fervour the strength of the discourse to which it was opposed.  This 
notwithstanding, oriental despotism did remain a relatively mobile rhetorical weapon 
during the 1780s and early 1790s:  Daniel O’Quinn, for example, offers a nuanced 
                                                          
46 Young, “Montesquieu’s View” 401. 
47 See Franco Venturi, “Oriental Despotism”, Journal of the History of Ideas 24, no. 1 (1963): 133-
142, 137. 
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reading of the mobilisation of Montesquieu’s theorisations “by all sides in the debate 
over the East India Bill”, an attempt to regulate the East India Company.48  Parallel 
to the growth of the discourses of feminist orientalism that we saw in the last 
chapter, however, a steady process of ossification was enacted on the idea of oriental 
despotism towards the end of the century; as Ballaster has it, “Enlightenment 
preoccupations with analogy, shared history, and sameness of self and culture, give 
way to an increasingly racialised sense of difference”.49 
 Though much of the rhetoric of the Rushdie affair is the product of this 
“racialised sense of difference”, the text at the centre of it, as we have seen, 
mobilises despotism in a far more complex way.  Whilst The Satanic Verses 
engendered the replication of late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century 
discourses of oriental despotism and Islamophobia in the Western press, its multi-
layered configurations of Islam as despotism itself, metonym for the despotism of 
religion in general, and metaphor for despotism at large, recall the deist, anti-
establishment writings of Montesquieu and Voltaire earlier in the century.  
 
Despotic Description 
The vision of hybridity as mongrelization that Rushdie offers us in “In Good Faith” 
is, as we have seen, self-confessedly celebratory.  It is, he tells us, “how newness 
enters the world.  It is the great possibility that mass migration gives the world, and I 
have tried to embrace it”.50  The key term here, however, is “possibility”.  Healthy, 
mongrelized cultural spaces are fragile entities in Rushdie’s pre-fatwa novels, either 
shown in retrospect, tinged with the sadness of nostalgia – as with the Bombay of 
                                                          
48 Daniel O’Quinn, Staging Governance: Theatrical Imperialism in London, 1770-1800 (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), 131. 
49 Ballaster, Fables, 4. 
50 Rushdie, “Faith”, Homelands, 394. 
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Saleem’s childhood and the glory days of the supernatural conference of the 1001 
children of Midnight – or as vulnerable, fledgling futures: the extra-textual whisper 
of Salahuddin’s new life on the final page of The Satanic Verses.   Positive 
mongrelization can take place only in the spaces where the permeable borders of 
cultural, national and religious zones overlap. As soon as any of these zones attempt 
to make rigid  their boundaries, to demand exclusive allegiance from their adherents 
and assert their singularity (to despotically enforce their mastery, we might say), 
mongrelization becomes a process of monstrous mutation.  In Midnight’s Children, 
artificial dividing-lines snake across the country: first the arbitrary state borders 
drawn by the British, and later the “walls of words” Nehru’s government builds as it 
compartmentalises the nation by language.51  Most monstrous of these lines is the 
fatal pen-stroke of Partition, drawn as communalist hatred flares and deforms the 
many gods of Hinduism into the many-headed demon Ravana, “a fanatical anti-
Muslim movement” that extorts money from Muslim businessmen “who were 
offered the choice between paying a single, once-only cash sum and having their 
world burned down”.52   The communalist hatred continues into The Satanic Verses, 
when the pilgrimage of village-girl-turned-prophetess Ayesha is interrupted by 
“certain religious extremist groupings” who issue statements denouncing the haj as 
“an attempt to ‘hijack’ public attention and to ‘incite communal sentiment’” and 
distributing leaflets “in which it was claimed that ‘Padyatra, or foot-pilgrimage, is an 
ancient, pre-Islamic tradition of national culture, not imported property of Mughal 
immigrants... Purloining of this tradition by so-called Ayesha Bibiji is flagrant and 
deliberate inflammation of already sensitive situation’”.53  The absurd rhetorical 
Othering of the Muslims through this wholesale elision of centuries of Muslim 
                                                          
51 Rushdie, Midnight’s Children, 189. 
52 Rushdie, Midnight’s Children, 72. 
53 Rushdie, Verses, 488. 
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habitation and culture in India in order to exclude them from national culture, to 
render them cultural intruders, and their “tradition-purloining” activities perversions 
of “pure” Hindu culture, is typical of the grotesquely distorting effect that the 
despotic language of cultural purity has in Rushdie’s textual worlds.   
 In The Satanic Verses, however, this incident is almost lost amongst the lurid 
emblems of mongrelization-turned-monsterization.  The pages of the novel swarm 
with monsters: “gigantic flowers with human breasts”, “winged bulls”, a tiger-
headed man, a half-woman-half-water-buffalo, a skeleton-woman and, of course, 
Satan-Shaitan himself, the goat-man.54  Hybrid creatures, they are the representatives 
of impurity, intermingling, change-by-conjoining, broken and deformed on the rack 
of despotic cultures of absolutism.  The novel is a kind of polyphonic 
bildungsroman, a chorus of overlapping, interlocking struggles to attain self-hood, 
spiralling out from the struggles of the two protagonists, Saladin Chamcha and 
Gibreel Farishta, to find themselves, to establish their individuality, in the face of 
dehumanising tyranny. 
 “When we are born we are not automatically human beings,” Rushdie 
explained in an interview of 1989, “[w]e have to learn how to be human.  Some of us 
get there and some of us don’t”.55  As ever in Rushdie’s oeuvre, the quests for 
selfhood – the search for humanity – that the two protagonists of The Satanic Verses 
undergo are symbolic of the struggles of wider communities, migrants, Muslims, to 
find themselves in a postcolonial world.  In “In Good Faith,” he tells us 
The Satanic Verses is the story of two painfully divided selves.  In the 
case of one, Saladin Chamcha, the division is secular and societal: he is 
torn, to put it plainly, between Bombay and London, between East and 
                                                          
54 Rushdie, Verses, 6, 117, 167, 168, 255. 
55 Ameena Meer, “Salman Rushdie”,  BOMB Magazine 27 (Spring 1989), accessed March 14, 2012, 
http://bombmagazine.org/article/1199/salman-rushdie . 
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West.  For the other, Gibreel Farishta, the division is spiritual, a rift in the 
soul.  He has lost his faith and is strung out between his immense need to 
believe and his new inability to do so.  The novel is “about” their quest 
for wholeness.56 
This, as a Rushdie narrator might say, is so and is not so. What he writes of Saladin 
is true up to a point, and yet as the battle between East and West rages within him, it 
is sublimated and subsumed by the battle of immigrant communities in London 
against what is represented as the racist despotism of Thatcherite Britain.  Saladin, at 
the opening of the novel, appears (or aspires) to be a stark throwback to Macaulay’s 
imperial vision of a class of interpreters, “Indian in blood and colour, but English in 
tastes, in opinions, in morals and in intellect” or, as Zeeny puts it, “[a] deserter is 
what, more English than, your English accent wrapped around you like a flag”.57  On 
his return to Bombay, the carefully crafted shell of his British identity begins to fall 
apart, and he is plunged into uncertainty about his cultural identity.  On his return 
journey to London, his plane is hijacked by Sikh terrorists and blown up over the 
Channel, and as he and his fellow traveller Gibreel fall from the sky towards British 
soil they undergo a miraculous transformation: Gibreel metamorphosises into his 
namesake, the archangel, and Saladin into his infernal counterpart.  He is arrested by 
immigration officials who, assuming from his bestial appearance that he is an illegal 
immigrant, beat him up, sexually abuse him and force him to eat his own faeces.  
Repelled by his Otherness, they refuse to allow the possibility that he could be “a 
British Citizen first class,” member of the same society as they: “Who’re you trying 
to kid? ...Look at yourself.  You’re a fucking Packy billy.  Sally-who? - What kind of 
                                                          
56 Rushdie, “Faith”, Homelands, 397. 
57 Thomas Babington Macaulay, “Minute on Indian Education” in Bureau of Education. Selections 
from Educational Records, Part I (1781-1839) ed. H. Sharp (Calcutta: Superintendent 
Government Printing, 1920): 107-117; Rushdie, Verses, 53. 
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name is that for an Englishman?”  When Saladin responds by pointing out that the 
names of the officers, Bruno, Novak and Stein “don’t sound so Anglo Saxon to me,” 
he is met with a blank “I’m from Weybridge, you cunt.  Get it straight: Weybridge, 
where the fucking Beatles used to live”.58  With the absurdity of the notion of 
national and/or cultural purity thus, once more, ironically laid bare, Saladin is 
knocked unconscious and awakes in the Babel of an immigration-run hospital ward, 
surrounded by animal noises.  It quickly becomes apparent that the ward contains the 
physical manifestations of all the racial anxieties of “purist” Britain: the animal 
babble of foreign languages, the hated smells of the immigrant, “jungle and farmyard 
odours mingled with a rich aroma similar to that of exotic spices sizzling in clarified 
butter – coriander, turmeric, cinnamon, cardamoms, cloves”.  It is inhabited by 
hybrid mutants, the tiger-man, the buffalo-woman: immigrants who have been 
transformed, made monstrous, by the performative utterances of the racial slurs of 
the white British state.59 
“But how do they do it?”  Chamcha wanted to know. 
“They describe us,” the other whispered solemnly.  “That’s all.  They 
have the  power  of description, and we succumb to the pictures they 
construct.” 60 
This act of performative description has its discursive roots in a variety of sources, 
from Foucault’s theorisation of the sovereign gaze in Discipline and Punish, itself 
drawn from Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon (Bentham makes a cameo appearance 
towards the end of the novel, as the librettist for a musical based on Dickens’s Our 
                                                          
58 Rushdie, Verses, 163-164. 
59
 My use of the idea of the “performative utterance” comes from J. L. Austin’s  How to do Things 
with Words (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975):  “to utter one of these sentences in 
appropriate circumstances is not just to ‘say’ something, but rather to perform a certain kind of 
action”, Austin, Words, 5. 
60 Rushdie, Verses, 166. 
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Mutual Friend), from the idea of domination-through-description that permeates 
Said’s Orientalism, and from ancient creation myths like Genesis (in the beginning 
was the word). “Animal,” the immigration officers curse Saladin when they first 
meet him, “You’re all the same. Can’t expect animals to observe civilized 
standards”.61  It is the imperial axis of control-by-naming, redolent of ethnographical 
and cartographical categorisations: peoples and cultures catalogued, national borders 
drawn, cities named.  In the crucible of British racism, Saladin Chamcha is 
transformed from human being, semblable, to animal Other by the mechanisms of 
despotic description. 
 Here, then, is one half of despotism’s divided self in The Satanic Verses: the 
tyranny of Mrs Torture’s government.  What of its other Janus-face, the despotic 
power that grips Gibreel, the thing that reduces him in the end to insanity, murder 
and suicide?  I would argue that Rushdie’s post-fatwa assertions that Gibreel’s story 
is about the crisis caused by his loss of faith, “his need to believe and his new 
inability to do so” are misleading.62  Similarly, I would challenge Brennan’s assertion 
that “The Satanic Verses is not (like the earlier novels) a rational critique of religious 
charlatanism by a Westernised Bombay Muslim”.63  Although Gibreel’s loss of faith 
is arguably the pivotal point in his narrative, it is represented as more of an atheist 
awakening than a theist bereavement.  When he loses his faith during a mysterious 
illness in which he begins “to haemorrhage all over his insides for no apparent 
reason,” the moment of his loss reads like a kind of atheist Damascene moment: 
During his illness he had spent every moment of consciousness calling 
upon God... Then it occurred to him that he was being punished, and for 
a time that made it possible to suffer the pain, but after a time he got 
                                                          
61 Rushdie, Verses, 159. 
62 Rushdie, “Faith”, Homelands, 397. 
63 Brennan, Salman Rushdie, 151. 
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angry... The anger with God carried him through another day, but then it 
faded, and in its place there came a terrible emptiness, an isolation, as he 
realized he was talking to thin air, that there was nobody there at all, and 
then he felt more foolish than ever in his life, and he began to plead into 
the emptiness, ya Allah, just be there, damn it, just be.  But he felt 
nothing, nothing nothing, and then one day he found that he no longer 
needed there to be anything to feel.  On that day of metamorphosis the 
illness changed and his recovery began.64 
This anti-revelation, and the feast of pork – “the gammon steaks of his unbelief and 
the pig’s trotters of secularism” – with which he celebrates it recall Rushdie’s 
account of his own loss of faith:  
God, Satan, Paradise and Hell all vanished one day in my fifteenth year, 
when I quite abruptly lost my faith... to prove my new-found atheism, I 
bought myself a rather tasteless ham sandwich, and so partook for the 
first time of the forbidden flesh of the swine.  No thunderbolt arrived to 
strike me down.  I remember feeling that my survival confirmed the 
correctness of my new position.65   
“Don’t you get it?” Gibreel shouts, “spewing sausage fragments from the corners of 
his mouth. ‘No thunderbolt.  That’s the point.’”66 
 With the recovery which his new-found godlessness seems to have prompted 
come dreams, visions in which “he was always present, not as himself but as his 
namesake... the bloody archangel, Gibreel himself, large as bloody life”.67  These are 
the dreams of revelation, the passages at the heart of the controversy of the Rushdie 
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Affair, in which Gibreel finds himself caught by the will of the Prophet Mahound 
(who is also somehow himself), and ventriloquised into reciting words forced into 
his mouth: “my lips moving, being moved by.  What, whom?  Don’t know, can’t say.  
Nevertheless, here they are, coming out of my mouth, up the throat, past my teeth: 
the Words”.68  Gibreel’s transformation is less easily decodable than Saladin’s: he 
goes from being a Bollywood film star, famed for his representations of a 
multiplicity of gods in the theological blockbusters of the day, whose “religious faith 
was a low-key thing, a part of him that required no more special attention than any 
other”, to an unbeliever, transported to London by his love for the glacial blonde 
mountaineer, Alleluia Cone.69  The text offers us little in the way of explanations for 
the dreams and the Blakeian visions of London that ensue when they bleed into his 
waking life.  They could be caused by schizophrenia, a punishment from God for his 
faithlessness (this is a possibility which, as we have seen, Rushdie is keen to stress in 
his post-fatwa essays), or Satanic deceptions.  When he returns to Bombay at the end 
of the book, by now certainly driven insane by his visions, no matter what caused 
them, there is a suggestion that they might be sort of elliptical flash-backs (or flash-
forwards) from his ill-fated pseudo-theological films.  There can be little doubt that 
Rushdie intends the textual source of the dreams to remain in darkness: when 
Gibreel finally comes face-to-face with his maker (or perhaps the maker’s opposite 
number) in the novel, it is Rushdie himself, dandruff and all.70  “Whether We be 
multiform, plural, representing the union-by-hybridization of such opposites as 
Oopar [above] and Neechay [below],” the apparition declares, “or whether We be 
pure, stark, extreme, will not be resolved here”.71  This metatextual play makes clear 
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that, beyond the oblique “in-text” possible explanations for the provenance of the 
dreams, the one ultimately responsible for them is the author: an author who has 
advertised many times which side of the union-by-hybridization/pure-stark-extreme 
binary he stands on.  Gibreel’s tortured visions of the vibrant, hybrid city of Jahilia 
reduced to “unfreedom” by the “prophet-motivated” Mahound’s creed of 
Submission, are stark warnings from a secular, liberal author-deity.72  
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Part III 
The Fatwa and the Philosophes 
 The affair erupted into a conflict between the European Enlightenment –  
 reason, tolerance, dialogue, secularism – and radical Islam – theocratic,  
 literalist and incompetent.1 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 Michael Ignatieff, “The lesson of Rushdie’s Fatwa Years,” Financial Times, September14, 2012, 
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Chapter 5 
Scheherazade and the Sea of Stories   
 
 Over the course of the first two parts of this study we have seen Rushdie 
mobilise the discursive figures of the oppressed Muslim woman and the Islamic 
despot which coalesced towards the end of the eighteenth century.  We have seen, in 
the two novels which preceded the fatwa, the half-thought, unarticulated echoes and 
resonances – the submerged presence – of the earlier eighteenth century and its use 
of the literary Islamic world as a means of exploring European oppression and the 
possibilities of increased European freedom.  The third and final part of this study 
moves to examine the open evocation of the Enlightenment as the birthplace of the 
Western self, either as incarnation of freedom of expression or of tyrannical 
secularism, in the Rushdie Affair.  Though eighteenth-century discourses – partly 
acknowledged, partly unseen – had marked his novels from the beginning of his 
career, amidst the furore of the fatwa Rushdie and his defenders triumphantly 
excavated an artefact they called “Enlightenment” (of doubtful eighteenth-century 
provenance) that would act as both shield and weapon in the battle of Secularism 
against the dark forces of Faith.  To the defenders of Islam, this same artefact would 
become an emblem of the West’s tyranny – a talisman of the historical and cultural 
despotism of the Occident. 
 By 2005, when Rushdie writes the article from which this study takes its title, 
ideas about the Enlightenment roots of contemporary ideas about freedom of speech 
have been joined by an open assertion of the similar provenance of that most 
precious of Rushdiean ideals, the freedom of imagination.  “Most of our 
contemporary ideas about freedom of speech and imagination come from the 
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Enlightenment,” he proclaims, “[w]e may have thought the battle won, but if we 
aren’t careful, it is about to be ‘un-won’”.2  This problematic link between the West, 
Enlightenment, and the stuff of life – Scheherazadian imaginative narrative – has 
long been a vital, if under-critiqued, aspect of Rushdie’s worldview.  Similarly, the 
rhetoric of a Manichean battle between secularism and religion (and all the familiar 
abstracts imbricated within them) stretches back to before the fatwa, at least as far as 
the declaration in The Satanic Verses that “[b]attle lines are being drawn up in India 
today... Secular versus religious, the light versus the dark.  Better you choose which 
side you are on”.3  But the powerful discourse of Enlightenment-West against anti-
Enlightenment-Rest has gathered force in the years since 9/11 to the point where 
Rushdie’s tendency to view the Islamic East as the locale of unfreedom has 
crystallised into an often brazenly totalising axis of West-Good, Islam-Bad. 
 In this chapter, I turn to Rushdie’s first post-fatwa work of fiction, Haroun 
and the Sea of Stories.  In it I trace not only the presences of some of the eighteenth-
century Scheherazades and Schahriars discussed in Parts I and II, but the literary 
origins of Rushdie’s move towards identifying the conflict of the Rushdie Affair in 
terms of a battle for the Enlightenment.   
 
Locating Haroun 
 Published nineteen months after the declaration of the fatwa, in the storm of 
the Rushdie Affair, Haroun and the Sea of Stories split its literary commentators 
along very similar lines to The Satanic Verses.  Many critics seem to have felt 
compelled, by the violence of Rushdie’s detractors, to commit themselves to reading 
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the text either in a sort of wilful political and social isolation, or squarely 
autobiographically, as a politico-personal response to Khomeini’s edict.   “In this 
tale, sorrow causes one to forget one’s name and lose the ability to speak,” writes 
Alison Lurie in her tellingly entitled review “Another Dangerous Story from Salman 
Rushdie”, “and no wonder, considering the recent life of its author…”.4 “In fact the 
book contains no messages for Ayatollahs,” asserts Dean Flower, “no topical 
nudges. It is wiser and deeper than that… What the story is really about is the 
story”.5  Inevitably, perhaps, it is the ground between these two critical furrows that 
has proved most fertile and – from the account in Joseph Anton of the novel’s 
genesis– the closest to the truth of the author’s self-positioning in this text.  Amidst 
threatened writer’s block and fatwa-induced doubts about his abilities as an author 
(“If that was what he got for making his best effort, then he should perhaps try doing 
something else”), Rushdie’s son Zafar reminds him of his promise to write him a 
book: 
 It was the only time in his working life that he knew almost the whole 
plot from the beginning.  The story dropped into his head like a gift.  He 
had told Zafar stories while the boy took his evening bath, bathtime 
stories instead of bedtime ones.  There were little sandalwood animals 
and shikara boats from Kashmir floating in the bath-water and the sea of 
stories was born there, or perhaps reborn.  The original sea was to be 
found in the title of an old Sanskrit book [the Kathasaritsagara]… 
usually rendered in English as the Ocean of the Streams of Story.  In 
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Somadeva’s huge book there wasn’t actually a sea.  But supposing there 
was such a sea, where all the stories ever invented flowed in intertwining 
streams?  While Zafar was having his bath, his dad would take a mug 
and dip it into his son’s bathwater and pretend to sip, and to find a story 
to tell, a story-stream flowing through the bath of stories. 
  And now in Zafar’s book he would visit the ocean itself.  There 
would be a storyteller in the story, who lost the Gift of the Gab after his 
wife left him, and his son would travel to the source of all stories to find 
out how to renew his father’s gift.  The only part of his original vision 
that changed in the telling was the ending… A happy ending had to be 
found…6 
It is, as I shall illustrate, significant that it is a collection of Kashmiri souvenirs 
(memories) floating on the waters of this very personal collection of moments with 
his son, and the title, rather than the body, of the Kathasaritsagara, that are the basis 
for this inspiration.  And typically for Joseph Anton – this multivalent piece of life-
(re)writing – one need only turn the page to detect, beneath the neat anecdotal arc, an 
uneasy narrative disjunction or temporal overlap.  His assertion, after this account of 
the fully-formed “gift” that fell into his head at his son’s demand, that the only part 
of this “original vision that changed in the telling was the ending”, is immediately 
called into question for the careful reader.  Firstly by the triumphant “and now” (my 
emphasis) of the following paragraph: it is a now that seems to make the storyteller’s 
“Gift-of-the-Gab”-lessness the echo, or product, of “the bleak, defeated idea of 
becoming not a writer” that had haunted Rushdie for the first months of his time in 
                                                          
6 Rushdie, Joseph, 166, 167. 
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hiding.
7
  Secondly, we are told on the following page of a short story called “The 
Princess Khamosh” (the Hindi for silent) written “many years earlier” as an 
imaginary fragment from the Travels of the fourteenth-century traveller Ibn Battuta, 
in which he “comes to a divided country in which two tribes are at war, the Guppees, 
a chatterbox people, and the Chupwalas, among whom a cult of silence has grown 
up, and who worship a stone idol called Bezaban, that is, without a tongue. When the 
Chupwalas capture the Guppee princess and threaten to sew her lips shut as an 
offering to their god, war breaks out between the lands of Gup and Chup”.8  The 
connection of the genesis of this then-rejected tale with the bathtime stories is 
unclear.  Certainly, it contains many of the major plot points of the central Kahani 
story of Haroun and the Sea of Stories, but is this a story that is then fitted into the 
bathtime frame-tale, or is it itself “a story-stream flowing through the bath of 
stories”?9  There follows another significant now: 
Now he realised that this little tale about a war between language and 
silence could be given a meaning that was not only linguistic; that hidden 
inside it was a parable about freedom and tyranny whose potential he 
finally understood.  The story had been ahead of him, so to speak, and 
now his life had caught up with it.
10
 
Although the story of this early fragment finding sudden resonance in the tempest of 
the fatwa is compelling (and I have no reason to think it untrue – though there is 
nothing relating to it in the material in the Salman Rushdie Papers at Emory 
University), this representation of a sudden Damascene realisation that it could act as 
                                                          
7 Rushdie, Joseph, 167, 166. 
8 Rushdie, Joseph, 168. 
9 Rushdie, Joseph, 167. 
10 Rushdie, Joseph, 168. 
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a parable seems a little disingenuous in the light of Rushdie’s longstanding interest 
in the notion of narration as freedom and silence as oppression.  Whilst the following 
chapter in part examines the shifts in Rushdie’s politics and ideology brought about 
by the fatwa, and later 9/11, the parable of freedom and tyranny told in Haroun and 
the Sea of Stories has, as we have seen, been told before.  
 
Scheherazade vs. Schahriar  
 Haroun and the Sea of Stories is, in many ways, merely a more prominent 
staging of the battle between mongrelization and absolutism, multiplicity and 
monophilia,that runs throughout Rushdie’s pre-fatwa oeuvre. The dark theme of 
heteroglossic cosmopolis ranged against despotic master-narrative is brightened, in 
this text, by the desperately hopeful rhetoric of cultural hybridity as salvation that we 
saw in his post-fatwa defences.  It is worth revisiting “In Good Faith” here – the 
essay he wrote to mark the first anniversary of the edict, as he was in the midst of 
writing Haroun and the Sea of Stories:   
Those who oppose the novel most vociferously today are of the opinion 
that intermingling with a different culture will inevitably weaken and 
ruin their own. I am of the opposite opinion. The Satanic Verses 
celebrates hybridity, impurity, intermingling, the transformation that 
comes of new and unexpected combinations of human beings, cultures, 
ideas, politics, movies, songs. It rejoices in mongrelization and fears the 
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absolutism of the Pure... The Satanic Verses is for change-by-fusion, 
change-by-conjoining. It is a love-song to our mongrel selves.
11
 
As I illustrated in Part II, this functions in some ways as more of a re-branding 
exercise than a faithful account of the The Satanic Verses’ discursive aims.  It does, 
however, work well as a kind of manifesto for Haroun and the Sea of Stories.  
Indeed, as he is writing “In Good Faith”, the change-by-conjoining he describes is 
taking place viscerally within the bodies of the “plentimaw fish” that inhabit the 
story sea of the parallel textual world of his novella.  “They swallow stories”, we are 
told, “through every mouth, and in their innards miracles occur; a little bit of one 
story joins on to an idea from another, and hey presto, when they spew the stories 
out they are not old tales but new ones”.12   
 Haroun, on a quest to return his Father Rashid’s story-telling abilities, finds 
himself on the world of Kahani (Hindi for “story”), a second moon, most of the 
surface of which is covered by the life-giving waters of the Great Story Sea.  It has 
been bisected by a great war between its two hemispheres, the Land of Gup and the 
Land of Chup.  Gup is populated by a lovably noisy and argumentative assortment of 
different creatures who go by the collective name of Guppees and Chup is, by 
contrast, occupied by a race of shadowy, hooded creatures who have “fallen under 
the power of the ‘Mystery of Bezaban,’ a Cult of Dumbness or Muteness, whose 
followers swear vows of  lifelong silence to show their devotion” to a despot called 
Khattam-Shud.
13
  The Guppees, in an oppressive act of Partition  enabled by their 
superior technology, have halted the rotation of the Story Moon, so that the land of 
Gup is bathed in perpetual sunlight and the Land of Chup is permanently blanketed 
                                                          
11 Rushdie, “Faith”, Homelands, 394. 
12 Rushdie, Haroun, 86. 
13 Rushdie, Haroun, 101, 39. 
144 
 
in darkness and, between the two lands, they have “constructed an unbreakable (and 
also invisible) Wall of Force”.14   
 The opposition between the mongrelized and the pure looms even larger in 
Haroun and the Sea of Stories than in The Satanic Verses, with the Guppees’ wall of 
force partitioning the globe into a map of binaries, with freedom of speech, 
secularism and progress in one hemisphere, and tyranny, censorship, religious 
fundamentalism and stagnation in the other.  What we are faced with is very much 
the same conflict that will later be branded “The Battle for the Enlightenment”.  And 
yet the artificiality of these polarities, the fundamental unnaturalness of a culturally 
partitioned globe, is seemingly underlined from the first by the swirling currents of 
narrative that wash the coasts of Gup and Chup alike: the waters of the Sea of 
Stories, “made up of a thousand, thousand, thousand and one different currents... all 
the stories that had ever been told and many that were still in the process of being 
invented”.15 
 This kaleidoscopic profusion of narratives constitutes both the “Aryan, 
Mughal, British, take-the-best-and-leave-the-rest” of Zeeny’s hybrid cultural history 
and the multiple selves that Saladin finds “jostling and joggling” inside him in The 
Satanic Verses.
16
  The Sea of Stories is a sea of metonymy, standing for the currents 
of narrative that move between and across global cultures, the tides of history out of 
which nations build themselves, and the streams of story that flow within us, creating 
us as individuals.  These are truly international waters – and, like many international 
waters, national/cultural rights to them have been contested, with critics locating 
                                                          
14 Rushdie, Haroun, 80. 
15 Rushdie, Haroun, 72. 
16  Rushdie, Verses, 52, 519. 
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their source within a range of cultural territories.  The most significant (and 
problematic) of these sources is, I will argue, the Arabian Nights. 
 Haroun’s name and that of his father, Rashid Khalifa, derive from one of the 
most prominent recurring characters in the Arabian Nights, Haroun al-Rashid, the 
Caliph of Baghdad.  Indeed, the entire text is swimming in references to the Arabian 
Nights: the Story Sea, as we have seen, is “made up of a thousand, thousand, 
thousand and one different currents”, the story that the Water Genie gives Haroun to 
drink on his arrival at Kahani turns out to be “Princess Rescue Story Number 
S/1001/ZHT/420/41(r)xi”: a subtle encryption of the 1001 Nights with the “S” and 
the “ZHT” possibly signifying, as Andrew Teverson suggests, Scheherazade, and the 
capital of the Land of Gup is “built upon an Archipelago of one thousand and one 
small islands”.17  And, beyond the many textual surface-references to the Arabian 
Nights, the discursive opposition of Scheherazade’s multiple narratives and King 
Shahriar’s genocidal master-narrative is starker even than it was in The Satanic 
Verses.  
 The despot Khattam-Shud, we discover, is methodically destroying the 
streams of story in a bid for world-domination.  In order to restore his father’s story-
telling abilities and save the world of Kahani, Haroun must travel to the Old Zone, to 
find “the Wellspring, or Source of Stories”, where it is believed “that all the streams 
of Story had originated long ago”.18  Making a meta-textual play on the multiple 
meanings of “source” as point of origin and document or archive, Haroun’s quest to 
find the Source of Stories is the source of his own story, the novel itself – and also 
the source of the writer.  The metatextual element of Haroun’s quest to find and 
                                                          
17
 Andrew Teverson, “Fairy Tale Politics: Free Speech and Multiculturalism in Haroun and the Sea of 
Stories”, Twentieth Century Literature 47, no. 4, (2001): 444-466, 454. 
18 Rushdie, Haroun, 86. 
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preserve the source of his father’s creative powers (Rushdie/Rashid’s Gift of the 
Gab, threatened by Khattam-Shud/Khomeini) signposts the literary traditions 
Rushdie draws on as the heart of the novel’s cultural-critical intervention.   
 
In Search of the Source  
 In his influential essay “Fairy Tale Politics: Free Speech and 
Multiculturalism in Haroun and the Sea of Stories”, Teverson joins Jean-Pierre 
Durix in placing the novel within the subgenre “the children’s story which only 
adults can understand”.19  The two members of this subgenre that Haroun and the 
Sea of Stories most resembles (and, the implication goes, is indebted to), Teverson 
writes, are Jonathan Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels (1726) and Lewis Carroll’s Alice in 
Wonderland (1865).
20
  After a meditation on the connections between the three texts, 
however, he indicates an important departure on Rushdie’s part: 
Despite the similarities between Haroun and texts such as Gulliver’s 
Travels and Alice in Wonderland, however, Carroll’s and Swift’s tales, 
unlike Rushdie’s, both derive from a predominantly English storytelling 
tradition… Rushdie’s fantasy, by contrast, demonstrates a resistance to 
the tradition’s exclusive reliance on European narrative forms and 
European modes of perception by taking this tradition, saturated in 
British folklore and fairy tale, and merging it with an equivalent tradition 
in Indian storytelling that derives from Indic, Persian, or Arabic oral and 
literary sources.  In addition to a host of character types and scenarios 
                                                          
19
 Jean-Pierre Durix, “‘The Gardener of Stories’: Salman Rushdie’s Haroun and the Sea of Stories” in 
Fletcher, Reading Rushdie, 342-351, 343. 
20 Teverson, “Politics”, 454. 
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reminiscent of Western fairy tales, for instance, Rushdie gives us plot 
motifs and expressions from The Arabian Nights, Bhatta Somadeva’s 
eleventh-century Ocean of Streams of Story (Katha Sarit Sagara), and… 
Attar’s The Conference of Birds.21 
The equivalence of this tradition – both in terms of positioning it as parallel to the 
European tradition outside Rushdie’s work, and in terms of rendering it of equal 
weight as a narrative source within Haroun and the Sea of Stories – is key to 
Teverson’s analysis, making the novel an equal hybrid of Eastern and Western 
narratives, one-part-West-to-one-part-East, and thereby a literary manifestation of 
the triumph of mongrelization over absolutism.  This is a conclusion drawn – often 
rather casually – by many critics, and is undoubtedly something that Rushdie sets out 
to court.
22
  And yet the breakdown of literary allusions and resonances within the 
book is in fact far more heavily weighted towards the European than the Eastern.   
 Beyond readings like Suchismita Sen’s which focus on the postcolonial 
Indianness of Rushdie’s diction and its debt to authors like R. K. Narayan, the 
Eastern texts that Teverson names above are the main three mentioned in critical 
writings on Haroun and the Sea of Stories – and they are name-checked in 
practically every work written on the novel.
23
  On close examination, however, the 
influence of two of the three on the text is almost nominal – in one case, literally.  
                                                          
21 Teverson, “Politics”, 454-455. 
22 Suchismita Sen, “Memory, Language, and Society in Salman Rushdie’s Haroun and the Sea of 
Stories”, Contemporary Literature 36, No. 4, (Winter, 1995): 654-675, 666. See, for example, 
Catherine Cundy, “Through Childhood’s Window: Haroun and the Sea of Stories” in Fletcher, 
Reading Rushdie, 335-342, and M. Mukherjee, “Politics and Children’s Literature: A Reading of 
Haroun and the Sea of Stories”, Ariel 29 (1998): 163-177. 
23 Madhumita Roy and Anjali Gera Roy make an interesting case for the Hamzanama cycle of 
paintings and the Dastan-e-Amir Hamza tales as influences on the fantastical world of Haroun and 
the Sea of Stories, but they admit that “specific references to… [them] are completely absent in 
Haroun” and I would suggest that their account of the influence of the dastan form on Luka and 
the Fire of Life is more convincing. Roy and Roy, “Haroun and Luka: A Study of Salman 
Rushdie’s talismanic stories”, The Journal of Commonwealth Literature (2014): 174-187, 175. 
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The Ocean of the Streams of Story gives the text one of its central metaphors, and its 
name, but, as we saw Rushdie put it in Joseph Anton, “[t]he original sea was to be 
found in the title of an old Sanskrit book …  In Somadeva’s huge book there wasn’t 
actually a sea.  But supposing there was such a sea, where all the stories ever 
invented flowed in intertwining streams?”24  To my knowledge, this is the only 
formal intertextual connection between Haroun and the Kathasaritsagara – beyond 
the image taken from the title and then expanded upon, there are no “plot motifs and 
expressions” taken from the body of the text.25  Its position as regards the novel is to 
exist as a marker of diverse cultural inheritance rather than as a(n inter)cultural 
inheritance in its own right:  it functions as another form of Rushdiean shorthand. 
 The centrality of Farid ud-din Attar’s The Conference of the Birds is, I would 
argue, similarly open to debate.  In Joseph Anton, Rushdie summarises the text thus: 
In the poem – a sort of Muslim Pilgrim’s Progress – a hoopoe led thirty 
birds on a journey through seven valleys of travail and revelation 
towards the circular mountain of Qaf , home of their god the Simurg.  
When they reached the mountain top there was no god there and it was 
explained to them that the name Simurg, if broken down into its syllables 
si and murg, means “thirty birds”.  Having overcome the travails of the 
quest they had become the god they sought.
26
 
Whilst it is true that Grimus, his first novel (an anagram of “Simurg”), is based on 
this work, and, as I shall explore later in this chapter, this parable holds a special 
place in Rushdie’s view of religion, the only direct reference to it in Haroun and the 
                                                          
24 Rushdie, Joseph, 167 (my emphasis). 
25 Teverson, “Politics”, 454. 
26 Rushdie, Joseph, 50. 
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Sea of Stories comes early in the text, when Iff the genie offers Haroun a choice of 
magical creatures to transport him to Kahani, the story moon. 
…[H]e decided not to argue and pointed at a tiny crested bird that was 
giving him a sidelong look through one highly intelligent eye. 
 “So it’s the Hoopoe for us,” the Water Genie said, sounding almost 
impressed.  “Perhaps you know, Disconnector Thief, that in the old 
stories the Hoopoe is the bird that leads all other birds through many 
dangerous places to their ultimate goal.
27
 
For Teverson, the hoopoe in The Conference of the Birds “comes to represent both 
the ancient tradition of Sanskrit storytelling from which Attar has taken him and the 
narrative arts in which he is adept”.28  In Haroun and the Sea of Stories, Teverson 
continues, “[a]s in Attar’s poem, this hoopoe signals Rushdie’s connection with an 
ancient Sanskrit tradition.  It also – at an early point of the narrative – introduces two 
of the primary objectives of the novella: to reassert the value of storytelling after the 
fatwa, and to defend free speech against what he sees as the forces of silence and 
oppression”.29  Again, what is significant is the external cultural inheritance to which 
this brief allusion connects Rushdie and his text, rather than any deep-seated 
intertextual relationship.  Whilst the character of Butt the wisecracking Hoopoe-boat 
with the robotic brain physically transports Haroun to the Wellspring of the story 
sea, and therefore literally takes him on his quest, he is no more of a spiritual guide 
than Iff the Water Genie or Mali the Floating Gardener, his other companions.  The 
links Teverson makes between the hoopoe and the importance of storytelling and 
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free speech refer back to the biographical account of Attar with which he opens his 
essay, rather than to anything in Haroun and the Sea of Stories.   His point is that the 
life of the poet, like that of Rushdie, was beset with violent struggles against 
censorship and accusations of blasphemy, and that The Conference of the Birds is 
“replete with examples of Sufis who have been dubbed heretics for their unorthodox 
beliefs and either driven into banishment or murdered by jealous tyrants”.30  He 
concludes this biographical passage with rather less certainty than that with which he 
makes his later assertion about the hoopoe’s link to free speech and oppression: 
It is tempting to believe, on this basis, that Rushdie makes reference to 
Attar’s work in Haroun either because he is aware of Attar’s persecution 
and wishes to draw strength from the fact that he is not the first (or the 
last) to suffer for expressing opinions in a fictional form or because he is 
unaware of Attar’s fate but recognizes in The Conference of the Birds the 
work of a man who is… [intimate] with the mechanisms of earthly 
oppression.
31
  
It seems difficult to believe that Rushdie would be unaware of the biographical 
resonance between his own experiences and those of one of his literary heroes, and 
yet it is not a point that I have seen him make in any of his writings.  As my later 
examination of invocations of Enlightenment figures in the fatwa will indicate, 
Rushdie found comfort and strength in the experiences of other embattled thinkers – 
in “the history of literature” – at this time, but he markedly makes parallels almost 
exclusively between himself and European writers.
 32
  Indeed, I would suggest that 
beyond using this brief reference to Attar as a means of connecting himself to 
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Eastern cultural networks – to Sufism as well as Sanskrit literature – Rushdie’s sense 
of kinship with the author of the The Conference of the Birds (though less central 
than Teverson indicates) lies more in the sense of a shared, almost secular, 
humanism (“they had become the god they sought”) bound up with ideas of 
Enlightenment, than to devotional Islam.
33
 
 This leads us back to the last and most important of the trinity of Eastern 
sources of the story sea: the Arabian Nights.  Of the Eastern literary-cultural 
inheritances that Haroun and the Sea of Stories lays claim to, the Arabian Nights is 
the only one to find widespread expression within the text – indeed, the Great Story 
Sea, though drawn from the title of the Kathasaritsagara, could almost be seen as a 
mere nomenclative alternative to the Nights. Not only does the tide of references 
from and allusions to the Nights flood the text, overwhelming the single nod to Attar 
and nearly subsuming Somadeva’s titular position, but the central discursive 
framework of the novel is in fact that of Scheherazade’s frame tale: fatal despotic 
censorship overcome by a profusion of stories. 
 
The Return of Scheherazade 
 After the systematic silencing of her voice in Shame, and the appropriation 
and despotic abuse of her power of performative narrative in The Satanic Verses, 
Scheherazade makes an almost triumphant return in this text.  The power of her 
narratives, as we have seen, is freed in the overthrow of the despotic Khattam-Shud – 
though, significantly, rather than transforming him into a benign ruler, this text 
destroys its despot.  Her role as storyteller is taken over, however, in a manoeuvre 
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which recalls her marginalisation in late-eighteenth century versions of the Arabian 
Nights.  The teller of tales in this text is the Rushdie-esque figure of Rashid.  The 
action of the novel begins with the curtailment of a woman’s song:  
Haroun grew up in a home in which, instead of misery and frowns, he 
had his father’s ready laughter and his mother’s sweet voice raised in 
song. 
 Then something went wrong. (Maybe the sadness of the city finally 
crept in through their windows.) 
 The day Soraya stopped singing, in the middle of a line, as if someone 
had thrown a switch, Haroun guessed there was trouble brewing.  But he 
never suspected how much.
34
 
This break in the flow of free expression constitutes the halt of life as Haroun knows 
it – and even the halt of time.  On the news that his wife, tired of his stories, has run 
away with the neighbour upstairs, an enemy to literature and the imagination 
(“What’s the use of stories that aren’t even true?” he spits), Rashid breaks every 
clock in the house, leaving them all stuck at exactly eleven o’clock.  This leaves 
Haroun unable to concentrate on anything for longer than eleven minutes at a time – 
“stuck in time like a broken clock”.35  For Rushdie, the links between time and 
narrative, and between narrative and The Arabian Nights run deep: one need only 
think of the thousand and one children born at the stroke of midnight.  The notion of 
despotism as the enemy of time as well as narrative was central to The Satanic 
Verses, with the terrible victory of the Imam over Ayesha marked by the conjunction 
of an Arabian Nights allusion and the image of broken clocks: “and now every clock 
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in the capital city of Desh begins to chime, and goes on unceasingly, beyond twelve, 
beyond twenty-four, beyond one thousand and one, announcing the end of Time”.36  
This early cessation of time in Haroun and the Sea of Stories marks the loss of more 
than the protagonist’s mother; it is at this point that “an Unthinkable Thing” 
happens: “Rashid Khalifa, the legendary Ocean of Notions, the fabled Shah of 
Blah… found that he had run out of stories to tell”.37  It is this silence – marked by 
the Death of Time, resonating with the extra-textual echoes of Rushdie’s Khomeini-
induced writer’s block, and proleptic of the giant plug that the villain Khattam-Shud 
is constructing to block the Wellspring of the Story Sea – that necessitates the 
voyage to the Story Moon Kahani.  It is a silence that will end only with the halt of 
the tyrannical censorship of the story sea, with the triumph of Scheherazade’s wealth 
of stories over Khattam-Shud’s despotic mono-narrative.  And the end of the silence, 
and the restoration of time, will be marked by the continuation of the woman’s song.  
The novel ends with Haroun looking at his clock: “‘Yes,’ he nodded to himself, 
‘time is definitely on the move again around these parts.’ Outside, in the living room, 
his mother had begun to sing”.38 
 Whilst the figure – or at least the paradigm – of Scheherazade and her life-
giving narrative has returned to the fore in this text, this is not the reappearance of 
the dynamic, metamorphic, liberating Scheherazade of early eighteenth-century 
Europe.  Her agency has been taken over by the two male protagonists, and her 
generative narrative abilities have become a natural resource – the story sea.  The 
woman’s song, broken at the beginning of the book and resumed at the end, is not 
the song of Scheherazade, but effectively the metonymic voice of the women she 
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intervenes to save: it is the sound of a world operating as it should.   It is also, in 
some ways, the sound of Rushdie’s childhood – or at least one version thereof.   “I 
grew up in a literary tradition,” Rushdie said in a conversation with Günter Grass in 
1985, “That’s to say that the kind of stories I was told as a child, by and large, were 
Arabian Nights kind of stories.  It was those sort of fairy tales… And the belief was 
that by telling stories in that way, in that marvellous way, you could actually tell a 
kind of truth which you couldn’t tell in other ways”.39  The Arabian Nights, then, is a 
tradition – a cultural inheritance perhaps more personal than those represented by 
Attar or Somadeva – that Rushdie equates with a form of fantastical truth-telling.  
Beyond that, as Teverson argues, and as borne out by its association with life-giving 
narrative and resistance that I have traced through Rushdie’s corpus, it is emblematic 
of a sense “that storytelling, when unfettered, becomes the antithesis of totalitarian 
thinking, because it resists the fascistic (or Platonic) drive to control society by 
limiting potential definitions and controlling interpretations”.40   But it is also, I 
would argue, a tradition that comes to Rushdie filtered, to a large extent, through 
Western culture.   
 Whilst the text, as I have indicated, is saturated with allusions to the Nights, 
Rushdie never references Alf Layla wa-Layla, or even The 1001 Nights (though the 
number 1001 does recur throughout the text), he only ever mentions The Arabian 
Nights – the name for the tales cemented in Western memory and culture by 
Galland’s 1706 translation.  This can partly be put down to an impulse to appeal to 
the Western literary market.  Certainly the cover and flyleaves of my Granta 
paperback edition are awash with celebratory quotes from the great and the good 
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hailing the novel as “a whole Arabian Nights entertainment,” (Nadine Gordimer in 
the Times Literary Supplement), or excitedly telling potential readers that “[i]n it, 
you notice not just the Arabian Nights but stray strands of Alice and The Wizard of 
Oz” (Victoria Glendenning, the Times).  These cover-quotes are clearly participating 
in the continued infantilisation of The Arabian Nights that began, as I outlined in 
Part I, in the final decades of the eighteenth century; a tendency perhaps exacerbated 
by the classification of Haroun and the Sea of Stories as children’s literature.   
 This is not Rushdie’s intention – though The Arabian Nights’ place in the 
Western children’s canon is certainly something he is playing on.  Rather, his 
privileging of the Arabian Nights as an intertext over non-Western collections might 
be read as a continuation of his earlier novels’ representations of the tales as 
occupying a colonially-inflected in-between space in the dusty bookcases of the 
educated middle classes in India.  “The Burton translation of the Alf layla wa layla” 
that Omar Khayyam (himself named for “a translated man”) finds in the library of 
Nishapur in Shame, for example, becomes the “ten-volume set of the Richard Burton 
translation of the Arabian Nights, which was being slowly devoured by mildew and 
bookworm” in Changez’s “teak-lined study” in The Satanic Verses.41  However, 
whilst these references to Burton’s edition of the Arabian Nights foreground the 
texts’ complex and problematic inter-cultural postcolonial status, in Haroun and the 
Sea of Stories such awareness gives way to an unproblematised blurring of 
translational and historical lines: his direct textual allusions to the text are markedly 
casual.  
 The houseboat from which Haroun and Rashid begin their journeys into the 
world of Kahani is called “Arabian Nights Plus One, because… ‘even in all the 
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Arabian Nights you will never have a night like this.’  Each of its windows had been 
cut out in the shape of a fabulous bird, fish, or beast: the Roc of Sinbad the Sailor, 
the Whale That Swallowed Men, a Fire-Breathing Dragon, and so on”.42  The Land 
of Gup, the hemisphere of the Story Moon which they arrive in from this 
Burton/Grub-Street-inflected point of departure, is also a place strikingly redolent of 
European visions of the Orient.  As Daniel Roberts points out in his excellent essay 
“Rushdie and the Romantics: Intertextual Politics in Haroun and the Sea of Stories”, 
the reader’s first sight of the City of Gup is through the shimmering intertextual 
vision of Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s poem “Kubla Khan: or A Vision in a Dream” 
(1797).  Coleridge’s famous dream-vision of Xanadu, the summer palace of Kublai 
Khan (invoked in the opening line of the acrostic poem that prefaces Haroun – 
“Zembla, Zenda, Xanadu:/All our dream-worlds may come true”) begins 
 In Xanadu did Kubla Khan 
 A stately pleasure-dome decree: 
 Where Alph, the sacred river, ran 
 Through caverns measureless to man 
    Down to a sunless sea. 
 So twice five miles of fertile ground 
 With walls and towers were girdled round; 
 And there were gardens bright with sinuous rills, 
 Where blossomed many an incense-bearing tree; 
 And here were forests ancient as the hills, 
 Enfolding sunny spots of greenery.
43
 
                                                          
42 Rushdie, Haroun, 50-51. 
43 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, “Kubla Khan, or A Vision in a Dream”, Poetical Works, ed. J.C.C. Mays 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), 512-513. 
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Meanwhile, in the citadel of the Guppees, “a gigantic formal garden came down in 
terraces right to the water’s edge.  In this Pleasure Garden were fountains and 
pleasure-domes and ancient spreading trees”.44  “Within the Oriental sublime of this 
garden, however”, Roberts notes, “we encounter an oddly democratic intrusion.  
Whereas Kublai’s palace is the sole architectural feature within the wild and 
expansive garden that he decrees (Coleridge follows his source, Purchas’s 
Pilgrimage, quoted in his 1816 introduction to the poem, in depicting it thus), 
Rushdie introduces three important buildings in fairy-tale mode” – the Palace of 
King Chattergy, the Parliament of Gup, and “the towering edifice of P2C2E 
[Processes Too Complicated To Explain] House, a huge building… in which were 
concealed one thousand and one Machines Too Complicated To Describe, which 
controlled the Processes Too Complicated To Explain”.45  Roberts, reading Haroun 
and the Sea of Stories firmly as an allegory of the conflict between India and 
Pakistan over Kashmir, interprets this as “[t]he text [speaking] back to and 
[inverting] the Orientalized politics of Coleridge’s poem very explicitly by 
introducing a parliament building into the Great Khan’s private gardens”.46  “The 
despotic Orient of the Romantic period,” he continues, “is now displaced by the 
bungling bureaucracy of modern and democratic India”.47   
 I would argue, however, that beside this familiar gesture of self-conscious 
(and therefore apparently playful or ironic) Orientalism, Rushdie is also using this 
Romantic lens to evoke the “delightfully disputatious” culture that he equates with 
both eighteenth-century Europe and his middle class, “secular Islamic” upbringing in 
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 Daniel Roberts, “Rushdie and the Romantics: Intertextual Politics in Haroun and the Sea of 
Stories”, Ariel 38, no. 4 (2007): 123-142, 128; Rushdie, Haroun, 88. 
46 Roberts, “Romantics”, 128. 
47 Roberts, “Romantics”, 128. 
158 
 
Bombay.
48
  The three buildings that Rushdie introduces can in fact be read as 
marking Gup City as an orientally-inflected occidental space.  The triumvirate of 
royal palace, parliament, and government office suggests that Gup is a constitutional 
monarchy – an implication borne out by the comic asides made by Guppees about 
the largely ceremonial function of their royal family (“‘After all,’ Iff the Chief Water 
Genie whispered to Haroun… ‘it’s not as if we really let our crowned heads do 
anything very important around here’”).49  Gup City is an idealised cosmopolis, its 
waterways “thronged with craft of every shape and size, all packed with Guppee 
citizens, who were similarly diverse”, and yet there is no mention of any place of 
worship.
50
  This is a hybrid society run along the lines of a British democracy, with 
the secularism of post-Revolutionary France.  And whilst the Arabian Nights are an 
integral part of Gup’s literary world, and indeed instrumental to its representation as 
the embodiment of a nation where freedom of speech reigns absolute, it becomes 
increasingly apparent as the novel wears on that this is a vision of The Arabian 
Nights which has almost lost touch with the Islamic world from whence it first came. 
In the Pleasure Garden, Haroun noticed large numbers of Guppees of an 
extraordinary thinness, dressed in entirely rectangular garments covered 
in writing.  “Those,” Iff told him, “are the famous Pages of Gup; that is 
to say, the army.  Ordinary armies are made up of platoons and regiments 
and suchlike; our Pages are organised into Chapters and Volumes. Each 
Volume is headed by a Front, or Title, Page…”51 
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On closer examination, Haroun realises that written on the garment of each Page is a 
story, each starring Bolo, the prince of Gup: “[o]ne Page wore the tale of ‘Bolo and 
the Wonderful Lamp’; another, ‘Bolo and the Forty Thieves’.  Then there was ‘Bolo 
the Sailor’, ‘Bolo and Juliet’, ‘Bolo in Wonderland’”.52  His friend the Page 
Blabbermouth, herself wearing the tale of “Bolo and the Golden Fleece” explains 
that the Princess Batcheat has had “all the greatest stories in the world rewritten” 
onto the Pages, with her beloved Bolo as the hero.
53
  This bibliographical army, 
emblematic of the forces of literature, history, and learning ranged against the 
deathly monism of Khattam-Shud (and, as I shall illustrate, the heart of Rushdie’s 
vision of a free (speech) society) is literally covered in references to The Arabian 
Nights – and yet the tales of Aladdin, Ali Baba, and Sinbad, whilst the most 
abidingly popular stories from the The Arabian Nights in the West, are precisely the 
narratives that Galland added to the original collection of texts that came into his 
possession. 
 The fable-world of Kahani is not – despite its Hindi-Urdu-Arabic 
nomenclature – a necessarily Eastern space (though, significantly, it does offer 
Rushdie a similar sense of safety and imaginative distance as the Oriental locale 
offered eighteenth-century satirists), it is an allegory of the divided globe.  It is a 
globe divided according to the precepts of the late eighteenth-century 
characterisation of the Islamic East as a zone of stagnation; Scheherazade’s life-
giving narrative is now literally the province of the Occident.  It is a globe upon 
which a geo-political battle is being fought between a despotism that looks very 
much like Rushdie’s vision of Islam, and an ideology that looks very much like 
Rushdie’s vision of the Enlightenment. 
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Haroun, Islam, and the Enlightenment 
Again, parallel to the critical reception of The Satanic Verses in the Rushdie Affair, a 
popular interpretative manoeuvre amongst many left-wing commentators has been to 
read Haroun and the Sea of Stories as a celebration of Islamic cultures, and even 
Islam itself.  Taken to their extremes – as with Aron R. Aji’s scholarly  “‘All Names 
Mean Something’: Salman Rushdie’s Haroun and the Legacy of Islam” – this can 
entail removing questions of East and West, Orient and Occident, from consideration 
at all.
54
 For Aji, Haroun and the Sea of Stories is one lengthy meditation on Islam: 
“[t]he fairy tale’s celebration of stories and storytelling, going back to The Arabian 
Nights,” he claims, “allows us to align the text with Islam’s cultural tradition, while 
the characterizations and setting descriptions in Haroun also compel us to recall core 
concepts of doctrinal Islam”.55  He reads the multiplicity of the story sea and the 
hybridity of Gup as representative of cultural diversity within the Islamic world, and 
Khattam-Shud as Iblis, or Satan.  “Iblis’s method,” he explains, “forments relativism 
and doubt, thus serving to annihilate the Absolute Oneness (Wahdad al-Vujud) of 
God’s universe”.56  Whilst Aji’s analysis makes some suggestive points and his 
assertions about the pluralism of the cultures of Islam are well taken, his reading of 
Haroun and the Sea of Stories as the triumph of oneness over relativism is, I would 
argue, an inversion of the text’s doctrine of disputational multiplicity over doubt-free 
singularity.  Beyond this, I would suggest, the foe that Haroun and the armies of Gup 
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must face is a figure steeped in the negative imagery and ideology which Rushdie 
associates with Islam in his pre-fatwa novels. 
 Khattam-Shud “is the Arch-Enemy of all Stories, even of Language itself.  
He is the Prince of Silence and the Foe of Speech” – the very incarnation of 
censorship.
57
  Not only is he clearly being figured in terms of Khomeini, but in the 
same anti-literary rhetoric with which Mahound the poet-silencer is portrayed in The 
Satanic Verses.   
The Land of Chup has fallen under the power of the “Mystery of 
Bezaban”, a Cult of Dumbness or Muteness, whose followers swear 
vows of lifelong silence to show their devotion… In the old days the 
Cultmaster, Khattam-Shud, preached hatred only towards stories and 
fancies and dreams; but now he has become more severe, and opposes 
Speech for any reason at all.  In Chup City the schools and law-courts 
and theatres are all closed now, unable to operate because of the Silence 
Laws… Bezaban is a gigantic idol… It is a colossus carved out of black 
ice, and stands at the heart of Khattam-Shud’s fortress-palace, the 
Citadel of Chup.
58
  
Not only does this vision of Bezaban and the censorship-crippled society vividly 
recall the Imam and the Submission of Jahilia sections from The Satanic Verses, but 
the language Rushdie uses is strikingly reminiscent of that he uses to describe the 
God of Islam in Midnight’s Children: “that God who had been named after a carved 
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idol in a pagan shrine built around a giant meteorite: Al-Lah, in the Qa’aba, the 
shrine of the great Black Stone”.59 
  My emphasis throughout this chapter has been upon the stark 
presence of Rushdie’s vision of despotic Islam at large in the complex allegory of 
Haroun and the Sea of Stories.  Similar to the way in which zones of Islamic 
wrongdoing overlap in Rushdie’s representation of Peccavistan in Shame, however, 
in this text Chup’s oppressive society is partly a refraction of Pakistan, indicated by 
the presence of the (P)artition built by the Guppees.  This implies both a Britishness 
and an Indianness to the Guppees: British due to the hand of the retreating imperial 
power which drew the line of Partition across the Subcontinent, and Indian by virtue 
of the states’ proximity to one another.  The Manichean binaries of the text’s 
discursive battleground are etched onto the surface of the story moon by the Guppee-
built wall which bisects it into permanent hemispheres of light and dark – rendering 
the Land of Gup literally a state of Enlightenment..  “Thanks to the genius of the 
Eggheads at P2C2E House… the rotation of Kahani has been brought under control. 
As a result the Land of Gup is bathed in Endless Sunshine, while over in Chup it’s 
always the middle of the night”.60  This despotic manoeuvre brings a note of unease 
to the representation of a land which is otherwise shown almost entirely in a 
celebratory light.  It is an unease compounded, though subtly, by the enigma of 
Gup’s machinery of government.  However comically they are depicted, processes-
too-complicated-to-explain suggest a government of secret machinations and 
mystification at odds with a land that seems otherwise to enjoy an Enlightened 
public sphere.  This would suggest that the Gup aspect of the allegory of Haroun and 
the Sea of Stories is not simply a celebration of mongrelization taking place within a 
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Western-inflected secular zone of freedom, or indeed a meditation on what Roberts 
terms the “bungling bureaucracy of modern and democratic India”.61  Just as The 
Satanic Verses did, this text engages with more than one form of despotism.  The 
despotisms in this text are presented as far more uneven than they were in The 
Satanic Verses, however: here, Islamic despotism is represented as a force dark 
enough to make the shady political dealings of the liberal West seem almost light.   
 
This part of the allegory is anchored in the non-Kahani sequences of the novel, in 
Rashid and Haroun’s journey to the Dull Lake in “Kache-Mer”62.  Once again, 
Kashmir is represented as a broken mongrel paradise, this time enmeshed in the 
corruption of the politician Snooty Buttoo.    
 Guppee society is the vibrant, chaotic embodiment of a freedom of speech 
completely untrammelled by any constraints, its loveable citizens in constant, 
amiable disagreement, and showing no respect for authority.  When Haroun sees the 
freedom with which members of the Guppee army insult their general, he muses “if 
any soldiers behaved like this on earth, they would be court-martialled quick as 
thinking”.  “But but but what is the point of giving persons Freedom of Speech,” 
Butt the Hoopoe replies, “if you then say they must not utilize same? And is not the 
Power of Speech the greatest Power of all? Then surely it must be exercised to the 
full?”63  The Land of Gup is not an allegory of an Actually Existing West, it is a 
vision of a land governed according to the precepts of a familiar series of abstracts: 
equality, liberty, and fraternity.  The Land of Gup is the heartland of the fictitious 
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Enlightenment that Rushdie was to invoke so many times over the course of the next 
twenty years. 
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Chapter 6 
The Enlightenment Affair 
 
I just felt this is much bigger than me: it’s a fight that’s been going on for 
hundreds of years. And, oddly, many people, including me, thought it was over 
– that this battle against religion for free expression was something that the 
Enlightenment finished 200 years ago. Then here I am in another episode of 
this fight. And I thought, I’m not going to be the one who caves in, because it 
matters too much.
1
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. “[M]e and the two Voltaires”: Christopher Hitchens and Salman Rushdie 
with a bust of Voltaire, 13
th
 April 2011.
2
 
 
                                                          
1 Rushdie, “Salman of Knowledge”, Irish Times, September 22, 2012, accessed November 22, 2012, 
http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/weekend/2012/0922/1224324252366.html . 
2 Image by Michael Zilkha, salmanrushdiearchive.com, accessed December 9, 2012, 
http://salmanrushdiearchive.com/tag/enlightenment/ . Caption quotation, Rushdie, “Christopher 
Hitchens, 1949 – 2011” Vanity Fair, February 2012, accessed November 30, 2012, 
http://www.vanityfair.com/culture/2012/02/rushdie-on-hitchens-201202 , 2. 
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In his February 2012 obituary of Christopher Hitchens for Vanity Fair, 
Rushdie writes with emotion of the way in which the furore of the fatwa drew the 
two men together.  “I have often been asked,” he says, “if Christopher defended me 
because he was my close friend. The truth is that he became my close friend because 
he wanted to defend me”.3  As Hitchens “leapt unbidden into the fray”, attacking 
John le Carré for his criticism of Rushdie, he became deeply embroiled in the Affair, 
outstripping other supportive voices from the ranks of the intelligentsia to become, 
so the rhetoric goes, almost a twin voice for the embattled author. 
He and I found ourselves describing our ideas, without conferring, in 
almost identical terms. I began to understand that while I had not chosen 
the battle it was at least the right battle, because in it everything that I 
loved and valued (literature, freedom, irreverence, freedom, irreligion, 
freedom) was ranged against everything I detested (fanaticism, violence, 
bigotry, humorlessness, philistinism, and the new offense culture of the 
age). Then I read Christopher using exactly the same everything-he-
loved-versus-everything-he-hated trope, and felt … understood.4 
Though clearly a heartfelt testimony of grief for a much-loved friend, this obituary 
also functions as a reiteration of Rushdie’s fatwa story as newly standardised by 
Joseph Anton, which was by this point approaching the final stages of publication.  It 
is preceded, at least in the archived online version, by a photographic portrait of 
Hitchens taken by Gasper Tringale and, inset at an intimate, family-photo-album 
angle, the image of Hitchens and Rushdie posing with a bust of Voltaire reproduced 
above.  Though separated from Rushdie’s account of their oneness in their response 
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to the fatwa by an account of – and excuse for – Hitchens’s flirtation with the George 
W. Bush administration, the image of the two friends on either side of Voltaire 
returns to conclude the piece. 
On his 62nd birthday—his last birthday, a painful phrase to write—I had 
been with him and Carol and other comrades at the Houston home of his 
friend Michael Zilkha, and we had been photographed standing on either 
side of a bust of Voltaire. That photograph is now one of my most 
treasured possessions: me and the two Voltaires, one of stone and one 
still very much alive. Now they are both gone, and one can only try to 
believe, as the philosopher Pangloss insisted to Candide in the elder 
Voltaire’s masterpiece, that everything is for the best “in this best of all 
possible worlds.” 
It doesn’t feel like that today.5 
Complex patterns of self-positioning are clearly visible here, in both text and image.  
In a piece that centres so pointedly on the intellectual and ideological similitude of 
Rushdie’s and Hitchens’s stance in the well-rehearsed clash of “literature, freedom, 
irreverence, freedom, irreligion, freedom” with “fanaticism, violence, bigotry, 
humorlessness, philistinism, and the new offense culture of the age,” the 
characterisation of Hitchens as Voltaire becomes an implicit but powerful self-
portrait.
6
  Rushdie’s physical stance in the photograph underlines this (tacit) 
statement of kinship with the philosophe: where Hitchens faces the camera squarely, 
his face ambivalent, Rushdie assumes precisely the same three-quarter view angle as 
the bust – his right shoulder tucked firmly behind Voltaire – his lips quirked in an 
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exact replica of the sculpture’s, his expression knowing.  Even the description “one 
of stone and one still very much alive,” coming as it does at the end of a eulogy, sets 
up an uncanny layering of (self-)representation, with the dead–living figures of 
Rushdie, Hitchens, and Voltaire overlapping and shimmering in and out of one 
another.
7
  The final, rather puzzling, invocation of Pangloss’s relentlessly satirised 
idealist refrain from Candide ends the piece on a yet more unsettling note; a 
(presumably) satirical reference to a satirical leitmotif, queasily replicating Voltaire’s 
satirical manoeuvre by parenthetically demanding us to imagine what the sceptical 
Hitchens would have made of it, to infer what Rushdie himself thinks of it, and to 
position ourselves as readers in relation to it.  Unsettling it may be, but it acts as a 
final blurring of the boundaries between the three thinkers: a knowing trinity, 
conjoined in a prism of humorous rationalism.  
 The irony which haunts this act of self-fashioning is that the more Rushdie 
has come to identify with – and as – Voltaire, the less like the historical Voltaire he 
has become.  The marked proximity between the two authors that I charted in my 
reading of Mahomet and The Satanic Verses in Part II – the complex patterns of 
opprobrious likening between Islamic and “Western” despotisms – have given way 
to a much less subtle axis of approval and opprobrium in Rushdie’s writing.  
Voltaire, over the course of his long life, was at least as “chameleon” in his writings 
as we saw Rushdie describe Talleyrand as being in his politics.
8
 Rushdie has 
dehistoricised Voltaire, just as we will see him dehistoricise Islam.  He has moved 
from active engagement with historical Enlightenment discourses to rehearsals of a 
series of myths of the Enlightenment.  In a 1992 speech to the International 
Conference on Freedom of Expression in Washington DC, Rushdie asserted that 
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blasphemy and heresy, far from being the greatest evils, are the methods 
by which human thought has made its most vital advances.  The writers 
of the European Enlightenment, who all came up against the 
stormtroopers at one time or another, knew this.
9
 
 In this rhetoric of philosophes versus stormtroopers lies the seeds of a 
flirtation with the Hitchens-inflected discourse of Islamofascism that comes 
increasingly to mark his view of the West’s relationship with the Islamic East.10  The 
everything-he-loves versus everything-he-hates binary that he so celebrates and 
identifies with in Hitchens is worlds away from the multivalent historical 
engagement with Islam that characterises Rushdie’s early writings and the writings 
of Voltaire and his contemporaries.  Indeed, look back at the photograph of “the 
three Voltaires” above in the light of the eighteenth century’s dialectical 
engagements with Islam, and the Voltaire in the middle of the trio seems almost 
embarrassed by his companions.  Rushdie’s relationship with Islam is moving away 
from self-reflexivity, towards an increasingly totalising Self/Other binary.  Indeed, 
his visions of Islam and himself are becoming mutually exclusive.   
  
The Enlightenment of the Rushdie Affair 
 Whilst the Hitchens obituary might constitute one of Rushdie’s more startling 
assertions of kinship with an “Enlightenment” philosophe, it is by no means the first.  
From the earliest years of the fatwa, selective (self-)identification with eighteenth-
century thinkers and the deployment of an essentialised view of the Enlightenment 
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 Rushdie, “from a speech to the International Conference on Freedom of Expression, Washington, 
DC, April 1992”,  Step Across, 232-233. 
10 See Hitchens, “Defending Islamofascism”. 
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has been a key manoeuvre for both Rushdie and his supporters.  Less than a month 
after the proclamation of the fatwa on Valentine’s Day 1989, the New York Times 
published responses from “28 distinguished writers born in 21 countries… [spoken] 
to him from their common land - the country of literature”.11  Among them was a 
message from Mexican author Octavio Paz: “We are seeing a disappearance of the 
modern values that came with the Enlightenment. These people who condemn you 
are living before the Enlightenment. We are facing a historical contradiction in our 
century”.12  In “One Thousand Days in a Balloon”, published in 1991, Rushdie 
himself writes “[o]ne day they [Muslims] may agree that – as the European 
Enlightenment demonstrated – freedom of thought is precisely freedom from 
religious control, freedom from accusations of blasphemy”.13  A year later, in a 
speech to the International Conference on Freedom of Expression in Washington 
DC, he asserted that 
It was because of his nervousness of the power of the Church, not of the 
State, that Voltaire suggested that it was advisable for writers to live in 
close proximity to a frontier, so that, if necessary, they could hop across 
it into safety.
14
 
Later in the same text, he identifies with “Denis Diderot, the great novelist-
philosopher of the French Enlightenment”, and the “dispute within him between 
aesthetic, materialistic rationalism and a profound need for spiritual and moral 
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depth”, quoting an undated fragment of a letter to Sophie Volland.15  This view of 
Diderot seems significantly more nuanced than the invocations of Voltaire that 
increasingly come to litter his texts, a suggestion perhaps that in the early years of 
the fatwa Rushdie’s notion of Enlightenment retains the same self-reflexive subtlety 
as his inter-cultural critique.  It is also likely that Rushdie’s more nuanced historical 
invocations of Enlightenment and eighteenth-century thinkers in the early years of 
the fatwa were influenced by the bicentenary of the French Revolution in 1989. 
Diderot is name-checked, as is The Nun (sometimes more grandly, as we have seen, 
as La Religieuse), in several subsequent texts, and yet his name never attains the 
talismanic importance that is attached to Voltaire’s (despite the fact that the only 
mention of a specific Voltaire text I can find is the somewhat opaque Candide 
reference above).
16
  The curious telescoping of Enlightenment thinkers into Voltaire 
is neatly encapsulated by an aside of Rushdie’s in an interview with Jack Living: “I 
found myself reading Enlightenment writers—Voltaire—and realizing that I was not 
the only writer who’d had a hard time”.17  Self-reflexivity is replaced with 
autobiographical self-identification – an unhistorical appeal to history, or to myth in 
historical dress. 
These invocations of the Enlightenment and its thinkers are some of the first 
utterances in a dialogue between the Rushdie Affair and the eighteenth century that 
continues to gather strength to this day on both sides of the Secular West/Islamic 
East battle lines.  Neatly summarized by Claes Kastholme’s essay “The Crime of 
Silence”, a powerful historiography of freedom of speech as the “child of the 
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European Enlightenment” in general, and the child of Voltaire in particular, has been 
woven in to the fable of the fatwa:  
A straight line runs from the 18
th
 century vision of the free enlightened 
human being to the finest flower of western culture, the United Nations 
Declaration of Human Rights, adopted on 10
th
 December 1948.  Article 
19 of the Declaration states: “Everyone has the right to freedom of 
opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions 
without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and 
ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers”.18        
          “The Crime of Silence” is one of a collection of essays published by the 
Nordic Council in defence of Rushdie and his Scandinavian publishers, and this 
“straight line” of thought runs through all of them, “clearly and solidly formulated by 
Voltaire”, as Kastholm says: “I do not agree with what you say, but I will defend 
your right to say it to the death”.19  “Democratic relativism”, Alse Kleveland, 
Norway’s then Minister of Culture, tells us, “means that we allow those with 
differing views the same rights as we allow ourselves.  That we defend the rights of 
others to say something with which we disagree, to paraphrase Voltaire’s classic 
maxim”.20   Voltaire “is the very personification of the Enlightenment,” and “it is 
Western Enlightenment itself that is threatened by ethnic nationalism and the 
fundamentalist exercise of religion”.21 
Although Kleveland quotes from the opening of the entry on tolerance from 
Voltaire’s Dictionnaire Philosophique (“What is tolerance?  It is the prerogative of 
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humanity.  We are all frail and given to making mistakes.  So let us forgive one 
another’s acts of foolishness; that is the first law of nature”), it is this “classic 
maxim” of his – the one she paraphrases and Kastholm quotes – that forms the heart 
of this story of Western Enlightenment, and thus Western democracy, and thus 
Western selfhood.  I do not agree with what you say, but I will defend your right to 
say it to the death.  It is the principle at the centre of practically every single defence 
of Rushdie, whether directly referred back to Voltaire or not.  And yet Voltaire never 
said or wrote these words.  Surely one of the most widespread of apocryphal 
quotations, it in fact stems from a misreading of a 1906 biography The Friends of 
Voltaire, written by S. G. Tallentyre (Evelyn Beatrice Hall), in which she coins the 
phrase as a loose, first-person summary of the writer’s attitude towards Helvetius in 
the furore following the publication of De L’esprit in 1758.22 
The apocryphal nature of this central tenet renders it all the more appropriate 
as emblem of the discourse of Enlightenment-as-freedom-of-speech-as-West: 
parallel to the “phantasmagorical simplifications” Aravamudan notes taking place in 
discussions of the novel at the heart of the furore are essentialising myths about East, 
West, and the Enlightenment.  The temporal-cultural disjunction of Paz’s bald 
“historical contradiction” (itself the product of Marxist stadial notions of history 
which grew out of the late eighteenth-century discourses of historical and 
civilizational progress), subtly echoed by the play of tenses in statements from 
Rushdie like “[o]ne day they may agree that – as the European Enlightenment 
                                                          
22 “What the book could never have done for itself, or for its author, persecution did for them both. 
‘On the Mind’ became not the success of a season, but one of the most famous books of the 
century. The men who had hated it, and had not particularly loved Helvétius, flocked round him 
now. Voltaire forgave him all injuries, intentional or unintentional. ‘What a fuss about an 
omelette!’ he had exclaimed when he heard of the burning. How abominably unjust to persecute a 
man for such an airy trifle as that! ‘I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death 
your right to say it,’ was his attitude now.” S. G. Tallentyre, The Friends of Voltaire (London: John 
Murray, 1906), quoted in ed. Elizabeth Knowles, What they Didn’t Say – A Book of Misquotations 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 55. 
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demonstrated…” (their modal future is our simple past), has set the tone for a 
discourse that makes both Secular West and Islamic East the product of a mythical 
Enlightenment.
23
  As an identity is created for the Secular West on the unsteady 
fictional foundations of a mingled ideological and historical myth of origin, the 
Islamic East, as Clement Hawes and others have suggested, is constructed in its turn 
as the historical and ideological Other of that self, forced to converse – or at least 
protest – across the rift of history.  And in protesting against the terms of this 
discursive manoeuvre, the Islamic East has frequently shored up the construction of 
an Enlightenment-determined West, positioning itself in terms of processes of 
cultural and historical Othering like Orientalism in such a way that discourses are re-
inscribed as they are critiqued.  Hawes describes this in terms of a strategy for 
“constructing oneself, in the name of some tradition or fundamentalism, as the 
inverted mirror-image of the ‘West’” and goes on to argue that 
This familiar nativist gesture often forces anti-imperial opposition to 
repeat that historical fallacy which annexed science and rationality as the 
essence of an ahistorical “West.” Thus glib attacks on the Enlightenment, 
whether postmodernist or neo-traditionalist, often merely invert the 
values of Eurocentric historiography without challenging its fundamental 
premise.
24
 
The misleading emphasis that Rushdie places on the secularism of Enlightenment in 
such assertions as “[i]ntellectual freedom, in European History, has mostly meant 
freedom from the restraints of the Church, not the State” becomes another dominant 
strand of this historiography, again centred on a simplified idea of Rushdie’s 
                                                          
23 “Words for Salman Rushdie”; Rushdie, “One Thousand”, Homelands, 432. 
24
 Clement Hawes, “Leading History by the Nose”, 164. 
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favourite philosophe: “[t]his is the battle Voltaire was fighting”.25  As Michel 
Foucault points out, the idea of freedom of speech or “parrhesia” has been by no 
means separable from State control since the time of Euripides:  
[M]ost of the time the use of parrhesia requires that the parrhesiastes 
know his own genealogy, his own status; i.e., usually one must first be a 
male citizen to speak the truth as a parrhesiastes. Indeed, someone who is 
deprived of parrhesia is in the same situation as a slave to the extent that 
he or she cannot take part in the political life of the city.26  
The complex negotiations between freedom of expression, and patterns of 
interlinked political and religious suppression that have marked the Western history 
of the discourse from its outset, are completely elided, reducing it to a battle between 
writers and religion in which the State is at worst a slightly oppressive onlooker, and 
at best a flag-waving secularist cheering its intellectuals on.27  Defences of the 
Islamic East in the Rushdie Affair have frequently centred on this aspect of the 
Western-Enlightenment narrative – consonant with the strategy outlined by Hawes 
above – with texts like Ziauddin Sardar and Merryl Wyn Davies’s Distorted 
Imagination: Lessons from the Rushdie Affair identifying the death of God in the Age 
of Reason as the defining moment for both Western selfhood and the irrevocable 
divergence of the Islamic World from that self. 
                                                          
25 Rushdie, “Imagine There’s No Heaven”, Step Across, 157. 
26 Michel Foucault, Discourse and Truth: The Problematization of Parrhesia, ed. Joseph Pearson 
(Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University, 1985), accessed  November 11, 2012, 
http://foucault.info/documents/parrhesia/. 
27 For useful accounts of the history of freedom of speech and its constant (re)definition in terms of 
political and religious climates, see Robert Hargreaves, The First Freedom: A History of Free 
Speech (Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 2002); David A. Copeland, The Idea of a Free Press: the 
Enlightenment and Its Unruly Legacy, (USA: Northwestern University Press, 2006); and the 
introduction to Charles Walton, Policing Public Opinion in the French Revolution: The Culture of 
Calumny and the Problem of Free Speech (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
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For Muslims, the context is provided by secularism, its history, and its 
rise as the dominant worldview.  In a secular world, where religion is 
relegated to personal preference and minor matters of conscience and 
where God has been killed, people who take their religion seriously 
appear not only out of step with modern times but quite abnormal.  Their 
actions are judged against the backdrop of a bloody conflict between 
organised religion and forces of reason and liberty that has nothing to do 
with their own history.  The secularization of European history and 
religion is one where gains have been secured after an intense physical, 
political, and intellectual war.  Understanding secularism and its history 
is, therefore, the prerequisite for Muslims to make themselves 
understood; it is also the prerequisite for their survival as Muslims.
28
  
Using the same emotive rhetoric of survival and extinction as we saw at play in the 
essays collected in Freedom of Expression: the Acid Test, Sardar and Davies 
consolidate the Enlightenment as the locus of destructive – even fatal – global 
cultural difference: the key figure in a mirror image of the conflict invoked by 
Rushdie and Hitchens. 
 The terrible irony of this stance – what Garcia, paraphrasing Archbishop 
Rowan Williams, calls “the imaginary opposition between Islam and Enlightenment” 
– is becoming more and more apparent in recent scholarship on eighteenth-century 
relations between Islamic and European worlds.
29
  It seems significant that the 
Enlightenment to which Rushdie appeals so frequently in the years after the 
publication of The Satanic Verses and the declaration of the fatwa is so firmly 
                                                          
28
 Sardar and Davies, Distorted Imagination, 3. 
29 Garcia, Islam, 223. 
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centred around the French Enlightenment and the philosophes.  As I suggested in my 
introduction, this may be the result of the philosophe-centric historiographies of 
Enlightenment by scholars like Hampson and Gay that came out during his study of 
history at Cambridge in the late 1960s, which stage the Enlightenment in terms of a 
conflict between thinkers like Diderot, Rousseau, and Voltaire, and the Monarchy 
and the Church.   Far from viewing eighteenth-century doctrines of secularism as a 
point of departure between Islam and Europe, Garcia uncovers a powerful narrative 
of “the emergence of Islamic-inspired secularization in eighteenth-century 
Britain”.30  And, beyond the arena of British Protestantism, Voltaire himself – later 
in the same entry from the Philosophical Dictionary that we saw Kleveland quoting 
from above – celebrates the state-enforced religious tolerance of the Islamic world: 
“[l]ook at the great Turk, he governs Guebres, Banians, Greek Christians, 
Nestorians, Romans.  The first who tried to stir up tumult would be impaled; and 
everyone is tranquil”.31  Indeed, in his Treatise on Tolerance (1763) – a text that 
must rank alongside Candide and the dictionary as one of Voltaire’s most influential 
works, certainly as far as historiographies of a continental Enlightenment go – 
Ottoman religious tolerance is hailed as even more of an exemplar for European 
states: 
Let us reach out of our narrow little sphere for a moment, and examine 
what goes on in the rest of the globe.  The Turkish prince, for example, 
rules peacefully over twenty races of different religious conviction; two 
hundred thousand Greeks live in Constantinople in perfect safety, and the 
Mufti himself nominates and presents the Greek patriarch to his emperor; 
                                                          
30 Garcia, Islam, xi (my emphasis). 
31 Voltaire, Philosophical Dictionary, ed. and trans. H. I. Woolf, (New York: Dover Publications, 
2010), 303. 
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there is even a Roman Catholic patriarch living there… This empire is 
stuffed with Jacobites, Nestorians, Monothelites, Coptics, Christians of 
St John, Jews, Gebers and Banians.  The annals of Turkey bear no record 
of a revolt raised by any of these religious communities. 
 Go to India, to Persia, to Tartary, and you will find the same evidence 
of tolerance and mutual respect.
32
  
As we have seen, this engagement between European and Islamic modes of thinking 
and governance has been submerged and almost entirely forgotten in the totalising 
historiographies of Islam and West that found voice in Huntingdon’s Clash of 
Civilizations, and the Rushdie Affair.
33
  The history of religiously and culturally 
hybrid Islamic societies, incompatible with the powerful figure of the 
un(E)nlightened, absolutist Muslim despot that emerged towards the end of the 
eighteenth century, was written over by dominant Western historiographies to the 
point where defenders of conservative Islamic responses to The Satanic Verses like 
Sardar and Davies almost obscure it further by replicating the Western-centric terms 
of “a conflict between organised religion and the forces of reason and liberty that has 
nothing to do with their own history”.34    
 Once more, the early history of Islam is at the centre of this process – the 
same history which we have seen Rushdie and Voltaire exploit to explore semi-
abstracted notions of despotism and absolutism, and which, through Garcia, we have 
seen eighteenth-century and Romantic-era writers configure as a time of republican 
                                                          
32 Voltaire, Treatise on Tolerance, trans. Brian Masters (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 
2000), 20-21. 
33 “Islam’s borders are bloody and so are its innards. The fundamental problem for the West is not 
Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam, a different civilisation whose people are convinced of the 
superiority of their culture and are obsessed with the inferiority of their power.” Samuel P 
Huntingdon, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1996), 50. 
34
 Sardar and Davies, Distorted Imagination, 3. 
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promise.  In twentieth-century historiographies of Islam such as Maxime Rodinson’s 
influential Marxist study Muhammad (1968) and then in 1990s accounts of religio-
cultural incommensurability like Bernard Lewis’s “The Roots of Muslim Rage”, the 
separation of state and religion within the Islamic world becomes an impossibility – 
due to the very same notion of Muhammad as legislator that is so central to 
eighteenth-century British Protestantism and to Voltaire.
35
  This view (perhaps 
inevitably, as Rodinson occupied a similar niche in the study of Islamic history when 
Rushdie was at Cambridge as Peter Gay did in eighteenth century studies) is central 
to both The Satanic Verses’s representation of the birth of Islam, and Rushdie’s early 
writings in the teeth of the fatwa.  Indeed, in his journals from the time he was 
writing The Satanic Verses, Rodinson’s Muhammad is the only source he quotes 
amongst his notes for what will become the Jahilia dream sequences.
36
  “[F]rom the 
earliest times,” he writes in “In God We Trust”, 
we see in Christianity a willingness to separate Church and State, and 
admission that such a separation is possible and maybe even desirable.  
In the world of Islam, no such separation has ever occurred at the level of 
theory.  Of all the great sacred texts the Qu’ran is most concerned with 
the law, and Islam has always remained an overtly social, organizing, 
political creed which, again theoretically, has something to say about 
every aspect of an individual life.
37
 
                                                          
35 Maxime Rodinson, Muhammad, trans. Anne Carter (London: Tauris Parke, 2002); Bernard Lewis, 
“The Roots of Muslim Rage”, The Atlantic, September 1, 1990, accessed October 12, 2013, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1990/09/the-roots-of-muslim-rage/304643/.  See 
also Bernard Lewis, What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response (Oxford 
and New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
36 Rushdie, Journals, Box 212, Folder 9, 1985, Salman Rushdie Papers, Manuscript, Archives, and 
Rare Book Library, Emory University, 138. 
37 Rushdie, “In God We Trust”, Homelands, 380. 
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Encoded in this – what purports to be a “neutral” historical account of the birth of a 
religion – is the same preoccupation with Islam as the despotic enemy of tolerance 
and individualism (“It was as if no aspect of human existence was to be left 
unregulated, free”) that I have charted in The Satanic Verses, and yet this is a point 
in Rushdie’s post-fatwa career in which his cultural critique is still operating on a 
more-or-less Voltairian level of inter-cultural likening.
38
  Timothy Brennan holds 
that Rushdie’s opposition to Conservative Britain – articulated in the Mrs Torture 
sections of The Satanic Verses – remained central to his politics, but had to be 
submerged in his prose for tactical reasons after the fatwa was declared in 1989 and 
he was forced to rely on the British state for personal protection.
39
  This is not 
articulated in Joseph Anton, perhaps because it would interfere too much with the 
image of a free-thinker unbowed by gross political pressures that Rushdie is so keen 
to create (and which he may consider already undermined by his temporary avowal 
of faith in “Now I Can Say, I Am a Muslim” in the December of 1990). It does, 
however, still seem a reasonable assumption.  In “In God We Trust” his account of 
Islam is balanced, almost evenly in terms of column inches, with a critique of the 
West – this time as America – and the rise of fundamentalist Christianities in the 
face of a “crisis of liberalism”.40  “In its way, the religious fundamentalism of the 
United States is as alarming as anything in the much feared world of Islam”.41  
Argued, or re-argued, a year after the publication of Francis Fukuyama’s seminal 
essay “The End of History”, asserting the universal triumph of Western liberal 
democracy, this “crisis of liberalism” is brought about, in Rushdie’s narrative, by the 
                                                          
38 Rushdie, Verses, 363-364. 
39 See Brennan’s “Nativism” in Brennan, Wars of Position: The Cultural Politics of Left and Right 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2006) 65-92. 
40 Rushdie, “In God We Trust”, Homelands, 391. 
41 Rushdie, “In God We Trust”, Homelands, 389. 
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crumbling of the USA’s belief in the idea of progress.42  What emerges is a vision of 
struggling nation-states on either side of the secular/religious divide: India, Pakistan, 
Iran, Poland, the United States, all simultaneously created and destabilised by the 
overlapping and yet oppositional forces of religion and politics.   
 Where this essay differs significantly from the discourses of The Satanic 
Verses, is that it espouses a self-consciously Saidian account of the vilification of 
Islam by the West – a doctrine that looks suspiciously like the liberal discourse 
protesting Islamophobia that Rushdie was to attack so furiously in his later writings.   
 
Rushdie’s Islams 
 Rushdie’s relationship with and conception of Islam has undergone 
remarkable changes over the course of his career.  Whilst this thesis does not aim to 
add substantively to the vast volume of literature already generated in and about the 
Rushdie Affair, it seems apposite here briefly to chart his political and ideological 
trajectory with regard to Islam in the years following the fatwa.  “In God We Trust”, 
a 1990 reworking of an 1985 essay, offers a commingling of an old academic interest 
in Islam derived from his study of the early history of the religion at Cambridge, and 
the first instance of the impassioned rhetoric of self-defence sparked by the 
proclamation of the fatwa.  His Rodinson-inflected account of Muhammad’s life 
quoted above is folded into a liberal narrative of Western monolithicisation of 
discrimination against Islam: 
                                                          
42 Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?”, The National Interest (Summer 1989).  See also 
Fukuyama’s book-length study, The End of History and the Last Man (Illinois: Free Press, 1992). 
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The sloganizing of the term “Islam” by the West in recent years has been 
extensively examined by Edward Said in his book Covering Islam.  What 
“Islam” now means in the West is an idea that is not merely medieval, 
barbarous, repressive and hostile to Western civilization, but also united, 
unified, homogenous, and therefore dangerous: an Islamic peril to put 
beside the Red and Yellow ones.  Not much has changed since the 
Crusades except that now we are not even permitted a single, leavening 
image of a “good Muslim” of the Saladin variety.  We are back in the 
demonizing process which transformed the Prophet Muhammad, all 
those years ago, into the frightful and fiendish “Mahound”. 
Whereas – and, like Said, I must make clear that it is no part of my 
intention to excuse or apologize for the deeds of many “Islamic” regimes 
– any examination of the facts will demonstrate the rifts, the lack of 
homogeneity and unity characteristic of present-day Islam.
43
 
It is difficult, with the double-authorship of pre- and post-fatwa Rushdies, to pin 
down his ideological position here with any clarity, but it is tempting to read this text 
as spanning a gap between earlier, more liberal accounts of the difficulties faced by 
migrants in the West, and the growing sense, gathering force from The Satanic 
Verses and through the first years of the fatwa, of Islam as Other to Western 
concerns rather than semi-semblable.  Sneaking into his Saidian portrayal of Islamic 
victimisation is the self-justifying reference to the naming of The Satanic Verses’ 
Muhammad-figure “Mahound” (a move which, as we saw in the preceding section, 
he inadequately attempts to gloss as a participation in the transformative reclaiming 
of opprobrious naming), as well as the reference to Saladin, here signifying the 
                                                          
43 Rushdie, “In God”, Homelands, 383. 
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historical figure celebrated by both Christendom and Islam, but subtextually 
underlining the cross-cultural naming of one of The Satanic Verses’s protagonists.   
 “In God We Trust” and its companion piece “In Good Faith” are notable for 
their emphasis on the non-unified nature of Islam.  Indeed, in “In Good Faith” 
Rushdie very deliberately distances his attackers and detractors from the main body 
of Islam: “many Muslims up and down the country find it embarrassing, even 
shameful, to be associated with such illiberalism and violence”.  Beyond this, he 
renders them part of the same anti-Islamic movement that he described, via Said, in 
the passage quoted above: “I have never given the least comfort or encouragement to 
racists; but the leaders of the campaign against me certainly have, by reinforcing the 
worst racist stereotypes of Muslims as repressive, anti-liberal, censoring zealots”.44  
He twice makes appeals – in the same words – to “that great mass of ordinary, 
decent, fair-minded Muslims” who, he says, “have provided much of the inspiration 
for [his] work” and whom he begs “not to let Muslim leaders make Muslims seem 
less tolerant than they are”.45  Filtered into this appeal are the beginnings of 
Rushdie’s self-identification as a secular Muslim, examined in the previous chapter, 
which come into full bloom in “One Thousand Days in a Balloon” written the 
following year (“Islam doesn’t have to mean blind faith.  It can mean what it always 
meant in your family, a culture, a civilization… open-minded… delightedly 
disputatious”).46  The impression we are left with is that Islam is not a unified entity: 
there is a “bad Islam”, which is to say fundamentalist, which is the province of 
“Muslim leaders” and a “good Islam”, which is represented by the benevolent 
                                                          
44 Rushdie, “Faith”, Homelands, 411. 
45 Rushdie, “Faith”, Homelands, 395, 413. 
46 Rushdie, “One Thousand”, Homelands, 435. 
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Muslim masses and which – the implication goes – is not so much religious as 
cultural or civilizational.
47
   
 In Faith and Knowledge, Jacques Derrida writes 
Our common “culture”… is more manifestly Christian, barely even 
Judaeo-Christian.  No Muslim is among us, alas… just at the moment 
when it is towards Islam, perhaps, that we ought to begin by turning our 
attention.  No representative of other cults either.  Not a single woman!  
We ought to take this into account: speaking on behalf of these mute 
witnesses without speaking for them, in place of them, and drawing from 
this all sorts of consequences.
48
  
In response to this absence of Islam, he suggests the notion of “the Abrahamic” as a 
means of reconsidering the pervasive, problematic tendency to consider Europe as 
Greco-Roman, Christian, and secular.  By “unsettling” this identity, as Garcia points 
out, “the Abrahamic resists the West’s cultural, political, and linguistic monopoly 
over prophetic history”.49  This offers the possibility of a recuperation of history 
beside, beneath, and beyond the bi- or tripartite patterns of religio-historiographical 
division that produce and promulgate narratives of Otherness.  This is a possibility 
that lurks tantalisingly in the wings of The Satanic Verses, but is precluded by the 
text’s preoccupation with a specifically Islamic prophet: with recitation rather than 
                                                          
47 This is a common move in Islamophobic discourses.  See, for example, Mahmood Mamdani, Good 
Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror (London: Pantheon Books, 
2004) and Andrew Shryock ed., Islamophibia/Islamophilia: Beyond the Politics of Enemy and 
Friend (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2010). 
48 Jacques Derrida, “Faith and Knowledge: The Two Sources of ‘Religion’ at the Limits of Reason 
Alone” in Religion, ed. Jacques Derrida and Gianni Vattimo (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1996), 1-78, 5. 
49 Garcia, Islam, 1. 
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pan-Abrahamic revelation.
50
  Nevertheless, the sense of convergence between forms 
of religious and political despotism in both Rushdie’s fiction and non-fiction in the 
pre- and early-fatwa years speaks of a sense of cross-cultural and -religious 
universality of experience when it comes to oppression. 
 Almost all of this is to be contradicted in Rushdie’s post-9/11 rhetoric – both 
in the essays immediately following the attacks on the twin towers and in the 
retrospective gaze of Joseph Anton – but the most significant divergence is 
exemplified by an italicised sentence in the middle of “In Good Faith”, and a 
phenomenon Rushdie comes to term “Actually Existing Islam”.  “The responsibility 
of violence lies with those who perpetrate it… There is no conceivable reason why 
such behaviour should be privileged because it is done in the name of an affronted 
religion”.51  In “One Thousand Days in a Balloon”, he tells us, “I… found myself up 
against the granite, heartless certainties of Actually Existing Islam, by which I mean 
the political and priestly power structure that presently dominates and stifles Muslim 
societies.  Actually Existing Islam has failed to create a free society anywhere on 
Earth”.52 
 It is at this point that I must collapse the post-fatwa, post-9/11, and present-
day Rushdies into one another for a moment.  Whilst Joseph Anton is a valuably 
complete account of the fatwa years, featuring large sections of the published post-
fatwa non-fiction writings as well as detailed information and snippets of 
conversation clearly recorded in his journals at the time, it is also, as I have 
indicated, a work of retrospective self-fashioning couched firmly in terms of 
                                                          
50 See Louis Massignon on revelation and recitation in “The Three Prayers of Abraham” (1923), in 
Testimonies and Reflections: Essays of Louis Massignon, trans. Allan Cutler, ed. Herbert Mason 
(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989): 3-20. 
51 Rushdie, “Faith”, Homelands, 411. 
52 Rushdie, “One Thousand”, Homelands, 436-437. 
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Rushdie’s post-9/11 political agenda.  In it, he writes of attending a meeting of the 
Parliament of Writers in Strasbourg in 1993, where he met Jacques Derrida. 
He soon realised that he and Derrida would not agree about anything.  In 
the Algeria session he made his argument that Islam itself, Actually 
Existing Islam, could not be exonerated from the crimes done in its 
name.  Derrida disagreed.  The “rage of Islam” was driven not by Islam 
but by the misdeeds of the West.  Ideology had nothing to do with it.  It 
was a question of power.
53
 
Adapted from the phrase “actually existing socialism” itself saturated with negative 
connotations of despotic soviet regimes in the Eastern Bloc, “Actually Existing 
Islam”, when it makes its appearance in “One Thousand Days in a Balloon”, marks a 
starkening in Rushdie’s view of the separation between (despotic) Muslim leadership 
and (oppressed) Muslim people.  It recalls and re-contextualises his assertion in “In 
God We Trust” about the intrinsic inseparability of state from religion in Islam – 
recasting what was couched in neutrally scholarly terms as a point of societal 
difference into a searing polemical assertion of the impossibility of freedom in an 
Islamic state.  It is difficult to say whether this speaks of unspoken prejudice lurking 
beneath the 1990 text, a residual mid-eighties distance from the material at hand, or a 
shift in political outlook in the year between the publication of the two texts.  
Certainly the phrase “he made his argument” in the Joseph Anton account of the 
1993 meeting suggests that by this point the notion had become an intrinsic part of 
his stance on Islam, or at least that is how it seems to him now.  Most significantly, 
the distance between Islam as an ideology, despotic Islamic leaders, and oppressed 
Islamic peoples has been collapsed by the point of his encounter with Derrida.  The 
                                                          
53 Rushdie, Joseph, 438. 
187 
 
idea that “[t]he responsibility of violence lies with those who perpetrate it” has now 
been completely overturned:  violence committed in the name of Islam is no longer 
to be distinguished from Islam itself and considered the work of wrongful 
individuals, it is now to be linked inseparably to Islam.  And this is not an Islamic 
world that is to be considered as operating dialectically (even in the violent dialectic 
of war) with the West.  This is a consolidated, fundamentally abhorrent entity.  
Indeed, the notion of an Islamic world – an Islamic East – has been stripped of its 
geo-political borders and collapsed into an abstract: Islam. 
 This tendency crystallised further – and only found full voice in his published 
writings – after the attack on the World Trade Centre.  In his essays which followed 
9/11, this conception of an ideologically, politically, culturally, and geographically 
consolidated Islam is ranged against a “West” into which, as we have seen, abstracts 
such as freedom of expression, freedom of imagination, freedom, and Enlightenment 
had been telescoped.  In “Not About Islam?” he writes that Islam, for the vast 
majority of Muslims, stands for “the fear of God … the sequestration … of their 
women,” and a “loathing (and fear) of the prospect that their own immediate 
surroundings could be taken over – ‘Westoxicated’ – by the liberal Western-style 
way of life”.54  Where the pre-9/11 Rushdie had been careful – at least in public – to 
temper his anti-fatwa rhetoric with assertions that “the great mass” of Muslims were 
“ordinary, decent, fair-minded,” for the post-9/11 Rushdie “fair-minded” Muslims 
had become the minority, and liberalism was intrinsically Western
55
.  Statements 
naming “the authority of the United States… the best current guarantor of… 
freedom,” and declaring that “to oppose the spread of American culture would be to 
take up arms against the wrong foe,” in an uneasy cultural-geographical transposition 
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or collage, render the USA the new location of Rushdie’s continental vision of 
Enlightenment: the new Gup.
56
   
 Beyond any of this, the move in Joseph Anton to vilifying the notion of 
Islamophobia moves Rushdie the furthest away from his philosophe ideal.  
Something new was happening here: the growth of a new intolerance.  It 
was spreading across the surface of the earth, but nobody wanted to 
know.  A new word had been created to help the blind remain blind:  
Islamophobia.  To criticise the militant stridency of this religion in its 
contemporary incarnation was to be a bigot.  A phobic person was 
extreme and irrational in his views, and so the fault lay with such persons 
and not with the wide belief system that boasted over one billion 
followers worldwide.  One billion followers could not be wrong, 
therefore the critics must be the ones foaming at the mouth.  When, he 
wanted to know, did it become irrational to dislike religion, any religion, 
even to dislike it vehemently?  When did reason get redescribed as 
unreason? When were the fairy stories of the superstitious placed above 
criticism, beyond satire?
57
 
Rushdie’s vision of the Enlightenment, whilst not specifically referenced here, 
resonates beneath the repeated invocation of his watchwords – reason, unreason, 
superstition and satire.  It is a final, even shocking, move away from the discourses 
of intercultural tolerance that he had propounded, in diminishing measures, through 
the 1980s, 1990s, and even into the early twenty-first century.  The Saidian 
awareness of the vilification of Islam that still glimmered in his early-fatwa rhetoric 
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has now not only been extinguished, but rendered illogical – reactionary and 
extremist.  The Voltaireian doctrine of tolerance (“I may not agree with what you 
say…”) which lit and shaped early responses to the fatwa from Rushdie and his 
supporters has become, bizarrely, a call to arms for the intolerance of tolerance.  The 
gap between Rushdie’s vision of himself as the new Voltaire and the philosophe 
credentials of his literary output have been stretched to breaking point. 
 
Joseph Anton: Philosophe? 
In the final pages of Joseph Anton, Rushdie launches a final, impassioned paean to 
the power of literature: 
This is what literature knew, had always known.  Literature tried to open 
the universe, to increase, even if only slightly, the sum total of what it 
was possible for human beings to perceive, understand, and so, finally, to 
be.  Great literature went to the edges of the known and pushed against 
the boundaries of language, form, and possibility, to make the world feel 
larger, wider, than before.  Yet this was an age in which men and women 
were being pushed towards ever narrower definitions of themselves, 
encouraged to call themselves just one thing, Serb or Croat or Israeli or 
Palestinian or Hindu or Muslim or Christian or Baha’i or Jew, and the 
narrower their identities became, the greater was the likelihood of 
conflict between them.  Literature’s view of human nature encouraged 
understanding, sympathy and identification with people not like oneself, 
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but the world was pushing everyone in the opposite direction, towards 
narrowness, bigotry, tribalism, cultism, and war.
58
 
Literature, then, is the pathway to inter-cultural accord – beyond that, to the Derrida-
like dissolution of harmful and arbitrary religious, political, and cultural boundaries 
between people.  Literature is the road to universal (E)nlightenment, a panacea 
offering the antidote to oppression and, ultimately, a kind of humanist apotheosis.  
Noble as this sentiment is, Joseph Anton as a wider text raises worrying questions 
about who has the ability – even the right – to access this humanist paradise.  The 
trope of literature versus Islam which we saw burgeoning in Haroun and the Sea of 
Stories, in the previous chapter, has found full voice in the memoir long before this 
final idealist meditation.  “The love of literature,” we are told, “was a thing 
impossible to explain to his adversaries, who only loved one book, whose text was 
immutable and immune to interpretation, being the uncreated word of God”.59  Not 
only is Islam antithetical to literature but, crucially, Muslims are constitutionally 
unable to practice literary criticism – that is to say, they cannot read properly.  As 
Zoë Heller points out in her review of Joseph Anton in The New York Review of 
Books,  
[i]n a departure from the standard, liberal notion that literature must be 
free to offend, he proposes that literature, properly 
understood, cannot offend. Muslims who were insulted by The Satanic 
Verses were guilty of a category error: just like Anis Rushdie, in his 
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“unsophisticated” reading of Midnight’s Children, they had confused 
fiction with other sorts of speech…60 
This comes down once more to Rushdie’s vision of the early history of Islam.  In a 
speech at the University of California, Santa Barbara, in 2008, amidst another 
invocation of the idea of a battle for the Enlightenment – this time, tellingly, with the 
US-oriented (and mathematically questionable) “the French Enlightenment 200 years 
ago, out of which this country was founded” – he dwells on the specifically Islamic 
resistance to literary interpretation: 
“Islam is the only religion born inside a political culture,” he told the 
USCB audience. “If the Quran is written by God (as conservative 
Muslims believe), than that becomes irrelevant.” The practical meaning 
of that interpretation, he said, that what is written in the Quran can’t be 
changed.  “You can’t edit God,” Rushdie said, eliciting laughter from the 
audience. 
In Christianity, he said, man is presumed to be created in the image of 
God, so the Bible is theoretically open to interpretation.  Since the Quran 
is not open to change, Rushdie said, it leads to political tyranny, 
intellectual stagnation and collapse.
61
 
This appeal to a vision of the foundational precepts of Islam as anti-literary renders 
his argument in Joseph Anton that there is a dark Islamic “project: the stifling of 
heterodoxy and dissent” – even a “global Islamic assault on free thinkers” – a matter 
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of historical and cultural inevitability.
62
  Literary ability, either to read or write, is 
stripped from any Muslim thinker whom Rushdie sees as hostile: a scant six pages 
after the above indictment of Islam’s stifling of dissent, he describes the way in 
which  
the Independent, which was becoming a sort of house journal for British 
Islam, carried an article by the “writer” Ziauddin Sardar who said, “The 
best course for Mr Rushdie and his supporters is to shut up.  A fly caught 
in a cobweb does not draw attention to itself.”  The fly in question called 
the editor of that newspaper to tell him he would no longer write reviews 
for its book pages.
63
   
What is especially notable here is not merely the hypocrisy of Rushdie’s attempts to 
smother dissent from his own position, but the inverted commas around the word 
“writer”.  Sardar, seen by Rushdie to be writing from inside the envelope of Islam, is 
to be denied even the name of “writer”, for literariness and Islam are mutually 
exclusive.  Similarly, a few pages earlier, Tariq Modood is deprived of his eligibility 
to be considered a thinker by being glossed as an “intellectual” in inverted 
commas.
64
  Rushdie has come to police the borders of an exclusively Western 
province of freedom of speech. 
 
The Accidental Philosophe  
 In a speech at the 2012 India Today Conclave replicated almost precisely in 
Joseph Anton, Rushdie declaimed: 
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At the time of the European Enlightenment in the 18th century, the great 
writers and intellectuals of that movement, Rousseau, Voltaire, 
Montesquieu, Diderot, knew that their real enemy was not the state but 
the Church. Earlier, when the mighty Rabelais was under fire from the 
Church, it was the King of France who defended him on the grounds of 
his genius. What an age that must have been, in which a writer could be 
defended because of his talent! After Rabelais, the 18th century writers 
of the Enlightenment insisted that no Church, even a Church with an 
inquisition at its disposal, could be allowed to place limiting points on 
thought. The so-called crimes of blasphemy and heresy were the targets 
because those were the methods used by the Church to limit discussion; 
and the modern idea of free speech was arrived at by defeating the notion 
that these were offences and that these could be used as ways of 
silencing expression.
65
 
This movement towards a benevolent dictatorship founded upon principles of erudite 
literary appreciation marks, perhaps, an inadvertent move back towards the 
worldview of the philosophes – one less consonant with the idea of figures like 
Voltaire as mouthpieces for republicanism, universal freedom of speech, and the 
rights of man which more frequently characterises Rushdie’s notion of the 
Enlightenment.  As Robert Hargreaves writes of the philosophes,  
[f]ew of them believed in democracy – Voltaire repeatedly referred to the 
common people as a “rabble” and on the whole put his trust in an 
enlightened and educated monarchy, his ideal being a “benign despot” 
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like his friend Frederick the Great.  Freedom, in which he passionately 
believed, would be imposed from above by the few enlightened men who 
were capable of thinking for themselves.  Free speech was reserved for 
the educated elite, and still considered to be too dangerous to entrust to 
the masses.
66 
 In 2003, as we have seen, Said remarked of Rushdie that “[t]here’s a greater 
disconnect between his non-fictional prose and his fiction, now, than there was in the 
decade of the 1980s”.67  In the conclusion to this thesis I examine this widening gulf, 
which Rushdie would have us believe is a move away from the politicised fictional 
text towards a form of politically engendered, yet apolitical, aesthetics.  Certainly, 
with its idealised representation of the Mughal emperor Akbar, The Enchantress of 
Florence seems to speak of a yearning for the days – or at least the idea – of the 
Enlightened despot.  It is a far cry from his 1980s and 1990s war cries of “Outside 
the Whale”, and yet I would argue that what Rushdie bills as his retreat from the 
political into history could be the means by which we might recuperate possibilities 
of positive intercultural engagements – both within Rushdie’s oeuvre and within the 
wider, and even more conflicted, political and cultural arena in which it sits. 
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Conclusion  
Back to the Future: History as Futurity in The 
Enchantress of Florence  
 
 What we are seeking to know is a portion of human history.  It is not a 
 history of the  past, however, but a history of future times, i.e. a predictive 
 history.
1
 
 
 Writing amidst the mass slaughter of the Second World War, Max 
Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno turned to history in search of a cause for the near-
global descent into violence that took place over the first half of the twentieth 
century – famously settling, in Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944), on an idea 
associated with the eighteenth century.  Twenty-two years later, Adorno wrote that: 
After the catastrophes that have happened and in view of the catastrophes 
to come, it would be cynical to say that a plan for a better world is 
manifested in history and unites it… No universal history leads from 
savagery to humanitarianism, but there is one leading from the slingshot 
to the megaton bomb.2 
9/11, the catastrophe with which this century opened, was described by Rushdie as 
“the worst-case scenario [come] true”.3  As we have seen, it marked a turning point 
in Rushdie’s view of inter-cultural relations: a polarising of his conception of Islamic 
East and Secular West that surpassed even the impact of the fatwa.  In “Not About 
Islam?” he distances his position from Samuel Huntington’s clash-of-civilisations 
                                                          
1 Emmanuel Kant, An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment? trans. H. B. Nisbet (London: 
Penguin Books, 2009; 1784), 67. 
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thesis only in so far as “the Islamists’ project is not only turned against the West and 
‘the Jews,’ but also against their fellow-Islamists”, citing tension between the Taliban 
and Iranian regimes.4   
 The pessimism and despair of this maelstrom of rhetoric is reminiscent of 
another author writing amidst “the appalling manifestations of politics-gone-wild”, 
George Orwell.5  In his 1984 essay “Outside the Whale”, Rushdie challenges the 
fatalistic doctrine of political quietism Orwell expresses in “Inside the Whale”, but is 
sympathetic to the bleakness of the historical moment he was writing in.  “I do not 
blame him”, he says, “[h]e lived in the worst of times”.6  If, in the 1980s, the war of 
Orwell and Adorno seemed the worst of times, with Rushdie’s assertion in 2001 that 
on 9/11 the “worst-case scenario came true” it seems that he found himself at a 
similarly catastrophic point of global crisis.  Whilst his next novel, Shalimar the 
Clown in 2005, marks a turn away from the apocalyptic journalistic outpouring of 
the immediately post-9/11 years, back to familiar questions of communalism, 
globalism, and the deforming effects of religion in general, there can be no doubt, as 
I suggested in my introduction, that it is a text born out of the ashes of the twin 
towers.   
 After these dark years, in which one mongrel space after another is destroyed 
by monophilic despotism, The Enchantress of Florence is one long celebration of 
“hybridity, impurity, intermingling, the transformation that comes of new and 
unexpected combinations of human beings, cultures, ideas”.7  If the mongrelization 
passage from “In Good Faith” was disingenuous about The Satanic Verses, it could, I 
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would suggest, be applied to his 2006 novel with complete accuracy.  “It rejoices in 
mongrelization and fears the absolutism of the Pure”. The Enchantress of Florence 
“is for change-by-fusion, change-by-conjoining.  It is a love-song to our mongrel 
selves”.8  Notably, however, in this text Rushdie’s ideals of mongrelization are 
embodied partly in the figure of an oriental despot: the Mughal emperor Akbar.   
 This conclusion does not mark an ending so much as an unfolding: it 
examines Rushdie’s return to history in this, his self-proclaimed most historical 
novel, as a means of recovering the possibilities of his earlier visions of a joined-up 
world.  It investigates the possibility that this novel is what Kant, in the epigraph to 
this chapter, terms “a predictive history”9. As Catherine Cundy and Nicole M. 
Gyulay have pointed out, Haroun and the Sea of Stories is the only text in which we 
see the triumph of hybridity, with the commingling of the cultural hemispheres of 
Gup and Chup.10  Cundy posits that this is because of its genre, that writing a fantasy 
tale for children allows Rushdie the kind of “wish-fulfilment” denied to him by his 
adult fiction: what Roger Young Clark terms “an escape from the real-world threats 
of dogma and fatwa”.11  It seems significant that The Enchantress of Florence, 
written in the wake of a similar crisis-point (though admittedly not so soon after), 
should constitute a similar break from the rest of his canon – both ideological and 
generic. If Haroun was an escape into fantasy, and the childhood world of happy 
endings, Enchantress is a return to history – a far more potent destination in terms of 
Rushdie’s inter-cultural discourse.   
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 The Enchantress of Florence is set in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth 
centuries – a tale of two journeys across the world culminating in inter-cultural 
penetration, one the West-to-East voyage of a mysterious yellow-haired storyteller 
from Florence to Fatehpur Sikri, the capital of the Mughal emperor Akbar, and one 
the East-to-West journey of the beautiful Mughal princess and enchantress Qara Koz, 
from India to Florence.  Whilst he may side-step the issue of the text’s direct 
involvement with contemporary politics in interviews, the narrative that Rushdie 
weaves again and again about the genesis of the book is telling.  Setting out to create 
a fictive encounter between the two golden ages taking place simultaneously in India 
and Europe, he tells successive interviewers that “the more I read about these two 
worlds, having set out thinking that I was bringing together two worlds that had very 
little in common with each other, I discovered that they were actually almost mirror 
images of each other”.12 
 Bearing in mind his self-professed near-lifelong fascination with these twin 
Renaissances, this tale of a discovery of similitude seems likely to be just that – a 
typical example of Rushdie’s appetite for a good story and, perhaps more cynically, 
its marketing power.  Certainly the text’s emphasis on cultural mirroring is not slow 
to make its appearance, with the emperor Akbar’s early infatuation with “his female 
mirror image” Elizabeth I.13  And we are not quite a third of the way through the 
book before its central thesis of universalism is boldly stated in italics: “This may be 
the curse of the human race... Not that we are so different from one another, but that 
we are so alike”.14  Florence and Fatehpur Sikri are both bustling cosmopolises, 
hybrid communities full of a Babel of “half-understood tongues”, and “pomaded 
                                                          
12
 Rushdie, in Ramona Koval, “The Book Show”, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, April 21, 
2008, accessed 7 March, 2010,  http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/bookshow/salman-
rushdies-enchantress/3268052. 
13 Rushdie, Enchantress, 74. 
14 Rushdie, Enchantress, 137. 
199 
 
exotics, weather-beaten merchants [and] narrow-faced priests”, recalling his 
representation of pre-Islamic Jahilia in The Satanic Verses, discussed in the second 
chapter.15  Fatehpur Sikri is home to Hindus, Persians, Turanis, and Indian-born 
Muslims, and the very whorehouses of Florence are hybrid communities of “wild 
Slav harlots... melancholy Polish doxies... loud Roman strumpets... thick German 
tarts... [and] Swiss mercenaries as ferocious in bed as their male counterparts were 
on the field of battle”.16  As the citizenry of Fatehpur Sikri become obsessed with the 
traveller’s tales of “the drink-sodden daily life and sex-crazed nocturnal culture of 
far-away Florence”, so the Florentines fall under the spell of the Mughal princess, “a 
princess not only of faraway Indy or Cathay, but of our own Florence too”.17  Not 
only are they mirror images of each other but, with a more requited passion than 
Akbar’s for Elizabeth, his mirror-queen, the two cities fall in love.  “We are their 
dream,” one of the emperor’s queens tells him, “and they are ours”.18 
 Though his humanist musings are paralleled by Machiavelli’s in Florence, 
Akbar’s internal monologues about selfhood, religion, and society are Rushdie’s 
primary vehicle for his own doctrines of secularism, freedom of speech and 
hybridity.  “In the heart of his victory city he would build a house of adoration”, the 
emperor decides, “a place of disputation where everything could be said to everyone 
by anyone on any subject, including the non-existence of God and the abolition of 
kings”.  He wants, we are told, “to be able to say, it is man at the centre of things, not 
God... man the angel and the devil, the miracle and the sin... man and always man, 
and let us henceforth have no other temples but those dedicated to mankind”.19  It 
becomes evident, then, that although the novel may be removed in time from the rest 
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of Rushdie’s corpus, it is no less passionately engaged with the contemporary 
discourses at the heart of his oeuvre than any of his other texts.  Indeed, in one 
interview he is prompted to say that: 
The part of this book that deals with ideas — I suppose there is an unsaid 
subtext here, which is that there are such things as universals. There are 
ideas which grew up in the West, and in a slightly different form they 
grew up as well in the East — the idea of freedom, of open discourse, of 
tolerance, of sexual freedom even to the level of hedonism, these are 
things which human beings have come up with as important ideas 
everywhere that there have been human beings. So to say that that we 
must now consider them to be culturally specific... is a denial of human 
nature. If there is an author’s message in this book, it was actually the 
discovery that I made that the worlds of the book were more like each 
other, than unlike.
20
 
The widening gulf between Rushdie’s non-fictional prose and his fiction that we saw 
Said remark upon in 2003 seems to have grown yet wider.21  In The Enchantress of 
Florence and the interviews he gives to promote it, he is not only celebrating cultural 
hybridity as mongrelization in a manner unseen since his pre-fatwa years, he is 
propounding an Enlightenment-inflected doctrine of universalism that seems entirely 
at odds with the stark vision of cultural difference espoused in his non-fiction.   
 This novel marks a return to the themes which have marked both my account 
of Rushdie’s literary and political careers, and the wider cultural discourses going 
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back to the eighteenth century which I have identified at work in relations between 
Islam and West.  Scheherazade, the Eastern female space, the power of narrative, 
heteroglossic hybridity, and monoglossic despotism – all are reconsidered here; all 
are modulated, and yet remain as problematic as they ever were.  But beyond any of 
these returns, I will argue, the most significant characteristic of this novel is the way 
in which it constitutes a powerful return to history.  This return, although it 
presupposes a singular, consolidated history, is a move which in a sense is the mirror 
of my own critical manoeuvre in this study.  Although cautious of Rushdie’s casual 
use of what might be characterised as an Actually Existing past as a means of 
understanding the present, my own sense is that it is through pluralising our ideas of 
history that we can best challenge the monolithic views which so threaten our 
present. 
 
Enlightened Despotism 
 Despotism once more forms the heart of Rushdie’s ideological framework in 
this novel – and yet, far from the hydra-like cross-cultural monster of oppression that 
despotism represents in The Satanic Verses, in The Enchantress of Florence it seems 
to offer not only harm, but a possibility of redemption.  Key to navigating the 
seeming gap between Rushdie’s recent fiction and politics is the nostalgia for the 
idea of the kind of Enlightened despot who defended Rabelais from the Catholic 
church: “What an age that must have been”, we saw him sigh to the India Today 
Conclave in 2012, “in which a writer could be defended because of his talent!”.22  In 
the figure of the emperor Akbar, as we have seen, Rushdie creates a powerful 
mouthpiece for his own views of secular humanism, and yet – perhaps 
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unsurprisingly – this Rushdie figure seemingly also represents the kind of regime 
under which Rushdie himself would like to write.  Akbar surrounds himself with 
philosophers, artists, poets, and musicians.  Not only does he go out of his way to 
find and foster new talent – as with his discovery of the great artist Dashwanth, the 
lowly son of a palanquin bearer – but he involves artists in the very creation of his 
empire, his world.  “So it was Dashwanth whom Akbar summoned when he had his 
idea about undoing his grandfather’s harsh deed and restoring the hidden princess to 
the history of her family at last.  ‘Paint her into the world,’ he exhorted Dashwanth, 
‘for there is such magic in your brushes that she may even come to life, spring off 
your pages and join us for feasting and wine’”.23  In the artists’ studios of Akbar’s 
court, the artistic elite of the empire come together in a hybrid Persian and 
Hindustani community:  
The hero in Dashwanth’s pictures became the emperor’s mirror, and all 
the hundred and one artists gathered in the studio learned from him, even 
the Persian masters, Mir Sayyid Ali and Abdus Samad.  In their 
collaborative paintings of the adventures of Hamza and his friends, 
Mughal Hindustan was literally being invented; the union of the artists 
prefigured the unity of the empire and, perhaps, brought it into being.24 
This performative artistic-historical syncretism recalls one of Rushdie’s few poster-
girls for successful cultural hybridity, as discussed in chapter Four.  Zeeny Vakil 
from The Satanic Verses, is an art critic who writes a book on “the confining myth of 
authenticity, that folkloristic straitjacket which she sought to replace by an ethic of 
historically validated eclecticism, for was not the entire national culture based on the 
principle of borrowing whatever clothes seemed to fit, Aryan, Mughal, British, take-
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the-best-and-leave-the-rest?”.25  Whilst I will return to the significance of Zeeny’s 
retroactive identification of hybridity later in my conclusion, it is important to mark 
the consonance of these moments here: arts and the successful, culturally-hybrid 
state are mutually constitutive.  Indeed, the state-patronised world-building of the 
artists, poets, and musicians of Akbar’s court amounts to the same process as state-
building itself. 
 As Justin Neuman points out in “The Fictive Origins of Secular Humanism”, 
“[t]here is a fundamental, unaddressed tension at the heart of The Enchantress of 
Florence – and indeed in much of Rushdie’s fiction and prose – between his explicit 
and implicit endorsements of secularism, humanism, and pluralism, on the one hand, 
and his equally pervasive argument for the power of fiction on the other”.26  In other 
words, the power of fiction, and particularly fantastical fiction, seems at odds with 
Rushdie’s rationalist views.  Akbar, we are told, is “the Enchanter.  In this place he 
would conjure a new world, a world beyond religion, region, rank, and tribe… An 
emperor was the bewitcher of the real, and with such accomplices his witchcraft 
could not fail”.  The accomplices that will aid him in this act of magical world-
building are “the Nine Stars, the nine most brilliant of the most brilliant” – recalling 
the nine muses – a selection of thinkers and artists from across the empire. Selected 
for special mention, beside geniuses of governance and finance: “[t]he songs of 
Tansen could break open the seals of the universe and let divinity through into the 
everyday world.  The poems of Faizi opened windows in the heart and mind through 
which both light and darkness could be seen”.27  Surrounded by his constellation of 
artistic, philosophical, and political lumières, it becomes clear that it is not only his 
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secular humanist principles that Akbar shares with Rushdie: it is his status as 
enchanter, as a conjuror of worlds.  Of all the many avatars of the author, with his 
god-like ability to transform and invent reality through narrative, which crowd the 
text, Akbar is the most powerful: a poet as acknowledged legislator of the world: 
Queens floated within his palaces like ghosts, Rajput and Turkish 
sultanas playing catch-me-if-you-can.  One of these royal personages did 
not really exist.  She was an imaginary wife, dreamed up by Akbar in the 
way that lonely children dream up imaginary friends, and in spite of the 
presence of many living, if floating, consorts, the emperor was of the 
opinion that it was the real queens who were the phantoms and the non-
existent beloved who was real.  He gave her a name, Jodha, and no man 
dared gainsay him.  Within the privacy of the women’s quarters, within 
the silken corridors of her palace, her influence and power grew.  Tansen 
wrote songs for her and in the studio-scriptorium her beauty was 
celebrated in portraiture and verse.  Master Abdus Samad the Persian 
portrayed her himself… and after this visionary work by the master of 
the emperor’s atelier had been exhibited, the whole court knew Jodha to 
be real… all acknowledged not only her existence but also her beauty, 
her wisdom, the grace of her movements and the softness of her voice.
28
 
Through the powerful fusion of art with more mundane structures of control, 
Akbar’s rule is rendered truly absolute: he is, quite literally, a god-like emperor.  In 
the beginning is his word.   
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 Enlightened he may be, in his commitment to philosophy, the arts, and 
secular humanism, but there is no question that the emperor is a despot.  One of our 
first encounters with him finds him quelling an uprising on the Kathiawar peninsula 
from “a feudal ruler absurdly fond of talking about freedom”. “This time… he had 
irritably torn the insolent Rana’s moustache off his handsome face, and had chopped 
the weakling dreamer into garish pieces – had done it personally, with his own 
sword, just as his grandfather would have”.29  Whilst this episode demonstrates the 
despotic violence Akbar is capable of, however, it also signposts the text’s readiness 
to engage with the kind of questions about progress and universal history we saw 
Adorno answering sadly above.  “History repeats itself,” the young prince says to the 
emperor, as he kneels at his feet, “Your grandfather killed my grandfather seventy 
years ago”.  “Our grandfather,” Akbar replies, “was a barbarian with a poet’s tongue.  
We, by contrast, are a poet with a barbarian’s history and a barbarian’s prowess in 
war, which we detest.  Thus it is demonstrated that history does not repeat itself, but 
moves forward, and that Man is capable of change”.30 
 What makes Akbar perhaps a particularly Enlightened despot in eighteenth-
century terms is not so much the rationalist ideals he propounds, but his status as a 
man in the process of a journey towards (E)nlightenment: “The king was not content 
with being. He was striving to become”.  Not only does Akbar decide to build the 
house of disputation, but “He would teach himself humility in that house.  No, now 
he was being unfair to himself.  Not ‘teach’.  Rather, he would remind himself of, 
and recover, the humility that was already lodged deep in his heart”.31  This is an 
Enlightenment – although never addressed by Rushdie in such specific terms – that 
                                                          
29 Rushdie, Enchantress, 32-33. 
30 Rushdie, Enchantress, 34. 
31 Rushdie, Enchantress, 36. 
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owes much more to Kant’s famous definition than to the unhistorical invocations of 
the philosophes that we have seen in Rushdie’s non-fictional prose. “Enlightenment 
is man’s emergence from his self-incurred immaturity.  Immaturity is the inability to 
use one’s own understanding without the guidance of another”.32  In his 
determination to find enlightenment – and to find it “lodged deep in his heart” – 
Akbar is enacting a process of self-improvement very consonant with late 
eighteenth-century philosophical ideals.
33
  Where the emperor’s process of 
(E)nlightenment is derailed from its Kantian trajectory, however, is that it does in the 
end rely on the guidance of another: the Scheherazadian figure of Mogor the 
storyteller.   
 Akbar is at a point of crisis: “[h]e trusted beauty, painting, and the wisdom of 
his forebears.  In other things, however, he was losing confidence; in, for example, 
religious faith”.  This doubt provides fertile ground for – indeed, is part of – the 
process of enlightenment, and yet what he yearns for is an interlocutor: “[a]bove 
all… I yearn for a young man I can trust”.  Sure enough, “[t]hat very day a yellow-
haired young man was brought before him wearing an absurd long coat made up of 
particoloured leather lozenges, and holding a letter from the Queen of England in his 
hand”.34  Amidst the “constant hubbub” of the Tent of the New Worship, with “the 
kingdom’s finest thinkers gashing one another dreadfully with their words”, Mogor 
triggers silent terror by publicly contradicting the emperor.  When he is warned by 
the crown prince that he could be killed for saying such a thing to the king, Mogor 
replies “If I can die for such a thing in this city… then it’s not a city worth living in.  
                                                          
32
 Kant, What is Enlightenment?, 1 (Kant’s emphasis). 
33 Rushdie, Enchantress, 36. 
34 Rushdie, Enchantress, 59-60.  
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And besides, I understood that in this tent it was reason, not the king, that ruled”.35  
For all the novel’s emphasis on the sixteenth-century doubled East-West provenance 
of secular humanism, the centrality of rhetorics of reason – reason, in fact, 
paradoxically deified (“reason was a mortal divinity”) – to Akbar’s Fatehpur Sikri 
owes a great deal to Rushdie’s broad-brushstroke historiography of the 
Enlightenment as the Age of Reason.
36
  Into this space, in which “[a]rgument itself – 
and no deity, however multi-limbed or almighty – would… be the only god”, Mogor 
strides, “a man of reason who in reason’s name [takes] unreasonable risks”.37   
 Like Scheherazade, his intention is to enchant the emperor with stories – to 
enchant him, and as he does so, enact a form of civilising process.  In this case, as 
Scheherazade did on her arrival in Europe through Galland in 1704, he brings with 
him exotic cultural freight: life-giving narratives of far-away cultures that will be the 
catalyst for new heights of cultural hybridity in Akbar’s capital.  Scheherazade’s 
power returns in full force in The Enchantress of Florence.  No longer is the power 
of narrative used to deform and twist the lives of the oppressed, as we saw it do in 
Shame and The Satanic Verses, no longer is it in a battle for its very survival, as it 
was in Haroun and the Sea of Stories; in this novel, narrative – migrant narrative – is 
the life-blood of the world.  And yet, once again, Scheherazade herself is 
disenfranchised, her narrative power co-opted by men.   
 
Scheherazade Ensnared 
                                                          
35 Rushdie, Enchantress, 79, 81. 
36 Rushdie, Enchantress, 80. 
37 Rushdie, Enchantress, 80, 82. 
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 Woman… is the very sum and matter of my story.38 
 The Enchantress of Florence is the story of a woman told by a man, to a man: 
the female space, contained and constructed by walls of male narrative, is once more 
Rushdie’s central figure.  Beginning on the book’s cover, with the words “The 
Enchantress of Florence [by] Salman Rushdie”, woman after woman is created and 
encased by the minds of men in a structure that is reminiscent not so much of the 
mismatched set of Russian dolls of Shame, but of the infinite, diminishing reflections 
of a hall of mirrors.  The many women of the text all spring from male 
imagination(s).  The God-like force of the author’s imagination as (textual) world-
creating becomes, as we have seen, a metaphor for the world-shaping force of the 
patriarchal imagination.  Women and the female space, therefore, once more occupy 
a metonymic position, each one a synecdochic emblem of the larger forces which 
have constructed them: history, culture and the desires of men.  The women of The 
Enchantress of Florence are both singular and plural, both encompassing and being 
encompassed by multitudes.  This is echoed by the material reality of the book: its 
title implies that it is a single woman, The Enchantress, who contains a world and 
yet, either held open in the hands of the reader or closed on a shelf, amongst other 
books, is of the world.  The female space is still bounded, but unlike the Shame-cage 
it is not a place of stagnation and death, but a zone of possibilities: here, once more, 
we see the harem as liberating as well as constricting.  The individual women of the 
text, whether Eastern or Western, all open out into a single, mystical, “world-
swallowing,” yet “world-swallowed” feminine space.39 
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 Rushdie, Enchantress, 142. 
39 Rushdie, Enchantress, 30; note the reference to Saleem’s repeated assertion in Midnight’s Children 
that “to understand me you have to swallow a world”. 
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 Rushdie uses this conceit in order to propound his doctrine of universalism, 
seeking to elide myths of difference between East and West, and, with a familiarly 
self-reflexive pre-emptive gesture, implicitly invokes the Subaltern Studies 
movement with the central notion of “the theft of [women’s] histories” by men.40  
This gesture is rendered impotent, however, by the fact that the Subaltern Studies 
project is never allowed to come to fruition: the true histories of the women in The 
Enchantress of Florence are never revealed.  Qara Köz, the most significant of all 
the enchantresses in the novel, has her story told for her by Mogor, the 
Scheherazade-supplanter.  Calling himself “Mogor dell’ Amore” (“Mughal of 
Love”), he claims that the princess Qara Köz, youngest sister to Akbar’s grandfather, 
gave birth to him after working her way across Asia to Renaissance Florence by 
enchanting a series of powerful men. The novel alternates between the depiction of 
the traveller’s reception in the imperial court and the Scheherazade-tales he tells of 
his “mother”, which, whilst they spark the Enlightenment of king and court, are 
designed to (vicariously) win the emperor’s love as much as to prove the story 
teller’s credentials as a member of the imperial family.  Qara Köz’s story has no 
parameters but itself, no concrete intersection with a discrete textual reality, and thus 
the reader can never be sure whether the lost princess ever existed outside of a male 
fiction. The portrait of “the enchantress” as a beautiful, empowered woman, it is 
implied, could be merely the mirror of Akbar’s desires held up for him to admire.  
Certainly, by the end of the text Akbar has fallen hopelessly in love with the 
imagined image of Qara Köz, who, as her story has circulated through the court, has 
become a city-wide obsession.  Mogor, with his spellbinding narrative, is not just a 
Scheherazade figure, but another avatar of Rushdie.   
                                                          
40 See, for a seminal example of the Subaltern Studies project, Ranajit Guha’s “Chandra’s Death”, 
Subaltern Studies V: Writings on South Asian History and Society ed. Ranajit Guha (New Delhi: 
Oxford University Press, 1987), 135-165. 
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Imagining Women 
 The figure of the enchantress does not derive its power over the collective 
imagination of Fatehpur Sikri from its newness, but from its status as an exoticised 
avatar of the familiar.  Qara Köz is not the first imaginary woman to walk the halls 
of the Mughal capital: as we have seen, long before the arrival of the traveller, Akbar 
had created his imaginary wife Jodha.  This perfect woman is a hybrid being, a 
composite whole made up of fragments of his other wives, her “limitless beauty… 
from one consort, her Hindu religion from another, and her uncountable wealth from 
yet a third”.41 Having begun life as the abstract fantasy of the emperor, she is given 
flesh by the pens and brushes of the male artists of the court, and gathers reality 
through a multiplicity of male representation until the whole city “knows her to be 
real”.  Qara Köz is similarly “realised” through male representation: Mogor narrates 
her, Akbar imagines her, and Dashwanth “paint[s] her into the world”.42  As she 
enchants the people of Florence in Mogor’s narrative, she enchants the people of 
Fatehpur Sikri, who begin to “dream of her all the time… courtiers as well as 
guttersnipes, sadhus as well as whores”:  
 [She] was becoming all things to all people… she was being used as one of 
those  vessels into which human beings pour their own preferences…their 
unrealized  selves, their shadows.
43
 
                                                          
41 Rushdie, Enchantress, 46. 
42 Rushdie, Enchantress, 28, 120. 
43 Rushdie, Enchantress, 199-200. 
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This “vesseldom” is to be both the enchantress’s fate and the source of her power 
wherever she goes: as she enters Florence, she immediately becomes the city’s “new 
symbol of itself”.44  Qara Köz is a mobile signifier, a shape into which anything can 
be poured, that can be made to represent anything: just as the name “Qara Köz” is 
merely a new term for the vessel of human preference which had been called 
“Jodha” in Fatehpur Sikri, in Florence she is simply the exotic reincarnation of two 
other “enchantresses” who have gone before, Simonetta Cattaneo and the courtesan 
“La Fiorentina”.  Where Qara Köz’s non-threatening “easternness” causes a frisson 
of sexual thrill in her Florentine public, her “Westoxication” is seen by the 
inhabitants of Fatehpur Sikri as “a little shocking but entirely delightful”.45  With the 
equivalence of these responses to her Otherness, Rushdie makes a point of de-
exoticising the exotic, indicating a universal thirst for familiar strangeness which 
dislocates Said’s theory of Orientalism from its Western point of origin and gestures 
towards a fundamental universality of human nature.   
 
Dislocating Orientalism: A Universal Other 
 Women, in The Enchantress of Florence, are the universal Other: whilst Qara 
Köz, Jodha, and the two previous enchantresses of Florence are the receptacles of the 
fantastic, the unknown, of myth, “unrealised selves” and “shadows”, Akbar is the 
embodiment of the empirical, the known, “of all his subjects, of all his cities and 
lands and rivers and mountains and lakes”.46  The projection of (patriarchal) 
society’s abstract fantasy into the passive female interior is an extension of the 
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projection of sexual fantasy into the voluptuous darkness of Aravamudan’s uterine, 
psychosexual harem interior which we met in Chapter Two.  In this, Rushdie’s (self-
professedly) most sexually charged novel, female eroticism is bound up with the 
mysterious and the hidden rather than the corporeal and the known.
47
 The first 
mention of women in the text comes at the end of a long, visceral description of the 
material wealth, “raucousness” and grandeur of Fatehpur Sikri.  Amidst the 
corporeality of the scene comes suddenly a suggestion of otherworldliness: “were 
those women’s voices the traveller could hear on the wind, ululating, teasing, 
enticing, laughing at unseen men?”.48  The perception of women is, from the first, 
half an act of imagination, and the act of imagination is firmly bound up with sexual 
fantasisation.   
 Mogor’s first impression of the women of Akbar’s harem is “fluttering 
movements behind curtained windows and latticed screens”.49  Immediately, the 
machinery of male fantasy clicks into gear and we are told that “[i]n the darkness of 
the windows,” he “imagined that he could make out a host of shining eyes”.50  
Rushdie is once more portraying the harem in the Saidian Orientalist language of the 
voyeur, of insinuation, the reader glimpsing fragments of an imagined interior 
through the same lattice-work screen that s/he first saw the Shakil sisters in Shame.  
Once more, rumours of harem lesbianism permeate the text: when Akbar is away, we 
are told, “[t]he queens lay together and moaned, and what they did to distract one 
another, what entertainment they found in one another in their veiled quarters, will 
not be described here”.51  Not only is the language of the Nishapur sequences of 
                                                          
47 Rushdie, in Muir, “Salman Rushdie”. 
48 Rushdie, Enchantress, 9-10. 
49 Rushdie, Enchantress, 27, 66. 
50 Rushdie, Enchantress, 66. 
51 Rushdie, Enchantress, 29. 
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Shame being repeated but, with the narratorial pattern of assertion through refusal to 
describe, the same old self-reflexive get-out clause as I identified, with Ahmad, in 
Part I. 
 In this novel, however, the cloistered zone of female seclusion and male 
fantasy is not merely an Eastern phenomenon.  Immediately after a description of 
Akbar’s harem, the reader is transported to a courtesan’s palace in Florence, where 
we find a young man catching “a glimpse through an idly opened door of La 
Fiorentina in her private sanctum, reclining on a gilded chaise”.  The language of 
glimpses, voyeurism and “Oriental” splendour is again collocated with rumours of 
lesbianism: the courtesan’s “midget agent,” Giulietta Veronese, is, “some say, also 
[her] Sapphic lover”.52  This western echo of the Mughal harem constitutes another 
piece of Rushdiean double-edged cultural commentary.  On one hand, the very 
drawing of a parallel between the harem and the house of a prostitute is an act of 
classic western-centric “Orientalism”, rendering the Eastern Islamic female domain a 
whorehouse, and the Eastern Islamic woman a whore.  On the other hand, however, 
by using the trope of “Oriental” harem eroticism in relation to certain western female 
spaces, he is making a post-Orientalism gesture towards redistributing the balance of 
agency between East and West, making the East less of a passive object in the 
Saidian discourse of Orientalism, and the West more so.  If the eroticisation of the 
female enclosure is an act practised by Western men on the Eastern harem, it is also 
an act practised by Eastern men on the Western female space.  Problematic to this 
attempt at registering an equivalence of erotic perception and description of the 
woman’s quarter is the fact that the deliberate practise of “Orientalism” I have traced 
in the description of La Fiorentina’s “private sanctum” is a western literary trope 
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used by a western narrator, Mogor.  We must consider his audience, however: his 
description of this western female space is designed to titillate Akbar, which we can 
infer from his enthusiasm for the tale it does.  The eroticism of the sequestered 
female and the mythicisation of her enclosure is, therefore, a phenomenon which 
spans both East and West, a universal male fantasy.   
 
A Zone of Infinite Possibilities 
 We saw Leila Ahmed argue, in the first chapter, that the western definition of 
the harem is as “a system that permits males sexual access to more than one 
female”.53  This is certainly consonant with Rushdie’s representation of Qara Köz 
and Jodha as pinnacles of desirability: as composite women, they are extensions of 
the harem fantasy.  Where matters become more complex, however, is his 
representation of this progression of fantasy as circular, leading back from plurality 
to singularity: the harem fantasy in Enchantress is the fantasy of a single, composite 
woman.  On the one occasion Mogor is invited into the emperor’s harem we are told 
that “[t]he concubines… blended into a single supernatural Woman, a composite 
Concubine, and She was all around the two men, besieging them with love… [t]he 
single woman of many arms and infinite possibilities”.54  We have an echo, here, of 
the Shakil sisters’ many-breasted, many-armed simultaneous plurality and oneness, 
however where they were the monstrous product of oppression, characterised by 
their incarceration, the composite Concubine of Akbar’s harem is a woman of 
infinite possibilities, a figure of universal womanhood.  When Mogor thinks of 
“other women far away and long ago,” the women of Florence, the women of 
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history, he realises that they are “part of the Concubine too”: the harem, the 
marvellous Concubine, the woman, the female space, is a zone that transcends 
temporal, cultural and geographical boundaries.  Transcendent though it may be, 
however, it remains a space delineated by the male imagination: whilst Rushdie uses 
the idea of a universal fantasy of perfect womanhood to erode the myths of 
difference which separate East and West, he seems to be replacing them with a 
unifying myth of universal, libidinous misogyny.  If all the men of the text are linked 
in lustful imagination, women, whilst defined by male desire, are not so 
unproblematically homogenised in passive subjugation. 
 
The Liberation of the Concubine 
 When Qara Köz is liberated from the clutches of her abductor, the “Uzbeg 
warlord”, by the Shah of Persia, she has the choice to return with her sister to the 
Mughal harem.  Rather than return to the tedium of a life of respectable royal 
womanhood, however, she uses her abilities as “a born Enlightened One, who 
instinctively [knows] what to do to protect herself, and also to conquer men’s hearts” 
to seduce her liberator.
55
  In turn, at the downfall of the Shah, she changes allegience 
and becomes the lover of “Argalia The Turk”, a young Florentine who, after being 
kidnapped by Barbary corsairs, had become general to the Sultan of the Ottoman 
Empire.  Qara Köz’s ability to conquer men’s hearts and her progression across Asia 
to the splendours of Florence through the seduction of powerful and influential men 
is strikingly reminiscent of Defoe’s Roxana.  Like Roxana she is a polyglot, learning 
Turkish “almost overnight, or so it seemed,” and intuitively discerning which avatar 
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of “the Concubine” to transform herself into to best capture the hearts of the men she 
uses to further herself.
56
  Her power lies in her ability to manipulate the male 
imagination, to embrace and capitalise on the power of the universal Concubine to 
bend men to her will.  Figured as such, her progression across the globe is a form of 
conquest and her enchantment of Florence a colonisation of the hearts of a people.  
Nevertheless, she is operating within the strictures of a male-delineated world, 
cannily pandering to male desires in order to achieve her own goal – which seems 
merely to be widespread adoration.  Fundamentally, she is manipulating male 
narratives of feminine desirability in order to place herself at the centre of them: 
during her conquest of Florence she tells Argalia “I am just trying to become what I 
have it in me to be,” which is no less (and no more) than the ultimate face of the 
Concubine.
57
  Stripped of the agency her magical powers lend her characterisation, 
Qara Köz would be simply capitulating to – rather than manipulating – male 
narratives. 
 Though she is an almost exclusively male-oriented woman, however, her 
narrative does intersect with other women: as she walks the streets of Florence, 
“making herself visible as no great lady of Florence had ever allowed herself to be”, 
she becomes a symbol of potential liberation to the other women of the city.
58
   
[S]lowly her fearlessness shamed the city’s young women of breeding 
into following her out of doors.  Breaking with tradition, they began to 
come out of an evening to promenade in twos and fours, to the delight of 
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the city’s young gentlemen, who finally had good reason to stay away 
from the bordellos.
59
 
We have, then, an example of Islamic Eastern womanhood teaching freedom to 
western women: though Qara Köz is by no means an example of typical Mughal 
female liberation, Rushdie’s decision to use her as a positive East-to-West catalyst 
for feminism of any kind marks a considerable movement away from any of his 
previous representations of female liberation and/against the East.  I say “feminism 
of any kind” because the positive nature of the liberation she incites in the women of 
Florence is, once more, undercut by the implication that its primary benefit is for 
“the city’s young gentleman”.  Their “delight” we can read as libidinous (and 
possibly financial), as the desequestration of the young women of breeding negates 
their need to go to brothels.  Be that as it may, an Eastern woman has become a 
model for “progressive”, rather than “regressive”, womanhood: a move which 
vividly recalls the proto-feminist orientalist responses which Scheherazade inspired 
on her arrival in Europe in 1704. 
 Indeed, early eighteenth-century representations of the Eastern female space 
– and those of Montagu in particular – reverberate throughout the text, both in terms 
of the opportunities for intercultural feminism that they offer, and their limitations.  
Rushdie’s depiction of the performative representation of Jodha and Qara Köz 
through the art of men echoes Montagu’s ekphrastic ventriloquisation of male artists 
in order to describe the women of the hammam, and the novel’s central conceit of 
female liberation and transcultural (albeit still problematic) equality within a 
representative framework of maleness is effectively a version of Montagu’s 
interpretation of the Eastern female space writ large.  Even Rushdie’s notion that 
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within the (male-centred) feminotopia there is to be found a primal, atemporal, 
transcendent composite woman could be viewed as a libidinous variant of Montagu’s 
perception of “our general mother” (Eve), behind the multiple bodies of the women 
of the hammam.
60
   
 The two accounts of the interior of the eastern female space are 
fundamentally separated, however, by the positions of the authors: Montagu is, 
though briefly, inside writing out, whereas Rushdie is outside writing in.  In another 
familiar gesture of self-reflexivity, this authorial externality is his point.  The 
Enchantress of Florence is, amongst other things, an examination of the process of 
men manufacturing myths of difference between themselves and women, and East 
and West.  The silence of the text’s women as they are created, and their stories 
narrated, by men is intended as an implicit feminist comment on the effacement of 
female voices and the delineation of the role of women by a universally patriarchal 
society.  Like the feminist project of Shame, however, this amounts to an inequality 
described rather than an inequality materially contested.  His cry of “(oh, for the 
voices of Muslim women to be heard!)” from “Not About Islam?” remains firmly 
within the parentheses of Rushdie’s self-consciously male discourse, within the 
parenthetic harem walls of the (now globalised) Eastern female space.
61
  
 
A Predictive History 
 In a 2008 interview, Rushdie spoke of his decision to return to history in The 
Enchantress of Florence: 
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This [period] is the beginning of the engagement between the East and 
the West, this is when India and Europe really first found out about each 
other... I thought, if you're going to look at now, we’re all talking about 
this whole East-West engagement, and how complex it is – in some ways 
very enriching, in some ways very disturbing – let’s go back to the 
beginning, let’s see how this started and maybe... this’ll be interesting.62 
Here, in a break from the publicity material characterising the novel as a retreat from 
the political, Rushdie asserts the importance of examining historical points of 
encounter.  It is curious, however, that he chooses to speak in broad terms of East 
and West – contentious terms that are called into question by the notion of cultures 
flowing into one another – rather than in terms of the encounter between India and 
the West.  By doing so, he skips over the history of the crusades, of the Moors in 
Europe, of the Ottoman Empire – in fact, he skips over much of the history of close 
engagement between Europe and Islamic worlds.  In the context of his promotional 
activities for the novel, this seems like an attempt – if not quite to rewrite history, 
then at least to re-brand it.  For all the fanfare of the unprecedentedly historical 
nature of this Rushdie novel – all the many mentions of the lengthy bibliography it is 
published with, and Rushdie’s humble references to going back to his Cambridge 
training as a historian, this is an imaginative journey into the past which seeks to 
shed light not so much upon what it finds there, but upon the world of the present 
from which it has come.  As Rushdie puts it in the novel, “The past [is] a light that if 
properly directed could illumine the present more brightly than any contemporary 
lamp”.63  This manoeuvre, Rushdie would have us believe, has always been central 
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to his oeuvre and, with the implication that he is the one who should be directing the 
lamp, he renders himself literally the agent of (E)nlightenment.   It is a gesture which 
recalls his claim in Joseph Anton that “his real subject, the one he would worry away 
at for the rest of his life, [is] the great matter of how the world joined up, not only 
how the East flowed into the West and the West into the East, but how the past 
shaped the present while the present changed our understanding of the past”.64   
 The problem is that there is no single impartial lamp of history that can be 
wielded in order to illumine the present: to borrow a phrase from Rushdie, “time 
cannot be homogenised as easily as milk”.65  In its accounts of the ruptures and 
convergences in Rushdie’s engagements with the eighteenth century, this study has 
identified multiple pasts: pasts which he has drawn upon directly, pasts which echo 
un- or partly uttered beneath the textual surfaces of his novels, and pasts which he 
has clung to that never quite happened.  Anyone who wishes to use history as a 
means of illumining the present must choose from a multiplicity of lights, and once 
she has chosen one, she must remember that it can never shine with an impartial 
white light.  Instead, at whichever present she points it, it can only shine with a light 
coloured by her own experiences and ideas.  All this does not prevent it from being a 
worthwhile undertaking, however. 
 The Enchantress of Florence, for all its faults, marks an important realisation 
of the significance of history as a lens through which to consider futurity – 
specifically the futurity, rather than the futility, of positive cultural hybridity in the 
form of mongrelization.  Towards the end of the novel, Akbar is faced with a choice: 
should he adopt the foreign storyteller he loves, and who claims to be his uncle, into 
his family?   
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Would his elevation to high rank result in the empire being blessed, or 
would it, by offending against some dark law of Fortune, bring down 
disaster upon the realm?  Was foreignness itself a thing to be embraced 
as a revitalizing force bestowing bounty and success upon its adherents, 
or did it adulterate something essential in the individual and the society 
as a whole, did it initiate a process of decay which would end in an 
alienated, inauthentic death?66  
This is a familiar Rushdian dichotomy: “mongrelization” vs. “the absolutism of the 
pure” once more.67  In the end, Akbar makes the wrong decision.  He strips the 
storyteller of his privileged access to the royal person, and the man calling himself 
Mogor dell’Amore, The Mughal of Love, leaves the city to its ruin.  As the life-
giving lake, symbol of fluidity and metamorphosis and echo of Haroun’s famous 
story-sea, dries up, Akbar faces the aridity of the future:  
[it] would not be what he hoped for, but a dry hostile antagonistic place 
where people would  survive as best they could and hate their 
neighbours and smash their places of worship and kill one another again 
in the renewed heat of the great quarrel he had sought to end for ever, the 
quarrel over God.  In the future it was harshness, not civilization, that 
would rule.68 
This is a far cry from Haroun and the Sea of Stories’s happy ending and yet, as the 
hybridity and religious tolerance symbolically ebbs away from the once-vibrant 
cosmopolis of Fatehpur Sikri, we are not left with quite the same sense of 
hopelessness that we are at the end of his other novels.  We have seen hybridity 
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work, we have seen the triumph of tolerance, we have watched East and West merge 
and mingle and be enriched. This is different from the frail hope held out to us at the 
end of The Ground Beneath Her Feet that, amidst the ever-more-frequent murders of 
the rai singers and the “pre-impact vibrations” of a possible “Big Crunch”, “ordinary 
human love” will stand its ground.69  Rushdie’s return to history to find, in Florence 
too, but especially in Akbar’s Fatehpur Sikri, a functioning culture of hybridity, of 
disputation, of religious tolerance – indeed, of a kind of secular humanism – is a 
powerful message of hope for our global postcolonial futures.  It is a statement that, 
as his friend William Dalrymple puts it at the end of his 2002 book White Mughals, 
“East and West are not irreconcilable, and never have been.  Only bigotry, prejudice, 
racism and fear drive them apart.  But they have met and mingled in the past; and 
they will do so again”.70 
 As attractive as these visions of the past are, they must be approached with 
caution.  Rushdie’s choice of the sixteenth century as the setting for his fable of 
mongrelized universalism neatly bypasses many of the problems which European 
imperialism presents to the historian in search of an undivided world.  Dalrymple’s 
White Mughals, on the other hand, chooses to write a narrative history of the 
relationship between James Achilles Kirkpatrick, British representative at the court 
of the Nizam of Hyderabad in the late eighteenth century, and Khair un-Nissa, a 
Mughal princess.  Equipped with a cover-quote from Rushdie hailing it as “brilliant 
and compulsively readable,” the blurb on the back of the paperback edition 
prominently states that “Kirkpatrick’s story was not unique.  By his time one in three 
British men in India were living with Indian women, many taking on Indian ways, 
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clothes, habits, and even religions, crossing cultures to become ‘White Mughals’”.71  
“I hope that if I’ve done my work properly it should be quite clear that this has a 
contemporary relevance,” he says in an interview published with the text, 
“…[w]hat’s so strange, I suppose, is that the British in the last ten years or so have 
woken up to the idea of multiculturalism, but this is something that’s a part of our 
history”.72  Indeed, so properly does Dalrymple do his work of creating an 
eighteenth-century Indian exemplar for contemporary global hybridity, that he 
arguably elides much of the dark undercurrent of burgeoning British imperialism 
which lies behind Kirkpatrick’s appointment to the Nizam’s court.   
 There seems to have been, particularly in the years since 9/11, a wider 
movement towards identifying what could be termed pre- and early-colonial cultures 
of hybridity.  Dalrymple’s Begums, Thugs, and White Mughals is another example of 
this, an edition of early nineteenth-century travel writer Fanny Parkes’s accounts of 
her wanderings across the subcontinent, brought out in the same year as White 
Mughals.  She is important, he tells us, “because she acts as a witness to a forgotten 
moment of British-Indian hybridity, and shows that colonial travel writing need not 
be an aggressive act of orientalist appropriation... but instead an act of 
understanding”.73  As Felicity Nussbaum says, eighteenth century studies has, in 
recent years begun to “usefully and intelligently complicate the picture of a unilinear 
progress from Europe outwards”.74  Whilst postcolonial theory has tended to 
conceive of hybridity as a contemporary lens through which to examine twentieth- 
and twenty-first century cultural phenomena such as migration and globalisation, 
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much of the scholarship Nussbaum describes implicitly situates hybridity as a 
characteristic of early- or pre-colonial contact between peoples.  Inevitably, most of 
these historical and critical interventions take place in dialogue with Said’s 
Orientalism, with some critics weighing in with an almost wilful urge to see 
hegemonic motives behind every early point of contact between Europe and another 
culture, and other scholars at times seeming to ignore the possibility of 
acquisitiveness or nascent dominance in cultural encounters of the same period, 
indeed seeming to overlook the patterns of trade and conflict which made the 
encounters possible in the first place.  There are similar moves taking place within 
popular culture, not just in Dalrymple-style popular histories, but in television 
documentaries such as Richard E Grant’s recent “Secrets of the Arabian Nights”.75  
Such attempts to unpick the complex webs of inter-cultural contact and connection 
between early European, Middle Eastern, Asian and African worlds are undeniably 
useful, and offer a valuable and potentially transformative view of our global futures.  
Perilously close to such studies, however, are the many popular history books 
still being published in Britain that justify and glorify the British Empire.  It is 
sobering to note that we still live in an age when the British celebrity journalist 
Jeremy Paxman can write an article in a leading British newspaper which was given 
the headline “Our Empire was an Amazing Thing” and, in a BBC TV series called 
Empire: What Ruling the World Did to the British, walk into a Croquet Club in Cairo 
and ask an Egyptian man, “so what did the British do for Egypt?”.76  This was 
followed, after a long pause during which his interlocutor, Ahmed Hamroush, stared 
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fixedly at the croquet lawn, with an incredulous “did the British really do nothing 
good during seventy years in Egypt?”  Rushdie’s “Outside the Whale” begins with a 
powerful indictment of the Raj revivalism taking place on British cinema and 
television screens in the mid-1980s.  “The creation of a false Orient of cruel-lipped 
princes and dusky slim-hipped maidens, of ungodliness, fire and the sword,” he 
writes, “has been brilliantly described by Edward Said in his classic study 
Orientalism, in which he makes clear that the purpose of such false portraits was to 
provide moral, cultural and artistic justification for imperialism and for its 
underpinning ideology, that of the racial superiority of the Caucasian over the 
Asiatic”.77  In the years since 1984, as we have seen, Rushdie has often 
instrumentalised this very same literary locale, falling into an old-school oriental 
aesthetic which he remains attracted to in spite of the negative charge of racism and 
imperialism it carries.  
As his ideas about Islam have become increasingly intolerant and absolutist 
over the course of his career, the Rushdie of the mongrelized, joined-up world and 
the Rushdie as war leader in the so-called Battle for the Enlightenment have become 
increasingly difficult for critics to reconcile.  In this study I have sought not only to 
illustrate the ways in which these two Rushdies have in fact been in constant 
dialogue with each other, but to show that the discourses mobilised in and around 
Rushdie’s work are part of a long, and too-often neglected dialogue with eighteenth-
century ways of thinking with and about the Islamic East.  Whilst I remain wary of 
accounts of mongrel pasts which elide histories of oppression, distrust, and 
inequality, I must admit that the course of this work has in some ways mirrored 
Rushdie’s move to illumine the present with the past.  By taking the two figures at 
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the heart of harmful Western perceptions of Islamic worlds, the Islamic despot and 
the fundamentally oppressed Muslim woman, and examining their eighteenth-
century European provenances; by folding back into the discourses of the Rushdie 
Affair the forgotten histories which preceded the crystallisation of these figures; by 
shining the light of multiple eighteenth centuries on the monolithic Enlightenment 
that has come to mark Rushdie’s understanding of the present, I have tried to 
contribute towards the dissolution of the damaging binaries which have come to 
mark, and threaten, our world.    
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